THE MYTH OF PASHTUN INVINCIBILITY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    If wars are won and lost, first in the head and only after that on the battlefield, then Pakistan and perhaps even the West might be on the verge of losing the War on Terror. Despite all the resources available to the forces battling terror, psychologically the Islamists are dominating their rivals in this war. One manifestation of this is the constant refrain inside Pakistan that this war cannot be won by force alone, that the warring Pashtun tribesmen can never be subdued by an alien force, that peace will not become possible as long as the foreign troops don't leave Afghanistan, and that Pakistan will have to reach out to the combatants and negotiate with them if there has to be peace in that country.

The psychological ascendance of the Islamists can also be gauged from the response of the Pakistani society to the devastating suicide bombing of the Marriott Hotel in the heart of Islamabad. Instead of the outrage stiffening the resolve of the people to wipe the Islamists out, the predominant opinion inside Pakistan is to make peace with them. At the same time, the collateral damage caused by Pakistan army operations inside the troubled tribal areas has also caused uproar inside Pakistan. It is almost as though the critics of the operations seriously believe that the Pakistan army could actually carry out surgical strikes in an anti-septic military environment!

On the other hand, the civilians caught in the cross-fire in the tribal areas, instead of being despondent are yearning for revenge, not against the Taliban but against the Pakistani state. In the midst of all this is the Pakistan army which still has large number of people who are still not convinced about fighting against the Taliban and who continue to see the Taliban as Islamic warriors. Alongside, the morale of the Pakistan army is being hit upon by the supporters and camp followers of the Islamists with talk of the disquiet within the Pakistan army rank and file because it is seen to be fighting an unpopular war on the side of the 'hated' Americans against their own countrymen, who are also fellow Muslims (who are fighting for the glory of Islam). One only wonders where these people (most of them right-wingers) were when the Pakistan army was butchering the Bengalis in the erstwhile East Pakistan or when they massacred the Baloch. If truth be told, the only time that the Pakistan army has won is when it has fought against its own people.

Actually, the right-wing supporters of the Islamists, who are functioning as the 'over-ground face of the underground' (to use Arun Jaitley's description to defenders of terrorists in India), are playing a big role in undermining the quest for a coherent national policy against the terrorists by questioning Pakistan's participation in the War on Terror. To say that Pakistan should not fight this war is nothing but an advocacy of the cause of the Taliban and an invitation to them to take over Pakistan. Even more galling is the nonsense being peddled that this war is not winnable and that the Pashtun lands are the graveyards of empires past and present. Not only is this historically incorrect, it is also a self-created, self-serving and self perpetuated myth.

    The fact is that the Pashtuns are eminently beatable and have been beaten plenty of times in the past. Alexander, Timur, Nadir Shah, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and the British, all have beaten the Pashtuns and established order in the Pashtun lands. Lest it be forgotten, the Sikhs followed by the British had defeated the Pashtuns so comprehensively that for almost 150 years now, relative peace and order has prevailed in the Pashtun lands. True, the British suffered the occasional setback but they eventually managed to subdue the Pashtun tribes. Had the British wanted they would have also continued to rule Afghanistan, only they didn't find it worth their while and preferred to let it remain a buffer between India and Russia. The defeat of the Russians would never have taken place had the Soviet economy not collapsed (and it didn't collapse because of the war in Afghanistan) and had the Americans not pumped in weapons and money to back the so-called Mujahedin.

    No doubt the Pashtuns are a very turbulent race. Not only have they crafted treachery into a fine art form, they have also used it to great affect in the way they fight against their rivals. But while they are terrific warriors for whom warfare is a way of life, they have always succumbed to superior force and superior tactics, not to mention the lure of money. The Pashtuns have never been known to stand against a well-disciplined, well-equipped, motivated, and equally ruthless force. But a set-piece army is only partially useful against the Pashtuns; it must be backed by highly mobile troops who can chase the guerrillas and hunt them down. To an extent, the pilotless drones do this job, but these need to be backed by troops on the ground. A piecemeal application of force of the type being use by the Pakistanis and Americans can never succeed against the Pashtuns. Application of force must be total and must aim at wiping out the opposition.

For the Pashtuns, human life – theirs and the enemies – has little value and they follow the logic that even if they kill one enemy for every ten of their men, they will still win the war. They are a people who have nothing to live for but everything to die for – they don't seek paradise in this life but in the after-life. If the Pashtuns see opposition as being namby pamby, then of course they will exploit it to the hilt, as they are doing with the Pakistanis. But if the opposition they face is as brutal and ruthless as them and gives back much better than they get then the Pashtuns are quite amenable to a peaceful settlement, more so if they feel they have no chance of winning.

Of course over the years some things have changed in Pashtun society. The decades of settled living has changed the attitude of many Pashtuns, especially those who are not living in the wild and lawless tribal region straddling Afghanistan. Unlike the tribal belt where life has been very harsh and tribal traditions have remained unchanged for centuries, the people of the settled areas have been softened by the 'settled existence' and will not find it easy to confront the state and risk losing all their worldly possessions. The fact that Pakistan has been quite successful in integrating the Pashtuns in the power structure of the country will also come handy in fighting the Islamist insurgents. And then there are the tribal rivalries that can always be exploited to raise a counter force against the Islamists.

Of course all this requires a determination to defeat the Islamists, no matter what the cost. For the moment, the Pakistanis have not been able to demonstrate this determination. It is also not clear how long the Americans will stay the course in this area. No doubt, if the Americans leave without finishing the job in Afghanistan they will be doing this at their own peril. In the globalised and borderless world of today, the US doesn't have the luxury that the British enjoyed of leaving Afghanistan to its own devices. The objective conditions have changed and if the sole superpower leaves Afghanistan that country will descend into chaos and become a base for jihad international.

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<1260 Words>                    25^th September, 2008

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IN FATA, THE WAR IS JUST STARTING

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Having lost all patience with what Newsweek calls 'Pakistan's dangerous double-game' in the War on Terror, the Americans have started baring their fangs and mounted the first ground action inside Pakistani territory by Special Forces troops. The storm of protest over violations of sovereignty by the top political leadership of Pakistan and threats of retaliation by the Pakistani army chief was treated with utter disdain by the Americans who have continued bombing suspected terrorist sites in Pakistan. But despite the aggressive posture that the Americans have taken against terrorist sanctuaries and launching pads inside Pakistan, the efficacy of this new policy remains suspect.

If the objective of the new American strategy is to force the hand of the Pakistanis and leaving them no option but to clean up the nests of terror in the Pakhtun tribal belt, then it still has a chance to work. But if the aim is to act unilaterally to wipe out terrorist bases inside Pakistan, then the Americans might end up creating a bigger problem, for themselves and for the wider region, than the one that confronts them at present.

Clearly, Washington is facing a Hobson's choice: if it continues to mollycoddle the Pakistanis and turn a blind eye to the links between the Pakistani military establishment and the Taliban, peace and stability in Afghanistan will never become possible; on the other hand, if the US troops start striking inside Pakistani territory, they could end up confronting an extremely hostile Pakistan Army and public, something that will not only widen the theatre of conflict but also severely disrupt the vital supply line of the US-led NATO forces inside Afghanistan.

Like the Americans, the Pakistanis too face a grave dilemma. Pakistan can, in an assertion of sovereignty, either obstruct the US war effort by denying transit facilities and logistics support or retaliate by stopping intelligence cooperation and shooting at US drones and personnel. But then it will face the prospect of stiff economic sanctions, which will push the tottering Pakistani economy over the edge. In addition, Pakistan will face international diplomatic isolation. And to top it all, if the situation deteriorates beyond a point, there is a real danger of armed confrontation between Pakistan and the US, something that Pakistan simply cannot sustain. On the other hand, if the Pakistani authorities do nothing about the increasing US incursions, then they risks massive domestic unrest which will almost certainly destabilise the civilian government.

To a great extent, the answer to the problems being faced by both the US and Pakistan lies with the Pakistan army. But two critical issues hamper the effectiveness of the Pakistan army in being a part of the solution. The first is the jihadist ideology that pervades the rank and file, not just of the ISI but also of rest of the army. It is this mindset that gave rise to the doctrine of 'strategic defiance', a doctrine that still dictates the policy and actions of the army. The ideological affinity that the army, and increasingly the Pakistani people, share with the Islamists makes them look upon the Americans as a bigger enemy and threat to the survival of Pakistan.

The second issue relates to the capacity and capability of the army in fighting the Taliban. Even if by some miracle good sense dawned on the Pakistan army to wipe out the radical Islamists, it will find it very difficult to do so. Until now, the Pakistan army has been worsted by the Taliban in practically every single ground engagement. The only successes that the army has notched up are those in which the Pakistan army has resorted to very heavy aerial bombardment of militant positions by fighter jets, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery. But this 'success' has caused massive collateral damage. Around half a million people have been forced to leave their homes and take refuge in refugee camps. The humanitarian crisis has created a huge amount of resentment and anger which in turn is fuelling the desire for revenge in even ordinary people. Many Pakhtuns feel that their traditions, their way of life, their culture are under assault by the Punjabi dominated Pakistani state operating under the diktats of the Americans.

Bombs from the air are however no substitute for boots on the ground, something that the Americans are finding out in Afghanistan. The ferocious air attacks, in which the Islamists are sitting ducks, will ultimately have to be followed by sending in ground troops to hold territory and enforce the writ of the state. But the terrain is such that it will need a huge amount of force to mount even a holding operation in these areas. The moment ground troops move in, they will open themselves to attacks by the insurgents who will use guerrilla tactics – hit-and-run, ambushes, suicide attacks, and IED blasts – to target both fixed installations as well as supply lines of the military. For instance, in the military operation underway in Bajaur as soon as the troops backed by armour moved in for mopping up operations, they faced such fierce resistance that they were forced to retreat.

Clearly, Pakistan is facing a very long, brutal, and horrendously expensive (in men and material) war of attrition. A comparison with the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir is apt to understand the magnitude of the problem facing Pakistan. In J&K at the worst of times the estimate of armed terrorists was never more than 4000-5000. India has had to commit nearly 400,000 security force personnel to keep control over the situation. In the areas affected by militancy in Pakistan, estimates of armed militants vary from 25000 to 100,000! This means a huge military commitment to keep the peace and defeat the Islamists, a commitment which could well be beyond the capacity of the Pakistani state, more so given its security commitments on the border with India which seems to be getting active once again.

There are only two ways this can be avoided: either the Pakistani state succumbs to the Islamists, or the Islamists have a sudden change of heart and decide to bid farewell to arms. But if neither of these two options are available, and Pakistan has to confront the problem, then it will need a huge amount of economic and military assistance from rest of the world, far beyond the one or two billion dollars it is getting at present. Pakistan is clearly in no position to handle on its own the massive dislocation of people, business, and politics that this war will cause. On the other hand, if Pakistan does not join this war in right earnest, and continues to play a 'double-game' and 'defy' the US, then it will leave the US with no option but to take action – military, economic and diplomatic – which again will have devastating consequences for Pakistan and rest of the region.

It is therefore in the interest of the US, of Pakistan and even of India (which will have to bear the brunt of a destabilised Pakistan) if Pakistan is forced to make the necessary course correction and combat Islamic radicalism on its own, of course with lots of help from friends and neighbours. But if Pakistan is not willing to do this, then regional and global players will have to undertake this unpleasant task. In either case, everyone should be prepared for a long, long war, which is probably just starting.

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    <1240 Words>                    19^th September, 2008

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PEACE PROCESS – ASIF VERSUS ARMY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    In his very first press conference as President of Pakistan, Asif Zardari promised his countrymen that they will soon hear 'good news' on the Kashmir issue. Quite aside the fact that Pakistani politicians routinely tantalise the media by promising 'good news' on one issue or another, Zardari's 'good news' on Kashmir might eventually be nothing more than opening up of trade routes along the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir or some other Kashmir-related confidence building measures between India and Pakistan.

    It must however be said that new civilian dispensation is Islamabad has made all the right noises and moves as far as pushing the peace process with India is concerned. President Zardari's take on relations with India, laid out in his interviews and statements after his party formed the government in Pakistan, is both realistic and visionary. The PPP-led government has unveiled a very progressive trade policy which grants India the 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) status in all but name. The Pakistani side is also open to the idea of inviting investments from Indian corporate houses. Indian investments will not only bolster Pakistan's industrial sector, but will also be a huge vote of confidence in Pakistan's faltering economy. The signalling impact of Indian investment in Pakistan will be far more effective in attracting international corporations to invest in Pakistan than any IMF-World Bank program. Apart from investment and trade, the Pakistani side appears keen to open travel between the two countries and encourage greater contacts between the peoples of the two countries.

    The task of the Pakistan government has been made somewhat simpler by the fact that at least at the political level it does not face any major opposition to its overtures to India. Not only coalition partners like ANP, JUI and MQM but also the biggest opposition party, PMLN, favour normalisation of relations with India. While the extreme right wing Jamaat Islami and Jihadi groups continue to oppose any rapprochement with India, they are today far too marginalised to be an effective obstacle in the path of the peace process. Businessmen, professionals, and civil society groups, are also looking forward to an era of peace and cooperation with India.

    But despite all these positives, there are disturbing signs that things might just go back to the no-war-no-peace situation of the past. The political consensus on peace with India is still very fragile and can easily break down under mounting pressure from elements within the military establishment who have not been able to shed their inveterate hatred for India. The growing disconnect between the political leadership and the military on the issue of relations with India will be the ultimate test of both President Asif Zardari's ability to side-step political minefields and his stated commitment on ushering in an era of friendship and cooperation between India and Pakistan.

    Already an insidious propaganda campaign has been launched inside Pakistan against India. Unsubstantiated allegations about Indian involvement in the insurgency in Balochistan and in Islamist terror attacks in other parts of Pakistan have been flying around in the Pakistani media. Quite clearly, the Pakistani media is being fed all these stories by the psy-war experts in the Pakistani intelligence establishment. Despite these clearly motivated and quite ridiculous allegations flying in the face of all logic, they are being unquestioningly gobbled up and then peddled as truisms by Pakistani media professionals. No doubt, India must be using its presence in Afghanistan to keep a close eye on developments inside Pakistan. This is exactly what any serious country would do. But to construe from this that India is using the Taliban to wreck havoc inside Pakistan is to stretch the limits of credulity.

    The Indian presence in Afghanistan, a red rag for Islamists, Jihadists and 'strategic depth' theoreticians in the Pakistani establishment, is now being used by them to whip up the mood against India. India is supposed to be maintaining 13 consulates – this is the latest figure conjured up by the fertile imagination of Pakistani cold warriors – but no one in Pakistan has until now listed where these missions are located. The funding of the Pakistani Taliban, their logistic support, their selection of targets, their training and brainwashing, everything is being ascribed to India. The reconstruction efforts of India in Afghanistan – roads, schools, hospitals, supply of transport equipment, building communication facilities, constructing dams, training the Afghan National Army – is all seen in Pakistan as part of an Indian effort to encircle Pakistan. To counter India's growing profile in Afghanistan, Pakistan has kept alive the Taliban option and used it keep Afghanistan destabilised.

Other than Afghanistan, the Kashmir issue too will come handy in sabotaging any political initiative by the PPP-led coalition to improve ties with India. The deteriorating political situation inside Jammu and Kashmir where the separatists and jihadists have once again become very active will give an excuse to the Pakistani military establishment to once again raise domestic political temperature on the issue. Any move by the authorities in J&K to counter the separatists will be blown up out of proportion and presented to the Pakistani public as atrocities being committed on 'hapless Muslims'. Of course, Pakistan's own actions against Islamist and Baloch insurgents – use of jet fighters, helicopter gunships, tanks and heavy artillery – will be conveniently brushed under the carpet while painting India in lurid colours. The thrust of the entire campaign will be to apprise the Pakistani public of the perfidy of the PPP-led government which it will be said is doing business with India even though India is 'butchering the Kashmiris', sponsoring terrorism inside Pakistan and destabilising the Pakistani state.

The big question is how the government of President Zardari reacts when this stage is reached and unbearable pressure is put on the government to give up its policy of rapprochement with India. Will Mr Zardari be able to resist this pressure? He has shown tremendous capacity for standing up to pressure – from the media, the public, the civil society, his political allies and from within his own party – on the issue of restoration of the deposed judiciary. But India is an altogether different ball game because on this issue he will have to fend of charges of being 'anti-national', a 'security risk' and a 'Indian, American or Zionist agent' – charges that were also heaped on his wife when she was prime minister. The opposition PMLN, in deference to its right-wing, conservative and reactionary core constituency will not be averse to using Kashmir as an issue to put the government on the mat. Even worse, the PPP might be deserted by crucial allies on this issue, something that will bring the government down.

To avoid the collapse of its government, it is possible that Zardari and Co. adopt a parallel track approach with India. In other words, the Pakistanis might cooperate and improve their relations with India in some areas and at the same time confront India in other areas, notably Afghanistan and Kashmir. If this happens then the ball will be firmly in India's court and everything will then depend on how India reacts to acts of provocation from Pakistan. Broadly India will have to choose one of two options: India can play the Pakistani game and choose to cooperate where possible, and retaliate where necessary; or India can stop dealing with Pakistan until it ends interference in Kashmir and stops sponsoring jihadi groups spreading terror in rest of India. Both these options are a classic case of 'been there, done that'. Therefore, instead of waiting for 'good news', perhaps India should prepare for the 'bad news' which is inevitable.

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    <1275 Words>                    12^th September, 2008

 

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THE CASE AGAINST AZADI

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

In recent weeks, a seditious assault has been launched on the will of the Indian nation by rootless liberals, 'mobile republics', and amoral columnists, who are exhorting India to 'think the unthinkable' and concede the demand for Azadi in Kashmir.

There are two ways of responding to those who advocate Azadi for Kashmir. The first way is to gun them down, throw a grenade on their house, kidnap their children and then slit their throats, threaten to rape their wives and daughters, or drive them forcibly out of their homes. This is precisely what was done to Kashmiris – Muslims and Pundits – who opposed the so-called 'freedom fighters' in Kashmir, whose brief these faux-intellectuals hold. Of course, the moment any of these steps is taken, these same people will demand protection from the very law enforcement agencies that they so ardently revile. At the same time, there will be a manufactured uproar by the NGO industry over how voices of dissent are being stifled. Only, those shouting about their right to dissent seem to readily acquiesce when dissent is brutally throttled in Kashmir by the jihadists and separatists.

There is however a more civilized way of answering those who propose a vivisection of India. This is the way of an 'argumentative Indian', a way that is in keeping with the 'Idea of India'.

As it stands, the Idea of India is good and noble. It is an idea that is progressive, inclusive, pluralistic, tolerant and accommodating. Above all it is a Republican idea which holds the ideal to be more important than the extant beliefs of the common herd. Compare the idea of India with the idea of a talibanised Kashmir (as professed by the Geelanis, Salahuddins and their ilk), or even the idea of Pakistan – denominational, exclusivist, reactionary, intolerant and very violent. No doubt, there is a lot of prejudice and discrimination still present in India. But the task of nation building in India is a "work-in-progress". Countries like the US are over 200 years old and have not yet solved all their social and communal problems.

The important point is that the Idea of India must prevail over the idea of exclusivist and regressive states like Pakistan or its fan club in Kashmir. The campaigners for Kashmir's Azadi (especially those based in Delhi) should perhaps be sent on a year-long study tour of Waziristan, Swat and Bajaur (with a week in the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp in Muridke thrown in as bonus) to make them understand why Kashmir cannot be abandoned for the Taliban and al Qaeda-inspired 'freedom fighters'.

The proponents of Azadi and their apologists misuse, if not abuse, concepts like secularism and democracy that embody the Idea of India to undermine India. Frankly, India does not need certificates on democracy and secularism from anybody in the world, least of all from Kashmiri separatists and their supporters and sponsors who while mouthing these concepts are totally unfamiliar with the meaning, much less the practise, of these words. Nor does India need to amputate a part of herself simply to prove her commitment to democratic values.

Accepting Azadi will mean subscribing to the doctrine of Clash of Civilisations, the fundamental assumption of which is that pluralistic societies are a quirk of history and will not be able to survive the assertion of primordial identities. This was exactly the logic that created Pakistan. It is hardly important that the bacon-loving Jinnah didn't want a theocratic state; the talibanisation of Pakistan is a logical outcome of the demand for a Muslim state. If today we accept that logic, then India will become a country only for Hindus.

The argument that granting Azadi will be the democratic thing to do is even otherwise totally specious. What is it that prompts some people to give more weightage to what 5 million Kashmiris want (assuming they all want Azadi) than the desire of 1 billion people who don't want a communal division of India? How can we be so cavalier about the security, safety and well being of 165 million Indian Muslims for the sake of 5 million Kashmiris? Secularism in India is bound to suffer if we accede to Muslim communalism in Kashmir. The forces that will be unleashed by another communal division will be beyond the control of arm-chair intellectuals. After all, if we are willing to give one small part of the population the right to secede, how can we deny a larger population the right to decide who stays and who is forced to leave India? Perhaps the democratic urgings of the faux-intellectuals will be satisfied by nothing less than a billion 'independent, mobile republics' in India.

Other than Muslim exclusivism, what is the justification for the demand for Azadi in Kashmir? Kashmiri separatists normally give three or four reasons in support of their demand. The first is that Kashmir was sold to the Dogra rulers by the British. But surely acquiring territory for a state by purchasing it is far more civilized and legitimate than military conquest. In any case, the cut-off point of history on which they base their case cannot be arbitrarily and self-servingly selected by the separatists. The second argument given is that Kashmir is a disputed territory. Well, in South Asia a legal dispute can be created out of nothing at all, so this argument doesn't hold any water. Thirdly, it is said that Kashmiris are a distinct and homogenous ethnic group and as such are entitled to Azadi. The answer to this is that every ethnic group in India is distinct and if this argument is to be extended then tomorrow a condominium complex in Gurgaon or cooperative society in Mumbai could demand independence on the same grounds. Finally, the separatists talk of how much they have sacrificed for Kashmir's Azadi. But then India sacrifices in men and material for Kashmir are far greater.

Another false argument in favour of Azadi is that India is unnecessarily spending billions to keep Kashmir in India and will be better off without it. But let's extend this argument a little further: Why should we spend money in the North-East? What are we getting out of it? So, let's give Azadi to the North-Eastern states as well. And, while we are at it, how about throwing UP and Bihar out of the Indian Union? Aren't these two states a huge drain on India's resources, and dragging India down? Ultimately, Kashmir is a question of national will. If Indians lose the will to keep Kashmir today, it won't be long before they lose UP tomorrow and Bengal the day after.

It is therefore time that India starts 'thinking the unthinkable' to end Kashmiri separatism. If the case for Kashmir's Azadi rests only on numbers, then let us change the numbers in Kashmir. If this means settling people there from other parts of India, then so be it. Kashmir is no anthropological laboratory that must be preserved from outside influences. The law forbidding non-state subjects from settling in J&K was a law made by the Dogra kings (so detested by the Kashmiris today) to protect their own interest. There is no reason why this law should not be repealed and Kashmir thrown open to every Indian – Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian – who wants to settle there. At the same time, any Kashmiri who considers Pakistan the Promised Land should be allowed, nay encouraged, to go and settle there; just make sure to shut the gate after they cross over.

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    <1250 Words>                        5^th September, 2008

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