Friday, October 30, 2009

PUNJAB IS AS BIG A PROBLEM

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    That Pakistan faces a mortal threat from Islamists who are somewhat conveniently but perhaps erroneously, clubbed together and referred to as the Taliban, is something that should have by now become clear to even the most purblind not only in that country but also in rest of the world. The real challenge for both the Pakistani state and society, however, does not lie so much in the efforts of the Pakistan security forces to defeat and exterminate the Islamists in the Pakhtun tribal badlands; the real challenge lies in fighting the Islamists in Pakistan's heartland – Punjab. And no, its not just South Punjab that one is talking about. Serious as the situation is in South Punjab, it is no better in central and north Punjab.

The phenomenon of 'Punjabi Taliban' has been receiving a lot of attention in recent months, more so after evidence has emerged of their involvement in almost all the major acts of terrorism in cities like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. But much of the focus on this phenomenon has centred on South Punjab. The abysmal development indices in South Punjab coupled with the domination of the feudal classes and the increasingly dysfunctional social and administrative structures have certainly acted as contributory factors for making this region a fertile recruiting ground for the Islamists of all hues. Whether it is Deobandi jihadists organisations like Jaish Mohammad, Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipahe Sahaba with close links to al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Salafi/Wahabbi outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba, they have all gathered their jihadi cannon-fodder from this region.

But for anyone to imagine that the rising tide of radical Islamism is limited to only South Punjab is nothing but self-deception. The fact is that Islamists (regardless of the labels they operate under) have spread their wings all over Punjab. Most of the top al Qaeda militants have been arrested not from the dirty backwaters of South Punjab, but from the bustling cities of central and north Punjab – Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Attock and what have you. The core support base of the fundamentalist Islamic party, Jamaat Islami, is central and north Punjab, and not only is the Jamaat Islami increasingly functioning like the political arm of the al Qaeda but cadres of this party have been found involved in sheltering al Qaeda fugitives.

Perhaps the biggest jihadist organisation in Pakistan, and one which is arguably far more dangerous than the TTP, is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is headquartered in Muridke (just north of Lahore). The LeT also maintains a huge establishment in the heart of Lahore and has a presence in every nook and corner of Pakistan. Most of the LeT cadre comes from all parts of Punjab and not just from the much maligned South Punjab. The extensive network of the LeT in Punjab is in many ways potentially far more destabilising for Pakistan than the horrendous acts of terror being perpetrated by the Taliban.

An indication of the immense power that LeT wields has comes in a recent write-up by the Pakistani journalist Shaheen Sehbai. He writes: "the GHQ realises that if the Kerry-Lugar Bill was to be implemented as desired by Washington, Pakistani cities could soon turn into battlegrounds between the Army and the Lashkar Tayyaba, the Jaish Mohammed and Taliban forces combined. So far the GHQ has kept the Lashkar Tayyaba quiet by not acceding to the US demands of attacking or even touching Muridke, arguing that once this sleeping elephant wakes up, it could turn around and trample our own forces. After all, the LeT was raised and trained by our military establishment to fight the Indians in Kashmir and they are good at it. Turning their guns inwards, with TTP suicide bombers roaming everywhere, would turn Pakistan into a burning inferno, ready to collapse."

Unfortunately, instead of waking up to the alarming spread of radical Islamist forces in Pakistan's political powerhouse, the Pakistani state and society has slipped into a mode of total and complete denial of the problem. In many ways, the denial over the inexorable march of talibanisation in Punjab is reminiscent of the dismissal of similar premonitions about the inevitable blowback of the policy of using the jihadists as instruments of state policy in Afghanistan and against India. Then, as now, the arguments given were more or less the same that we are hearing today: the state machinery is pretty much in control and remains effective enough to snuff out any challenge to state authority; the army and intelligence agencies are competent and powerful enough to turn off the tap of jihad with a snap of their fingers; the jihadists pose no threat to Pakistani state and people and are only fighting the enemies of Islam and oppressors of Muslims; a handful of jihadists are in any case in no position to bite the hand that feeds them, etc. But if all these arguments of yore have fallen flat today, then the arguments being given today to refrain from moving against the Islamists in Punjab, will almost certainly yield disastrous consequences tomorrow.

True, the LeT and other Punjab-based jihadist organisations are not fighting the Pakistani state today. But it is equally true that the ultimate objectives of 'loyalist' jihadist outfits are no different from those of the 'rogue' jihadists; only their immediate objective and enemy is not the same. Given the firepower at their command, and their long-term objective of imposing a Wahabbi/Salafi version of Islam on Pakistan, a clash between the loyalist jihadists and the Pakistani state is simply a matter of time and the break, when it comes, could be over something pretty trivial. After all, the Taliban too were loyalists, even clients, of the Pakistani state not too long back in the past. None of the 'rogue' jihadists ever indulged in terrorism inside Pakistan so long as they were allowed to function unhindered. But the moment obstacles were placed in their path they turned their guns on the Pakistani state. What is there to ensure that organisations like the LeT will not do something similar in the future?

To an extent, the manner in which the problem of talibanisation is defined prevents a realistic appreciation of the threat, or if you will challenge, of radical Islamism or jihadism in Punjab. As the thinking goes in Pakistan's security, political and intellectual circles, so long as the jihadists do not defy the state or create an insurgency-like situation inside Pakistan but continue to export their violence and virulence outside Pakistan, they are not considered a danger; rather, they are lauded as 'mujahids'. In the process, the fact that the jihadists cannot ply their trade without distorting and disrupting the social, economic and administrative fabric of local communities is simply glossed over. The focus is generally limited to the law and order implications of jihadist militancy. But the mindset that provides legitimacy and justification, not to mention recruits, to militant jihad is all too often neglected.

In Pakistan's Punjab province, the threat of the extensive network of armed militants (call them Taliban or jihadists) running amok is just one part of the problem. Equally serious is the mindset that has emerged from nearly three decades of sustained brain-washing of the society to make it more 'Islamic' and exhorting the people to contribute men and material for the so-called 'Islamic causes'. Anyone who follows the public discourse in Pakistan (which is basically dominated by the Punjabis) will realise its jihadist orientation. This is not something that has happened overnight; nor is this a function of the imagined persecution of Muslims by the West. And it is certainly not a trend that has emerged in reaction to the US occupation of Afghanistan.

The reality is that this is a mindset that has been actively encouraged and assiduously cultivated by the Pakistani state. And while it is easy to blame it all on the proliferating Madrassas, one just needs to read the stuff that is taught in state-run schools to understand the demonical mindset that is being imbued in Pakistani children. It is hardly any surprise therefore that over the years the innate pragmatism that characterised the Punjabi has given way to Islamism, which coupled with a false sense of machismo has created a society that brooks no compromise, tolerance or accommodation of another man's worldview. The Pakistani Punjabi mind has become so radicalised that many people in Pakistan don't even realise how extreme they appear to the outside world, in both their action as well as their words.

If the Pakistanis really want to rediscover their traditional moderation and syncretism then they have no choice but to confront and defeat militarily, philosophically and ideologically the jihadists in their midst. The longer that the Pakistani state delays action against jihadist infrastructure in Punjab and Sindh, the more difficult it will become to dismantle the nurseries of terror that are operating right under the nose, and by accounts with the connivance, of the Pakistani establishment. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are becoming powerful by the day and could one day not too far in the future pose an even more potent threat to the existence of the Pakistani state than is posed by the Taliban.

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    <1530 Words>                    30th October, 2009

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Friday, October 23, 2009

NO QUICK DELIVERANCE FROM TERRORISM FOR PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    That the Pakistani state was left with no option but to launch a military offensive in South Waziristan against one of the most dangerous, destructive and vicious factions of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) became amply clear after the spate of devastating terrorist attacks in Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar in the first two weeks of October. But the presumption that a successful military operation in South Waziristan will once and for all end terrorism in Pakistan is quite off the mark. Operation Rah-e-Nijaat (path to deliverance) is only a necessary first step to deliver Pakistan from the scourge of terrorism. It is by no means sufficient to wipe out the existential threat that fanatical Islamism poses to stability and security of Pakistan. If the various assessments of the Islamists' penetration in the Pakistani society are anything to go by, then even if Op Rah-e-Nijaat is successful, it will take a decade or more of unrelenting and ruthless action by law enforcement and security agencies to douse the flames of jihadist terror in that country. On the other hand, failure of this operation could see Pakistan being reduced to cinder by the jihadist fires.

    No doubt, breaking the back of the TTP's Baitullah (or should we say, Hakimullah?) faction and denying it a safe haven in South Waziristan will certainly disrupt and even degrade the capability and capacity of this group to mount terror attacks in Pakistan's heartland. Almost all the spectacular terror attacks in the past couple of years – Benazir's assassination, the bombing of Marriot hotel in Islamabad and Pearl Continental in Peshawar, the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, the assault on the GHQ in Rawalpindi – have either been claimed by, or been traced back to, this group. The 'Baitullah Mehsud network', a phrase used by the Pakistan army to distinguish it from other TTP factions, has been in the forefront of hitting the Pakistani state where it hurts the most by carrying out suicide bombings and launching fidayeen attacks against high-profile civilian and military targets. The actions of the 'Baitullah Mehsud network' have shaken to the core the confidence in the Pakistani state's ability to fight terror and imposed a siege mentality on almost the entire country. So deep are the psychological wounds caused by this groups that it has made many Pakistanis question the very survivability of their state.

    Quite aside it's brutality and savagery, its close association with the al Qaeda or the presence of a large number of foreign fighters in its ranks (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs, Chechens among others), what really distinguishes the 'Baitullah Mehsud network' from other TTP factions like that of Mullah Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulana Sadiq Noor etc., is both its extensive reach in Pakistan's hinterland as well as its choice of targets. Unlike the 'Baitullah Mehsud network' that uses its assets and linkages in Taliban or jihadist networks operating in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP to target government and military installations, and terrorise the civilian population, most other Pakistani Taliban warlords have primarily focussed on fighting a guerrilla war inside Afghanistan. It is for this reason that the Pakistan military and intelligence establishment believes that once they get rid of the Baitullah network, they will be able to end the wave of terror attacks inside Pakistan.

Other Pakistani Taliban groups have generally desisted from targeting Pakistani security forces unless forced to do so. Even when they have clashed with the Pakistan army or the Frontier Corps, it has been in their own areas. Their objective has only been limited to maintaining their control in these areas and ensuring non-interference by Pakistani security forces in their movement to and from Afghanistan to fight the US-led NATO troops and their Afghan allies. They have never really targeted civilians, or carried out attacks in the cities of NWFP or Punjab. These warlords have kept their lines of communication open with Pakistani security agencies and are not in favour of taking on the Pakistan army or destabilising the Pakistani state. In other words, these are the "good" Taliban.

    It is hardly surprisingly then that the Pakistan army does not consider this lot of Islamists a threat to the state, not for the moment at least. If anything, the position taken by these groups fits in well with the objectives of the Pakistan army in Afghanistan and makes them strategic assets of the Pakistani security forces. And even if there are any reservations about these groups, these will be ignored for the time being simply because these groups have so far taken a position of neutrality in the battle between the Baitullah Mehsud network and the Pakistan armed forces underway in South Waziristan. To move against these groups at this stage will open new fronts which the Pakistan army will find impossible to handle with the current force levels that it has committed to Operation Rah-e-Nijaat. Additional forces can be made available only by drawing down troops from the eastern front with India, something that the Pakistan army is so far not willing to even countenance.

In any case, an insurgency in a remote corner of the country which is aimed at the US-led international forces in Afghanistan and doesn't have direct fallout on the Pakistani hinterland is something that the Pakistan army could live with indefinitely, or so they think. The reason why the other Taliban groups are not targeting Pakistan is tactical – opening a front against Pakistan could catch them in a nutcracker situation and fritter away the gains they have made against the US troops in Afghanistan. However, the long term objective of all the Islamist groups – Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban, Punjabi Taliban, jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkatul Mujahideen etc – is the same: the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and making this a base for taking on the West.

Unless Pakistan wants to become a jihadist state, sooner or later it will have to move against all these other Taliban groups which are not only operating from its soil but have also established their writ over large swathes of territory, replacing the Pakistani state in these areas. An offensive against the "good" Taliban will become an imperative if the US belies expectations of an early, and ignominious, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and decides to stay the course and clean up the nests of terror that exist in the Afpak region. Since these Pakistani Taliban groups are committed to launching attacks against foreign troops in Afghanistan, there will naturally be a lot of pressure on Pakistan from the US and other Western countries to extend the military operations against these groups, something that could lead to all the Islamists forging a common front against the Pakistani security forces.

Not only will Pakistan have to take on all sorts of Pakistani Taliban, it will also have to end the network of jihadists in provinces like Punjab and Sindh if it really wants to get rid of the Islamist menace. The longer that the Pakistani state delays action against jihadist infrastructure in Punjab and Sindh, the more difficult it will become to dismantle the nurseries of terror that are operating right under the nose, and by accounts with the connivance, of the Pakistani establishment. The fact is that groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are becoming powerful by the day and could one day not too far in the future pose an even more potent threat to the existence of the Pakistani state than is posed by the Taliban.

As for the current wave of terror attacks, perhaps a successful Operation Rah-e-Nijaat will lead to a major reduction in these attacks. But in the short to medium term, it is entirely possible that the 'Baitullah Mehsud network' unleashes the full force of its terrorist assets against Pakistan both in retaliation to the military operation as well as in an effort to ease the pressure that is being mounted on its base in South Waziristan. In the event, one of three things could happen: one, public pressure could mount on the government to sue for peace with the Taliban; two, the attacks could stiffen the resolve of the government and the people to exterminate the terrorists no matter what the cost; and finally, there could be mixed response of the neither-here-nor-there sort that Pakistan has adopted for so long. Whatever the response of the Pakistani state and society, one thing is clear: Pakistan has entered into what is going to be a very long and bloody phase in its history.

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    <1430 Words>                    23rd October, 2009

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Friday, October 16, 2009

THE PROBLEM WITH AMERICA

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Why is anyone surprised that the US finds itself in a complete mess in Afghanistan as also in Pakistan? The portents of disaster became clear within the first few weeks of the Operation Enduring Freedom – the Kunduz airlift being a prime example – only they became manifest after a few years. The single biggest mistake that the US made was that it enlisted the Pakistan army as its most critical ally in the War on Terror, not realising that this was in many ways the nub of the problem and could never be the solution. Perhaps, under the given circumstances and geo-political realities, the US had no choice but to use the Pakistan army. This however does not answer why the US either turned a blind eye or continued to make concessions to the innumerable shenanigans of the Pakistan army on the issue of the Taliban. After all, unless the US has discovered the existence of the 'Quetta Shura' just now, why have they been soft-peddling this issue for so long?

    Clearly, the single biggest mistake made by the Americans has been their failure to force compliance on the Pakistan army which even now continues to draw a distinction between al Qaeda and Taliban, between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban and between 'good' jihadis (Lashkar-e-Taiba and others who don't indulge in terrorism in Pakistan and follow the instructions of the handlers in the Pakistan army and intelligence agencies) and 'bad' jihadis (those who are directing their attacks on targets inside Pakistan). The evidence of this came recently from none other than the spokesman of the Pakistan army who has been taking pains to make clear the army's intention to target the Tehrik-e-Taliban 'Baitullah Mehsud network', thus sending out a clear signal that the Pakistan army has no problems with the TTP as such, but only with those elements of this umbrella organisation of Pakistani Taliban who are waging war against the Pakistani state. In other words, the Pakistan army is willing to tolerate jihadists who target American soldiers in Afghanistan or innocent civilians in India so long as they don't launch attacks inside Pakistan.

    The primary reason for the inability to make the Pakistan army fall in line is that the Americans neither understand completely the nature of the Islamist phenomenon nor for that matter do they understand how the Eastern mind operates - the native cunning, duplicity, deception, instinct for siding with the winning side and most of all the tendency to give solemn assurances which they have no intention of honouring. The cultural milieu of this region is just too alien, and indeed slippery, for the Americans to know when they are being led up the garden path.

As a result, the Americans have tended to take things at face value, falling hook, line and sinker for any and every self-serving, if disingenuous, argument that has been given to them by the Afghans and the Pakistanis. From the manufactured outrage over the Kerry-Lugar bill and the drone attacks to the constant whining about Indian presence in Afghanistan, and from the desperate attempts to delink the al Qaeda from the Taliban, to the advocacy for giving the Pashtuns a greater stake in power in Afghanistan at the expense of the pro-US Tajik and Uzbek elements, the Americans seem either desperate enough or clueless enough to be buying whatever line, or lie, is sold to them.

    Why else have the Americans suddenly started subscribing to the nonsense of seeing the al Qaeda as being different from the Taliban? The fact of the matter is that the Taliban are nothing but a localised manifestation of the virulence that the al Qaeda symbolises at the global level. From Morocco to the Moro Islands, there is an underlying continuum in ideology, philosophy and world view that binds radical Islamic outfits. While the tactical and strategic alliances of these myriad Islamist groups may differ from place to place, their objectives are more or less similar. This is the reason why any attempt to draw a distinction between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban is laughable, if not downright dangerous. For anyone to say that the Afghan Taliban are no longer thick with al Qaeda or that they have disassociated themselves from the Pakistani Taliban and disapprove of their actions that destabilise Pakistan is at best, naive, and at worst, self-deception. While one can understand the Pakistani proclivity to indulge in this sort of a thing, what boggles the mind is the American's giving credence to this specious argument. At the risk of sounding apocalyptic, a Taliban government in Afghanistan is an open invitation to another 9/11 type attack in the US or Europe.

    Apart from the failure to understand the nature of the beast that they are fighting, another major problem of the Americans is that they are either clumsy, or ham-handed and very often apologetic in exercising their immense power and influence. It wouldn't be very wrong to say that they are either unaware of the influence and leverages that they command, or else they are uncomfortable using these instruments to force compliance. Had this not been the case, then after 9/11, they would not have been surprised when Musharraf accepted each and every of their demands. What they don't realize is that whatever they asked Musharraf was so small that he would have in fact been relieved, if not amused, by the list of demands put before him.

Even today, if the Americans were to really lean upon the Pakistanis and apprise them of all the horrible things that can happen to their country, there is nothing that they would not get out of them. All this talk in Pakistan about national dignity and self-respect is only so much hot air and a couple of pricks in the right places and to the right quarters will puncture this hot-air balloon. After all, many of those making inflammatory speeches against the Americans have stashed their ill-gotten wealth in bank accounts in the West, their children study in Western universities, they go for medical treatment to the West, the clothes and shoes they wear come from the West, their cars, their homes, their businesses, their holidays, their preferred destination for exile – the list is endless – is all in the West. And yet, instead of exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Pakistanis, the Americans are more concerned about their own vulnerabilities.

    What the Americans do not understand is that in this part of the world, the slightest hint of vulnerability leads to switching of sides. Had they understood this, there would be no talk of an 'exit strategy' from Afghanistan, nor for that matter would there be any public disclosure of the precarious security situation in Afghanistan, as was done by the deliberate leakage of Gen. Stanley McCrystal's assessment of the Afghan campaign. Even greater damage has been done by the reports of a secret dialogue with the Taliban. Quite aside the fact that this dialogue is being done with people who count for nothing, it is being used by the Islamists and their supporters as a sure shot sign of the imminent defeat of the US-led forces in Afghanistan, something that is making more and more people join the ranks of the Taliban who they see as the future rulers of Afghanistan. Cynical though it may sound, the reality is that negotiations never solve anything; they only enable the formalisation of something that will be decided on the battlefield.

    While there can be no denying that the US is in a very precarious situation in Afghanistan, all is still not lost. There is still a lot that can be done to retrieve the situation. But this can only happen if the US does what needs to be done to set matters right. If this means giving up the quest for a democratic Afghanistan and empowering local warlords by giving them money and weapons to defeat the Taliban, then so be it; if this means forging a common front with India (which incidentally is the only country to have done any worthwhile work to improve the lives of ordinary Afghans), then so be it; if this means squeezing the Pakistanis where it really hurts and forcing them into compliance, then so be it. One could go on and on, but suffice to say that unless the Americans get real, their defeat is inevitable, as is the next 9/11.

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    <1400 Words>                    16th October, 2009

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Friday, October 09, 2009

A TALE OF TWO OPERATIONS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Flush with its 'victory'
against the Taliban in Swat, the Pakistan army is now poised to launch the 'mother of all battles' against the Islamist insurgents in their stronghold in the Waziristan area. To its credit, the Pakistan army has taken its time to prepare for this offensive. If successful, this military operation will deprive the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies the control of a territory and a sanctuary from where they could operate with impunity and launch terror strikes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, if the Pakistan army is unable to wrest control of this area, or if it suffers major reverses and has to stop its ground offensive for any reason, then there is a danger it might result in a domino effect that could severely weaken the Pakistani state.

No doubt, the success of the operation in Swat and Malakand would have certainly raised the morale and confidence of the troops and lent a momentum to future military campaigns against the Taliban. It would however be wise to keep a perspective on what has been achieved so far and not go overboard in lauding the performance of the army. The reality of the Swat operation is that the Pakistan army has only wrested physical control of the area from the Taliban. Psychologically, the Taliban continue to instil dread in the minds of the people of the area. Although the Taliban no longer have a run of the place, and notwithstanding the recent successes of the army in arresting and eliminating some of the high-profile Taliban commanders, the bulk of the Taliban cadre has not only eluded the dragnet of the security forces, but are also able to frequently mount guerrilla attacks against both civilian and military targets.

What the Pakistan army has so far fought and won was largely a conventional conflict and that too against an enemy who was heavily outgunned. While the Pakistan army was equipped with tanks, fighter jets, heavy artillery and gunship helicopters, its adversary, even though well-entrenched in certain places where fierce fighting took place, was using no more than assault rifles, mortars, grenades and IEDs. Given the superiority it enjoyed, the Pakistan army was always going to win a set-piece battle against the highly mobile light infantry of the Taliban who would have found it impossible to stand an onslaught by a regular army using all the firepower at its command. This was the easy part, and in the case of Swat this was made even easier by the tactic of clearing out the civilian population from the entire area and then using overwhelming force against a lightly armed insurgent group without having to worry too much about civilian casualties.

The more difficult part is going to be keeping the peace and restoring a sense of security in the people by ensuring law and order and a terror free atmosphere. This next phase of the operation is even more critical than the physical ouster of the Taliban from the towns and villages they controlled in Swat. In this new phase conventional tactics are unlikely to work and will have to be replaced by counter-insurgency tactics, which in turn could embroil the Pakistan army in a long and 'dirty' war of attrition. The problems for the Pakistan army will increase as it regains control of other areas which are currently under the sway of the Taliban. As the army clears out newer areas, the theatre of operation will expand and with it the requirement of troops needed to first hold and then sanitise these areas of the Taliban.

Perhaps this is the reason why the Pakistan army has adopted measures that it believes will help in preventing a return of the Taliban. One of these measures is the setting of state-supported vigilante groups – Lashkars – that not only defend the 'liberated' areas but also assist the army in hunting down the Taliban cadre. The Lashkars also serve as a convenient alibi for the army to explain the hundreds of bodies of alleged Taliban cadre or supporters that are being discovered everyday in Swat and Malakand.

Reports in the Pakistani media suggest that most of these people have been victims of brutal extra-judicial killings by the security forces. There are stories of mass graves being discovered, of how the army has hurled arrested Taliban out of choppers over the areas still dominated by the Islamists, or how mutilated bodies of suspected Taliban have been found hanging from lamp-posts. It is believed that the army is not only trying to make an example of the Taliban, but also getting its own back at them for the mutilation of bodies of soldiers who were captured by the Taliban. For its part, the army denies any wrong-doing by its troops and conveniently blames these murders on local people who they say are exacting revenge from the Taliban.

Whatever the truth behind the mass murder taking place in Swat and Malakand, the efficacy of the tactics being adopted in ending the Islamist insurgency are quite uncertain. The summary executions of suspected Taliban are, for the moment at least, being welcomed by the victims of Taliban and adding to the support for the army. But while the army has successfully managed to establish a balance of terror with the Taliban, this could easily boomerang. Many innocent people will inevitably become victims if the mass killings continue. Not only will this fuel resentment against the army, it could easily lead to greater support for the Taliban. What is more, the execution of suspected Taliban will effectively close the door to any surrender or laying down of arms by the Islamists, thereby prolonging the conflict.

More importantly, the use of vigilantes could easily usher in an anarchic situation and make the task of restoring law and order next to impossible. One the one hand, there are serious questions about their effectiveness in resisting the Taliban once the army withdraws. On the other hand, if they remain effective, they could become a state within a state, something that will make a mockery of the objective of restoring the writ of the state in these areas.

The security dimension - area domination and control by the army – is only a necessary condition for restoring the lost writ of the Pakistani state in places which had for all practical purposes become Islamic emirates run by Islamist warlords. It is just as important to undertake the political, administrative and ideological measures necessary to isolate Taliban. Until now all these three aspects are missing from the strategy of the Pakistani state. For now, the people's antipathy for the Taliban has probably obviated the need to put in place the ideological, political and administrative effort needed to ensure that the Taliban can never comeback. But this situation could change very easily. If law and order remains disturbed, judicial system remains inefficient, administrative delivery stays dysfunctional and the local economy doesn't recover, the people's sympathy could once again shift in favour of the Taliban.

Therefore, before they tom-tom their success in Swat and compare it with the imminent failure of the US mission in Afghanistan, the Pakistanis will do well to keep in mind the experience of Americans in Afghanistan. When the Americans launched their offensive against the Taliban in 2001, they had everything going for them – overwhelming superiority, support of anti-Taliban forces and almost the entire international community, the contempt that ordinary Afghans felt for the Taliban and most importantly, promise of a better life that they held for Afghans. It took the Americans just one month to capture Kabul. Within a couple of weeks the Taliban were ousted from everywhere in Afghanistan.

Like the Pakistan army in Swat, the Americans enjoyed a lot of goodwill. It was expected that the international community would rebuild Afghanistan and usher in an era of development and stability in that country. The revulsion that they caused left the Taliban practically friendless. Local communities and warlords collaborated with the foreign forces and helped in hunting down the Taliban and settling their scores with them. At that time no one imagined that the Taliban would ever make a comeback.

But eight years later the tables have turned and the Taliban are once again on the verge to occupying Afghanistan. Partly because of their military tactics and partly because of their dismal development record, the Americans have lost whatever goodwill they enjoyed. The Taliban, on the other hand, have reorganised themselves and once again become a force to reckon with, something that they could have never managed without the support of local people. The renewed support for the Taliban is partly a function of the disaffection with the Americans, partly a result of the inability of the ISAF troops to provide security to local communities, partly a reaction to the failure of the international community to make any meaningful difference in the lives of ordinary Afghans, partly as a result of the coercion by the Islamists, partly because of continuing support and sustenance that the Taliban receive from official and non-official sources in Pakistan and last but not the least, because of the natural proclivity of the people to support they side they think will win the war, a conclusion that many Afghans have reached because of the defeatist mindset of the Western forces.

    Clearly, if the Pakistanis are to avoid a fate similar to that being suffered by the Americans in Afghanistan, they need to get their political, administrative and ideological act together and present the Pakistani state as a preferable and desirable alternative to anything that the Taliban might offer. The Pakistanis enjoy many of the advantages that were never available to the ISAF in Afghanistan. But these advantages could easily disappear if there is confusion over identifying the enemy – the distinction between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban or the distinction between the 'Baitullah network' of Pakistani Taliban and other Pakistani Taliban groups (drawn out by none other than the Pakistan army's spokesman in a TV interview).

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    <1675 Words>                    9th October, 2009

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Friday, October 02, 2009

CRIBBING OVER CONDITIONALITIES

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    With both houses of the US Congress having passed the 'Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act', Pakistan will soon start receiving an annual economic assistance package of $1.5 billion for the next five years. Normally a legislation such as this which triples the quantum of aid should be warmly welcomed by both the recipient country and the donor country. But the Kerry-Lugar bill has so far only caused immense heart-burn – in Pakistan where the conditionalities contained in the bill are seen as demeaning, or worse, an assault on the country's sovereignty and that too for a 'pittance'; among influential US Congressmen and Senators who continue to doubt Pakistan's commitment in fighting Islamist terror groups; and predictably enough, in India there is a sense of disquiet over the enhanced US assistance to Pakistan which many Indians feel will ultimately be used against India.

    Perhaps the Pakistanis have a point when they say that $1.5 billion per year is not going to go very far in achieving the ambitious objective of promoting "long-term development and infrastructure projects, including in healthcare, education, water management and energy programmes in all areas of Pakistan". Given the extent of mess in Pakistan, an economic aid package of around $ 5 billion might have just about helped turn things around. Of course, in the din surrounding the 'paltry' sum offered in Kerry-Lugar bill what is ignored is that direct economic assistance is only one part of the US aid to Pakistan. The US plays an important role in making available finance from multilateral institutions like IMF, World Bank and ADB, which in turn raise confidence on Pakistan in international financial markets and encourages trade and investment. What is more, the US also influences other countries to provide aid and assistance to Pakistan, for instance through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) forum.

While grumbles over the amount of economic assistance is understandable – Pakistanis claim that the War on Terror has cost the country anything between $35 billion to $50 billion – what is not understandable is the whining about how cheaply Pakistan has sold itself to the Americans. This is like saying that if the price was right, they would have no compunctions on swallowing the bitter pill of compromising their self-respect, independence and sovereignty by accepting the conditions enshrined in the aid package. Clearly then, it is not so much the compromise on the principle that bothers the cribbers; rather it is the 'peanuts' they are being paid for compromising on the principle that they find so outrageous.

    No doubt, prima facie the conditions imposed in the Kerry-Lugar bill appear harsh and humiliating for the Pakistanis. But viewed in the proper perspective, the complaints over the terms and conditions of the Kerry-Lugar bill are somewhat misplaced, more so since the violation of these conditionalities will affect not the economic assistance programme but only the security-related assistance, the details of which have not been specified. The violations can however be waived off "if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so." In other words, while the conditions list out US concerns and highlight the red-lines that Pakistan should not breach, it is entirely possible that despite Pakistani violations of these red lines, the security-assistance will continue as long as US strategic compulsions dictate so. This is exactly what happened during the 1980's on the issue of the Pressler amendment. Of course, Pakistan will once again have been fore-warned about aid being replaced by sanctions if it does not adhere to the markers set out in the Kerry-Lugar bill.

Indeed, strict adherence to the conditionalities would be good for Pakistan, good for the US and good even for India. Take for instance the US insistence on an elaborate and quite intrusive system of accounting and auditing of the aid package. This is being done to ensure that there are no leakages and diversions of the aid money and that money is used for the purpose it has been sanctioned. To the extent that this betrays a lack of confidence in the Pakistani state's delivery mechanism, it is natural for the Pakistanis to feel slighted. But the fact is that Pakistan has been notorious in misappropriating and diverting previous aid packages. While military and civilian officials and some politicians enriched themselves by siphoning off the money, the aid had little, if any, impact on the general development of the country. Instead of constructing Pakistan, US dollars ended up corrupting Pakistan. This time around the US is not ready to repeat the mistake of the past and disburse aid merely on the basis of assurances and proposals from Pakistan.

The strict accounting, auditing and monitoring procedures for the aid does not however raise the hackles in Pakistan as much as the conditions relating to democratic governance, combating terrorism and dismantling nuclear proliferation networks. On nuclear proliferation, the US secretary of state will have to certify that "the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks".

In addition, every six months, "the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense", shall submit a report that gives a detailed description of "Pakistan's efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise [and] an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan's financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program". Unless Pakistan wants to restart the nuclear Wal-mart being run by Dr AQ Khan with the connivance of Pakistan's military establishment, it should not really have a problem with this condition. The stopping of proliferation to and from Pakistan is something that India too should welcome whole-heartedly.

The second major objection being raised by Pakistanis relates to the conditionalities seeking to promote democracy in Pakistan and empower the civilian government and institutions. Every year the US secretary of state is required to certify that "the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan". Bi-annually the secretary of state will have to prove appropriate congressional committees with "an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration."

Only someone who seeks to perpetuate the hold of the army on the politics of the country would object to or resent this conditionality. In any functioning democracy where civilian supremacy is firmly established (India for example) such a condition would be meaningless because not only are all top military appointments are entirely the prerogative of the civilian government, all important policy decisions too are taken by the civilian authority, albeit after taking inputs from the military brass. But given the peculiarities and weaknesses of Pakistani democracy – the preponderant influence that the army exercises in the politics of that country – such a condition affirms US commitment to empowering civilian institutions in Pakistan and supporting a stable democratic order. As far as the Americans are concerned, they are trying hard to change the widely, and perhaps correctly, held perception inside Pakistan that they are more favourably inclined to and comfortable dealing with military strongmen who serve as a single window clearance in Pakistan as opposed to civilian politicians who have to try and keep the public mood in mind before taking any decision. For anyone in Pakistan to construe this condition to mean that the US will henceforth interfere in decisions on military promotions is quite preposterous. But even if this were the case, surely senior appointments in the army of people who are opposed to the Islamists and who are apolitical is something that is also in Pakistan's interest.

The third and potentially most critical conditionality is over the issue of terrorism. According to the Kerry-Lugar bill, the secretary of state has to certify that "the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups...including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws".

Every six months the secretary of state will have to provide to appropriate congressional committees "an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism."

Clearly, the benchmarks set on the issue of terrorism seek to make the Pakistani government live up to its oft stated commitment to "fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations". In other words, Pakistan will have to act not only against terrorist groups that threaten the US and itself but also against those groups that indulge in terrorism against India. The reference to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad and the inclusion of places like the LeT headquarters, Muridke, is a clear signal to Pakistan that the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' jihadists no longer washes with the US. Although in deference to Pakistani sensitivities, the final version of the Kerry-Lugar bill has removed any specific reference to sponsorship of terrorism against India by Pakistan-based groups, this is hardly a concession to Pakistan. If anything, the US Congress has made the terrorism benchmarks so much more broad-based that very little wriggle room has been left for the Pakistanis (or for that matter even the US) to continue playing favourites among the jihadists. This means that it is no longer enough to say that there will be no terror against India but also those jihadists who spread terror in Iran (Jundullah) or China (ETIM) will be curbed. This is exactly what is needed if Pakistan has to be transformed back into a modern and moderate state.

Pakistanis are being rather disingenuous when they argue that terrorism related conditions amount to an acceptance of the charges that Pakistan was indeed involved in sponsoring terrorism. It is one thing to be in denial over the activities of jihadists operating as instruments of state policy and quite another trying to deceive rest of the world of this immutable reality. Of course, the Pakistanis are justified in their apprehension that Pakistan will be held hostage to any act of terror in neighbouring by jihadist groups based in Pakistan acting on their own and without any state support, involvement or sponsorship. But the fact is that no one (not even India) expects Pakistan to deliver overnight on these terrorism conditionalities. What everyone expects however is a sincere and serious effort by Pakistan to dismantle the physical, political, and ideological infrastructure that provides sustenance to the jihadist groups. This includes ending the fiction of holding companies of terror groups like Jamaatud Dawa being mere charities. There is little doubt that the terrorism conditionalities impose a very onerous responsibility on the Pakistani authorities. It is going to be a very tall order for Pakistan to clean up its act, but this is unavoidable if Pakistan does not want to acquire the status of a jihadist state.

    Rather than being apprehensive, India should in fact welcome the Kerry-Lugar bill and the conditionalities it contains. The monitoring mechanism being put in place will address many of India's concerns about the economic aid being diverted for military purposes. The quantum of aid is such that it will at best keep Pakistan on life support and reduce it into a dependency of the US, which is not a bad thing for India. After all, India has been unable to influence developments in Pakistan or enforce compliance on Pakistan to its demands. As a result, India depends on the US and other Western countries to pressure Pakistan on issues of concern to India. The more Pakistan becomes dependant on the US, the more the possibility of India being able to use US influence on Pakistan for its own ends. The only two other countries that can exercise influence on Pakistan are China and Saudi Arabia, and neither is likely to intercede on India's behalf with Pakistan. To the extent that US assistance and influence will lead to modern schools replacing madrasas, health facilities being created, urban decay being arrested, economic growth providing employment to young people and weaning them away from throwing themselves into the fires of jihad, a stable democratic order, reduction in the political role of the army, dismantling of the nuclear proliferation networks and winding down of the jihad infrastructure, there is little reason for India to complain.

    With the Kerry-Lugar bill being passed, the ball will now be in the court of Pakistan which will have to decide whether to accept or reject the conditions contained in the bill. Despite all the angst over the conditionalities in the bill, chances are that Pakistan will accept the bill. Pakistan of 2009 simply does not have the economic, military and strategic space that was available to the Pakistan of 1980 when Gen. Ziaul Haq could reject the initial US offer of economic assistance by calling it 'peanuts'. The fact of the matter is that on its own resources Pakistan is no longer a sustainable entity. And while Pakistan could still try and develop a taste for grass by rejecting US assistance, there is no way it can economically sustain the fight against the Islamist insurgency without external assistance. The history of the subcontinent tells us that insurgencies sap the energy of the state and weakens it to a point where it collapses. The only way states can beat history is through external help which enable the state to counter the economic drain that an insurgency imposes. This is something that the Pakistanis should bear in mind before they mindlessly oppose the US munificence. What is more, the Pakistanis need to work out the fallout of the US calling its bluff in the event that the aid package is rejected.

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    <2610 Words>                    2nd October, 2009

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BEST AND WORST CASE SCENARIOS FOR PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Given the state of affairs in Pakistan, and the fast changing geo-political situation, it is quite clear that Pakistan cannot continue with the 'business as usual' approach. Reform – political, economic, social, religious and strategic – is a sine qua non if the Pakistani state has to survive and thrive. If the Pakistani elite are able to undertake the necessary rescuing reforms, Pakistan and rest of the region will pull back from the brink. On the other hand, if the reforms are not ushered in, or if a half-hearted and non-serious approach is adopted on the issue of reforms then there is every possibility that Pakistan will fall off the cliff, and what is worse, drag rest of the region along with it into the abyss. Depending on the course Pakistan follows, two possible scenarios could come into play.

The best case scenario runs as follows: The political climate in Pakistan stabilises. Politicians no longer attempt to short circuit the political process by seeking to use intervention by the army to catapult them into power. Political differences between the ruling and opposition parties do not destabilise the polity. The army's continues to exercise a major influence over the policy on issues of national security, but its role in politics is greatly circumscribed. The sidelining of the army enables the development of a democratic political culture which gradually ushers in a more liberal, tolerant and moderate political atmosphere which in turn acts as an effective counter force to the growing influence of the Islamists.

Problems in governance and administration don't disappear, but serious and sincere efforts are made to improve the situation and bring about greater accountability. The economic situation remains precarious but a tentative recovery gets underway. Foreign assistance and aid floods the country and allows the government to provide some relief to the people. Trade concessions and investment flows help to kick start the economy and provide employment opportunities to a large number of people. Huge investments in infrastructure projects have a multiplier effect on the overall economic situation. The agricultural sector flourishes because of the infrastructural projects like canals, dams, roads, electricity. There is a greater public investment in the social sector and health and education are treated as priority sectors.

The war against the Islamic insurgents continues with the security forces notching up notable successes and scattering the insurgents. While terror attacks do not stop, the danger of Islamists acquiring control of the state recedes significantly. The Islamists no longer are able to run a parallel administration in vast swathes of territory. Law enforcement agencies are able to penetrate and break jihadi networks (not only in the western parts of the country but also in Punjab and Sindh) and degrade the jihadists' capability to strike against the state. At the public level there is a reaction against the Islamists which enables the political establishment to reorient state policy in a moderate and liberal direction. The Pakistan army and intelligence agencies end their patronage of jihadi outfits and no longer make a distinction between good and bad jihadis. While the process of extirpating the jihad culture will take a long time, there is no longer any confusion or duality on the issue of jihad.

With the winding down of the jihad factory, a serious and substantive process of engagement commences with India. Improved relations lead to a boom in trade, travel and investment between the two countries. The Kashmir issue remains unsolved but efforts to find a mutually acceptable deal on the issue gain pace. Both India and Pakistan are able to work together on stabilising Afghanistan. Greater autonomy is conceded to the provinces which gives all the provinces a stake in the system and effectively addresses the grievances in disaffected provinces like Balochistan.

Perhaps the best case scenario is too good to be true. It is equally possible that the worst case scenario in which everything that can go wrong goes wrong, is too bad to be true, or so everyone should pray.

The worst case scenario runs as follows: The war against the Islamists stretches the Pakistan army to its ideological and logistical limits. Despite notching up a few successes, the army is unable to contain, much less eradicate, the jihadi terror groups. Every time the army frees one area from the Islamists, the insurgency shifts to another area. A consensus within the security and the political establishment on combating the Islamists remains elusive. As a result, elements in the army and intelligence agencies work at cross-purposes to the stated policy of the top brass. Divisions within the security establishment on the issue of Taliban ensure that no effective action is possible against the jihadists. A few major setbacks break the resolve of the Pakistan army, and the army is forced to stop all offensive operations and enter into 'peace deals' with the Islamists.

The basic strategic orientation of the Pakistan army remains unchanged – India remains the enemy, the Islamists an asset. The army continues with its 'running with the hare, hunting with the hound' game with the Americans – partaking the dollars, but keeping the Taliban option alive. The Americans are eventually forced to exit Afghanistan and after a brutal civil war, the Taliban acquire control over bulk, if not the whole, of Afghanistan. With the Taliban in control in Afghanistan, the Islamists run riot inside Pakistan. Initially they extend their influence insidiously but within a few months they start to challenge the Pakistani state which is unable to resist their onslaught. There are two options before the Pakistani state: one, take the war to the Taliban, which means going into Afghanistan; two, succumb to the Taliban – neither of them an easy choice and both with horrendous implications.

The Islamists extend their operations into Punjab and Sindh. They use the networks of state sponsored jihadi organisations to consolidate their position in these areas. The law and order situation collapses. Widespread sectarian violence breaks out and this brings in countries like Iran into the fray.

All hope of economic revival dies. There is capital flight and trade and industry come to a practical standstill. Rising unemployment and economic distress levels create massive unrest in the country. International assistance flows in for some time, but then dries up because Pakistan is unable or unwilling to deliver on the wish list that accompanies the aid. As a result, the economy goes into a tail spin and the state becomes bankrupt and is unable to discharge even its basic functions.

The political instability only adds to the problems. The government and the opposition are daggers drawn and no effort is spared to pull the government down by hook or by crook. Corruption is rampant and all development activity grinds to a halt. The army once again plays the political power broker, making and breaking governments at will. The judiciary resists for some time but is utterly ineffective in enforcing its decisions. The political tussle prevents any attention being paid to the existential crises facing the state. Even as the state continues to recede (a redux of the Bahadur Shah Zafar syndrome) the politicians continue to conspire to attain high offices of the state.

The failure of politics to solve political problems leads to ethnic nationalism boiling over, especially in Balochistan. The movement for an independent Balochistan gains strength with the weakening of the state. International powers start backing the Baloch national movement. The Baloch however face the hostility not only from remnants of the Pakistani state but also from the Taliban. Up north, the Chinese try and insulate themselves from the fallout of a collapsing Pakistan through a forward policy which includes occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan. A Civil war like condition exists throughout the country. Attempts are made to convert Karachi into an independent city state which results in ethnic warfare and blood-letting.

The failure of the state raises questions about the safety of nuclear weapons. The international powers try to denuclearise Pakistan but this effort is resisted. Attempts to 'snatch', disable or destroy these weapons meet with limited success. The Islamists finally gain control over these weapons and use them as a currency for bargaining with India and with the West.

With chaos and anarchy reigning in Pakistan, there is a flood of refugees into India which imposes intolerable strain on the social and political fabric of India and an unsustainable economic burden on the Indian economy. The jihadists take advantage of the unsettled conditions and infiltrate in large numbers into India, unleashing horrendous acts of terror, which severely disturbs communal relations inside India and creating an unmanageable law and order situation.

Clearly, Pakistan's best case scenario is also India's desired scenario. The big question is whether India is even aware of the implications of an imploding Pakistan. Equally important, does India have the policy instruments required to ensure that Pakistan's best case scenario, or something close it, becomes a reality? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is in the negative at this stage.

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    <1500 Words>                    24th September, 2009

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