BLASPHEMY LAW AND THE MARGINALISATION OF PAKISTAN'S MODERATE MUSLIMS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

In a country where the man in charge of maintaining law and order and fighting Islamic terrorists, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, has no compunctions in declaring that he would personally shoot anyone committing blasphemy, where a minister for religious affairs justifies suicide bombings in Britain because of the knighthood given to author Salman Rushdie, and where the chief justice of Lahore High Court enunciates a new principle of jurisprudence under which the courts don't require any witness to establish a case of blasphemy against an accused, a Mumtaz Qadri (the assassin who murdered Punjab Governor Salman Taseer for calling the infamous Blasphemy Law a 'black law') is pretty much par for the course. But more than the act of assassination, or for that matter the motivation of the man who carried it out, the real significance of the event lies in what it exemplifies and portends viz. radicalisation has seeped far too deep into Pakistan's society and is today the norm, and the liberals and moderates with which the rest of the world interfaces are the exception.

The outpouring of grief, condemnation and soul searching by what is now clearly an endangered species of liberal and moderate writers has conveyed an impression that there is widespread revulsion in the country over the assassination. Nothing can be farther than the truth. According to Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, the 'moderates' have a strong presence only in the editorial pages of the English language press, the readership of which is not more than a few hundred thousand in a nation of close to 180 million people. More than anything else, the virtual deluge of write-ups on Salman Taseer's killing in the English media illustrates the panic being felt by sections of the Pakistani elite. Taseer's murder came as a rather rude shock to many of these people who until now had pretty much been untouched and unaffected by the tide of religious fanaticism that is sweeping Pakistan. Qadri has, however, demonstrated that they too are fair game for the Islamists if they either defy or even deviate from the norms dictated by the extremist mainstream.

The times when this tiny elite used to set the social, cultural and political agenda of Pakistan are long gone. Over the last couple of decades, street and state power has been steadily shifting away from the miniscule, so-called liberal and progressive elite. The reaction of both the street and the state to Taseer's killing stands testimony to the marginalisation of the so-called 'moderates', what with million man marches in support of Qadri, and not more than a handful of 'civil society' activists protesting against the assassination. And while rose petals were showered on Qadri by Pakistani lawyers, it was difficult to find a cleric who was willing to read Taseer's funeral prayers. Even worse, leading lights of the lawyers movement – Aitzaz Ahsan, Justice Tariq Mehmood, Justice Wajihuddin and Ali Ahmed Kurd – who never tired of telling the world that the movement was in defence of rule of law and a more liberal and caring Pakistani state, flatly refused to come out in public to condemn Qadri.

If this was the 'civil society's' reaction, the response of the state was no better. Reams have been written about how, from the Prime Minister down all senior government functionaries distanced themselves from the stand Taseer had taken against the death sentence given to a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi, for allegedly committing blasphemy. There is also the sorry spectacle of Interior Minister Rehman Malik advising a ruling party lawmaker, Sherry Rehman, to leave the country if she wants to live. Her crime: she moved a private member's bill seeking amendments in the blasphemy law to prevent its abuse and misuse. The mullahs are baying for her blood, issuing fatwas that hold her murder a righteous and obligatory act for Muslims, but there has been absolutely no action by the state machinery against this blatant incitement to murder. What is worse, many police officials, including those involved in anti-terrorist operations, are reported to have voiced their support for Qadri and justified his actions. Is it any surprise then that warnings about Qadri's Islamist leanings were ignored?

With the Pakistani state leaning over backwards to appease the extremists, the Islamists have latched on to the blasphemy law to stamp their domination on the social, political, cultural, legal and constitutional discourse in Pakistan. They have felt further emboldened by the judiciary's complicity with, if not capitulation to, Islamism. To quote Pakistani columnist and Member of National Assembly, Ayaz Amir: "lower-tier judges go out of their way to look for loopholes when dangerous terrorists are on trial, thus giving them the benefit of the doubt, and...close all loopholes and don spectacles of the utmost strictness when it comes to the trial of a poor Christian man or woman...charged with blasphemy, on the flimsiest of evidence or the most dubious of motives". The attitude of the superior judiciary is no better, with the chief justice of Pakistan declaring that the court couldn't be a mute bystander and let Pakistan become a secular state and the Lahore High Court forbidding the government from granting any clemency to Aasia Bibi.

The seriousness of the systemic crisis that confronts Pakistan can also be gauged from the fact that the mullahs who are in the vanguard of extolling Qadri's act belong to the anti-Taliban Barelvi sect which is being touted as face of moderate Islam and is being propped up by the Pakistani state as a counterforce to the pro-Taliban Deobandi sect. But as is clear from the Taseer episode, when it comes to fanaticism, there is little to choose between the shrine- worshipping Sufi syncretism of the Barelvis and the Puritanism of Wahabbi inspired Deobandis. In other words, the struggle in Pakistan is no longer between moderate and radical Islam; it is between two competing versions of radical Islam. The vortex of fanaticism has not left the security forces and other instruments of state untouched. How could it, considering that it was the security establishment itself that fanned the flames of fanaticism in pursuit of its political and foreign policy objectives. To expect the same security forces to now recognise the danger of radicalism and put the genie back in the bottle is utterly delusional.

What has contributed to the unbridled rise in power and influence of the Islamists is absence of a convincing and credible religious and ideological narrative that can counter the Islamists. The best that the so-called moderates can come up with is that the fundamentalists do not represent the 'silent majority', something that has been proved by the consistently poor performance of religious parties in successive elections. But as Hajrah Mumtaz writes: the phrase 'silent majority' in Pakistan can only be used in the context of its original meaning — it originates from Homer's Odyssey, and refers to the dead who are in the majority as compared to the living...if Pakistan has a 'silent majority at all, it is in this manner". What the 'moderates' cannot or don't want to understand is that the extremists don't need to win a majority in Parliament to push for what they want; they can easily force their way through the use of their street power and firepower. The reality of Pakistan is that even without a single seat in Parliament, the fundamentalists hold a veto over any and every progressive measure that the government might want to take.

Take for instance the issue of amending the procedure of the blasphemy law to prevent its abuse. If even the 'enlightened moderate' regime of the former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf was unable to make the smallest of procedural changes in the blasphemy law, what are the odds of the current crop of 'empowered' politicians doing the same, assuming they find the courage to even attempt such an amendment? In any case, the problem is not so much with the blasphemy law itself as it is with the society's attitude towards someone accused under the law. No sooner is someone accused of blasphemy, the person is condemned regardless of the existence or otherwise of any intent, let alone evidence, of having committed blasphemy. Even if the courts acquit someone – a rarity given that the judges are either too scared or too Islamised to do so – the people take it upon themselves to kill the person.

The point therefore is that unless this attitude, rather mindset, changes, no amendment in the procedure of the law will make a whit of a difference to those wrongly accused of blasphemy. By concentrating only on the inequities of the blasphemy law, the Pakistani moderates, as also the rest of the world, are missing the woods for the trees. The real battle to be fought is the one against radical Islamic thought and not for some minor changes in law. But this is a battle that has still not been joined in any serious and sustained manner and might have already been lost.

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    <1510 Words>                         14^th January, 2011

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NEED FOR A COMPOSITE BACK CHANNEL WITH PAKISTAN ARMY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    One of the most vexing and intractable foreign policy issues dogging India has been the bilateral relationship with Pakistan. Over the last six decades, a lot of effort has been expended on working out a modus Vivendi with Pakistan, but in the face of implacable hostility and unrelenting irredentism from Pakistan, all the initiatives taken by India have so far come to nought. After 26/11, India and Pakistan have once again reached a dead-end of sorts with public opinion in India inimical to any political or diplomatic initiative by the government to try and improve relations with Pakistan. But unless India has decided to turn its back on Pakistan and behave, even wish, as though Pakistan has ceased to exist, such an attitude would appear to be unsustainable. Worse, this attitude is also untenable because it is not the result of a conscious policy or strategic game plan, but is borne out of a lot of pique, some prejudice, a degree of pugnacity and of course domestic political compulsions.

Restarting a dialogue with Pakistan is however easier said than done, more so when there is a civilian government in office but the Pakistan army is in charge. This is a problem for the Indian political and permanent establishment, which despite being aware of the power realities in Pakistan, balks at the idea of entering into any separate or direct dialogue with the Pakistan army. In other words, while India can countenance a dialogue with the 'puppets', it is averse to talking to the 'puppeteers'. The resistance to opening a dialogue with the Pakistan army would be understandable if it was part of a well thought out strategy to alter the internal dynamics of Pakistan's power structure – drive a wedge between the political and military establishment in Pakistan and eventually end the preponderant power and influence that the generals wield in the politics of the country as well as sideline them from exercising a veto power on relations with India. But clearly, this strategy is a non-starter because the Pakistani political establishment has outsourced, rather abdicated, the country's India policy to the army and now tows the line set by the army.

To be sure, India's reluctance to engage the Pakistan army is morally correct and principled. But it goes against the basic principles of realpolitik, more so when self-proclaimed standard bearers of 'democracy' and 'freedom' don't bat an eyelid while mollycoddling Pakistani dictators, or doing business with the chief of the Pakistan army even though a civilian government is in office. The Indian distaste for opening a dialogue with the Pakistan army makes even less sense considering that India has never refused to engage military regimes in Pakistan, following the principle that it would deal with whoever was in power. Why then the resistance today to deal only with the de jure power (civilian government) and not the de facto power (army) in Pakistan? Not to put too fine point on it, in Pakistan if you win over the army, everything else falls into place, more or less.

While India's antipathy towards the Pakistan army is quite natural, the absence of a credible interlocutor in Pakistan who can exercise effective control over the Pakistan army leaves India with little choice except to open a parallel dialogue with the military establishment in Pakistan. The Indian policy of developing closer people-to-people relationships as a means to make a breakthrough in the bilateral relationship is unlikely to ever work. The manner in which the entire progress made on the people-to-people front between 2004 and 2008 was practically overnight reduced to nothing after the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai should be proof enough that when it comes to India-Pakistan relations, the people tend to follow the line set by their establishments. In order words, people-to-people relations flower when the establishment allows them, and they wither away when the establishment shuts the door on them.

It is even more futile to depend on the so-called civil society of Pakistan for raising a constituency of peace. For one, what goes as civil society in Pakistan is really a fringe group and constitutes around a 1000 people, and if you want to be very charitable then the number can be raised to 5000. This is not to belittle the commitment, conviction and courage of some of the members of civil society in promoting and propagating the cause of normalisation of relations with India. But at the end of the day, despite their visibility and volubility, how many army divisions or jihadists or even votes do these people control?

Interestingly, in trying to engage the Pakistan army, India doesn't even have to take the initiative; it just has to respond to overtures that the Pakistan army already appears to be making. Over the last few months, enough hints have been dropped by Pakistan's military establishment of their desire to deal directly with the Indian establishment. There are some reports, albeit unconfirmed, of a meeting between the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad and the Pakistan army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. The ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha has met the Indian armed forces representatives posted in the High Commission in Islamabad and is believed to have conveyed to them that India needs to talk directly with the Pakistan army. There are also some suggestions (straws in the wind actually) that the Pakistan army is opening up to the idea of working with India on Afghanistan.

Indications of the Pakistan army's willingness to engage with their opposite numbers in the Indian establishment have also come from the gestures made by the Pakistan army – for instance, Pasha attending an Iftar party thrown by the Indian High Commissioner, the ISI hosting farewell parties for some Indian defence advisors who were returning to India after completing their tenures in Islamabad, the Indian defence advisors being invited to attend the passing out parade at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul. For its part, the Indian establishment has been reciprocating the gestures from the Pakistan military establishment and has invited the head of the National Defence University in Islamabad, a serving Lt. Gen., to India. But until now, no decision has been taken to engage the Pakistan army in a serious, sustained manner.

There are of course a whole lot of counter-signals also being received that suggest that the Pakistan army has restarted the jihad factory directed against India. Many of the jihadist outfits that had been forced to go underground have started resurfacing and are openly preaching violence against India. Pakistan's Taliban proxies are targeting Indian interests, workers and projects in Afghanistan. The ISI has been once again tried to reignite the insurgency in Kashmir by coordinating the actions of the agent provocateurs and funding the unrest in the Kashmir valley last summer. None other than Gen. Ashfaq Kayani has made no bones about the fact that the Pakistan army remains India-centric and cannot ignore or neglect the threat it perceives from its eastern front regardless of the deterioration in the situation on the western front. The ratcheting up of the anti-India propaganda by the so-called 'independent' media in Pakistan is yet another pointer to direction in which the wind is blowing inside Pakistan. And, if there were still any doubts, the rise in anti-India rhetoric of the Pakistan foreign office, especially from the foreign minister, should clinch the argument that the process of normalisation of relations between the two countries has regressed significantly.

But these negative signals are precisely the reason why it is so important for India to engage with Pakistan army. That the Pakistan army and Gen. Ashfaq Kayani don't like, much less trust, India is a sentiment that India reciprocates in full measure, and perhaps with far greater justification and reason. But what India is unable to understand fully is what is prompting Kayani's anti-Indiaism. Is it a religious, or even a civilizational, hang-up? Or does it arise out of a genuine sense of insecurity from India? And is there any way that India can address this anti-Indiaism without in any way compromising on its security preparedness and its territorial unity, integrity and sovereignty? Similarly, there is a lot that Pakistan needs to do to reassure India and address its security concerns, and a dialogue with the Pakistan army can become a useful forum in finding a redressal to these problems.

Advocation of open lines of communication with the Pakistan army doesn't in any way mean letting down the guard or dropping 'assets' and 'leverages' that India might have built inside Pakistan (as had been done in the past by so many Indian Prime Ministers, including Morarji Desai and IK Gujral). Nor does it mean harbouring starry-eyed notions that the Pakistan army is no longer inimical to India's security or is in the process of ending its hostility to India.

The point being made is not that there will be an end to the secret, or if you will, 'shadow' wars being fought between the two countries in different theatres; it is that in the course of engagement, the two establishments might be able to reach a better understanding of each others' concerns and might find that some of their assumptions and presumptions about each other were misplaced. There is also a possibility of breaking common ground on a range of issues and initiating a process of confidence building measures that are verifiable on the ground.

Any dialogue with the Pakistan army must, however, be held far away from the media glare, otherwise the entire effort will be rendered futile by the grandstanding that is inherent in the presence of the media. Equally important, there must be strict confidentiality about the talks because nothing kills trust more than selective and self-serving leaks to the media. The template that can be adopted is that of the the 'back-channel' that had opened up after the Islamabad meeting between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 2004.

Once the decision to enter into such a dialogue is taken, there will arise the question as to who from India's side will talk to the Pakistan army, especially since the Indian Army, by no stretch of imagination, occupies the same position in the Indian power structure as the Pakistan army does in Pakistan. Similarly, in terms of the power it wields, the Indian external intelligence agency RAW cannot be put on the same pedestal as the ISI. One way out of this is to adopt a multi-track approach, a sort of 'composite back-channel' in which the intelligence agencies comprise one track, the military leaders another track in which they discuss military and security related matters, a third track can discuss larger strategic perceptions, outlooks and assessments. All these various tracks can then provide inputs to the political back-channel. To start with, the discussions in these various tracks can be unstructured and, if necessary, can be held in some third country.

The question whether will such a composite back channel between the security establishments of the two countries work is hardly important. Having tried everything else, this is probably the only thing that is left to be tried. If it works, the prospects for normalization of relations will brighten; if it doesn't, neither country will have lost anything.