Friday, November 26, 2010

26/11: TWO YEARS ON, BARBARIANS EXULT AS JUSTICE ELUDES

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Two years after the barbaric mass murder of innocent people in Mumbai, justice has continued to elude the families of victims. The Pakistani perpetrators, masterminds and sponsors of the 26/11 attacks are either openly strutting about the streets of Pakistani cities or are enjoying a rest and recreation break behind prison walls, secure in the knowledge that the faux trials in Pakistani courts will end in a predictable manner – i.e. with their acquittal. Not that all this comes as a surprise. Given the complicity of the Pakistani state (read army and intelligence agencies) in the attacks, the prosecution of the people arrested in Pakistan was never going to be anything more than an eyewash.

    Within hours of the arrest of Ajmal Kasab, one of the ten terrorists who attacked Mumbai, the Indian security agencies had got enough information to pin the blame for the attack on the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. Despite knowing of the links between the LeT and the ISI – the former being a virtual paramilitary force of the Pakistan army – the Indian government tried to give the benefit of doubt to the Pakistani state by talking of the involvement of 'elements within the Pakistani establishment'. Had the Pakistani state not been involved in planning and provisioning and providing training for the attacks, it would have grabbed the opening given by India to bring the guilty to justice. That this has not happened coupled with the fact that all efforts have been made by the 'deep state' of Pakistan to delay the trials of arrested people is irrefutable evidence of the participation of the state machinery and agencies in the entire macabre episode.

    Even the trial which is underway in Pakistani courts against six of the accused was the result of the enormous international pressure that was put on Pakistan by Western countries whose nationals were murdered by the Pakistani terrorists in Mumbai. But apart from Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Zarrar Shah, the other under-trials are mere foot-soldiers, and almost all the main masterminds like Sajid Mir, Abu Qafa and others whose names have been revealed by David Headley have got away scot free. As far as the trial itself is concerned, there are serious questions being raised over the seriousness and sincerity with which it is being conducted. Given that the trial is being conducted in camera, there is a veil of secrecy over it. Even the charge-sheet and the evidence that has been produced by the Pakistani authorities is unknown.

    All assurances given by the Pakistani authorities on bringing the guilty to justice have been violated. Take for instance the assurance given by Pakistan's interior minister to the Indian home minister on the issue of providing voice samples of some of the masterminds. Six months after Rehman Malik gave a solemn assurance, not one step has been taken in this direction. Meanwhile, the Pakistani authorities have tried to complicate the trial by sending one dossier after another seeking more information from India on the attacks. Given that the Mumbai terrorists were in constant communication with their masters in Pakistan for nearly 72 hours while the horror was playing out in front of TV screens across the world, surely the Pakistani intelligences would have got a fix on the people sitting in Pakistan who were issuing instructions to the terrorists. But so far there is total silence on this count.

Most of the information sought in the dossiers sent by Pakistan is either totally irrelevant or a clumsy effort to deflect, dilate and thereby delay the investigation. Worse, the questions are more in the nature of a phishing expedition to try and ferret out the depth and if possible source of information that the Indian security agencies have gathered so that next time around the Pakistani can take care to cover their tracks. But even as the Pakistanis try to cover the tracks of their auxiliaries who carried out the attacks, explosive new information and revelations have come pouring out. The interrogation of the Pakistani-origin terrorist, David Headley aka Dawood Gilani, has implicated the ISI and LeT, including some senior serving officers of the Pakistan army, including the ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha who is supposed to have visited Lakhvi in prison. Small wonder then, that the Pakistan state continues to be in complete denial and resorting to lies and obfuscation to protect its jihadis – uniformed and in mufti.

Forget about taking action against the masterminds, the Pakistani government and agencies have allowed the organisation that carried out the attacks to operate openly. Despite a ban being imposed on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its front organisation Jamaatud Dawa, these groups enjoy complete impunity to carry out their murderous trade of collecting funds, operating training camps, making hate speeches and recruiting jihadist cadres. So much so that the so-called civil society of Pakistan feels no compunctions in inviting the head of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafiz Saeed, to give a talk, as was done by the Lahore High Court Bar Association some days ago.

In spite of the stonewalling on action against the terrorists, Pakistan is audacious enough to call for talks with India and asking India to not become hostage to a single incident. It is almost as though the Pakistanis want India to forget that 26/11 ever happened. Normally it is not a bad idea to move on and put the past behind. But in the case of Pakistan, every time India has tried to put the past behind and move on to normalise relations, the past has inevitably repeated itself. Take for instance the train bombings in Mumbai in 2006. India did move on and what happened? 26/11. Perhaps if India was to now forget 26/11 and move on, it would be followed by another such spectacular attack. Clearly then, India must draw a red line now. Not doing so and re-engaging Pakistan without the perpetrators and masterminds of 26/11 being punished would amount to inviting Pakistan to launch more such attacks.

    More than anything else, the 26/11 attacks which have scarred the Indian psyche, need to be used both to build up an impregnable and uncompromising internal security architecture as well as developing instruments to deter and if necessary inflict unacceptable damage on the country that sponsors and supports terrorist activities in India. To do so India needs to bring into play all the components of national power – overt and covert, economic and military, conventional and sub-conventional, diplomatic and political – to protect the lives and properties of its citizens.

*********************************************************************

    <1090 Words>                    26th November, 2010

*********************************************************************    

Friday, November 19, 2010

COLD START AS A DETERRENCE AGAINST PROXY WAR

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    For some months now, the Indian Army's 'Cold Start' (CS) doctrine has been attracting a lot of attention from Western diplomats, generals and political leaders. The reason is simple: the Pakistanis, who were reluctant to move against their 'strategic assets' (aka Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliates like Lashkar-e-Taiba), have self-servingly flagged this doctrine as proof of India's hostile and aggressive design. Waving the 'threat' from India, the Pakistan Army has been resisting pressure from the West to redeploy troops from the eastern border to the western front. The gullible Westerners appear to have bought the Pakistani line and are seeking to persuade India to renounce the CS doctrine. This, the Westerners believe, is the magic bullet to address Pakistan's sense of insecurity and allow the Pakistan Army to move against terrorist safe havens inside Pakistani territory.

    How much the CS doctrine has spooked the Pakistani is clear from the statements of the Pakistani political leaders and military generals. Addressing senior officers in the GHQ on 1st January, the Pakistan army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani called the CS doctrine "an adventurous and dangerous path". He flogged this theme during his talk at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and later in a meeting with Pakistani journalists where he showed deep concern over the Indian Army's preparations for making the CS doctrine operational. Taking the cue from him, the National Command Authority of Pakistan issued a statement in which it said that an "offensive doctrines like Cold Start...tend to destabilise the regional balance". The Azm-e-Nau military exercises, held in April-May this year, were primarily aimed at countering the CS strategy of the Indian army. Completely at a loss to understand Pakistan's recalcitrance over acting against Islamist terror groups, the West appears to have latched on to the Pakistan's India bogey as a possible solution to end the Pakistani double-game in the war on terror. Hence, the efforts to try and make India back off from the CS strategy.

The problem, however, is that no amount of disavowals by India, and no amount of security assurances by the US or other Western nations, will ever convince Pakistan, which has been badly rattled by the CS doctrine, that India's basic defence posture is defensive in nature and orientation. Despite the Indian army chief Gen. VK Singh denying the existence of any such doctrine, the CS strategy has acquired a life of its own in the Pakistani military mind.

Come to think of if, this is probably not such a bad thing from India's point of view. Even as strategists debate over the practicality or otherwise of the concept of a limited war under a nuclear overhang and the CS doctrine as a military strategy – after all, the battleground has a nasty habit of springing surprises that can ground the most well-prepared battle plans – the doctrine's validity has been confirmed by Pakistan's frenetic efforts to put in place a counter strategy. That the Pakistan army is preparing to counter the CS by its conventional forces and not through use of nuclear weapons is a tacit acceptance of both the theory of limited war under a nuclear overhang as well as the exploitation of this strategic space through the device of CS doctrine.

More important, however, has been the utility of the CS doctrine as a tool of psy-war. Not only has it unsettled the adversary, it has also put in place an effective deterrent against the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan-sponsored terror groups in India. In other words, Pakistan can no longer be sure on whether or not India will resort to lightening strikes across the border in response to actions by Pakistani terror groups inside India. The prospect of sudden retaliation by India effectively means that the impunity with which Pakistan was exporting terror to India is in grave danger. Perhaps this is one of the major reasons why there has been no major terrorist attack in India since 26/11.

    But the utility of CS as a deterrent to sub-conventional warfare or proxy warfare depends in large measure on the credibility of the deterrent. In a sense, the dynamics and dialectics of a sub-conventional deterrence like CS are no different from those of nuclear deterrence. As and when India effectively operationalises the CS doctrine, it will have to ensure that the adversary knows the resolve of the Indian state to implement this strategy in response to another major terrorist strike. This is critical to prevent any miscalculation or misreading by Pakistan of India's resolve. While the retaliation doesn't have to be immediate – to quote Mario Puzo "revenge is a dish that tastes best when it is cold" – any failure by India to resort to CS in response to a terror attack supported, inspired or originating from Pakistan will degrade the value of the deterrence.

It is in this sense that the CS doctrine is a double-edged weapon for both India and Pakistan. To retain credibility India will have to retaliate militarily using the CS strategy, otherwise not only will India loses all credibility, it will embolden Pakistan to continue to unleash jihadist terror on India. But retaliation will put India on the escalation ladder which could easily go beyond the parameters of scope and scale of CS operations. The big unknown is that with sub-conventional deterrence in the form of CS doctrine breaking down, how much time and what level of desperation of either party will force them to take the next escalatory step which in turn could lead to making real the spectre of a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent.

To an extent, the escalation ladder will depend on how Pakistan responds to a CS by India. The dilemma for Pakistan will be that if it doesn't respond with its nuclear weapons, it will not only validate India's belief of space for a limited war under a nuclear overhang but more seriously, rob Pakistan of its nuclear deterrent, if only in the context of a limited war. In other words, Pakistan will face a Hobson's choice: it can either degrade the quality of its nuclear deterrent or it can unleash a nuclear holocaust which will not only wipe it out but wreck horrendous damage on India and indeed on rest of the world. 

    As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region by forcing Pakistan to exercise extreme caution in unleashing terrorist violence in India. Far from asking India to renounce the CS doctrine or put it in the cold storage, the West needs to impress upon Pakistan that it can no longer expect India to roll over and play dead in response to actions of terror groups based inside Pakistan. If Pakistan stops using terror as an instrument of state policy, the CS strategy will stay in the cold storage. Otherwise, all bets are off.

*********************************************************************

    <1150 Words>                    19th November, 2010

*********************************************************************


 

Friday, November 12, 2010

INDIA, US AND THE 'P' WORD

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Try as it might, India just doesn't seem to be able to get over its much disliked hyphenation with Pakistan. Even when the 'hyphenators' make a studied effort to avoid hyphenating India with Pakistan, the Indians seem hell bent on raising the 'P' word and descending back into the quagmire in which it had been enmeshed for better part of the last six decades. This needless obsession with Pakistan came tumbling out during the visit of the US President Barack Obama. Until Obama backed Indian claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it almost appeared as though Pakistan was the biggest agenda item in the US-India summit. Everything else - defence deals and compact on fighting terrorism through intelligence sharing, capacity building and technology transfers, investment and trade pacts, cooperation in space and education, collaboration on energy, health and environmental issues, easing of the technology denial regime, support for India's membership to groups like the NSG, Australia group and Wassenaar group, India's role in East Asia and Afghanistan – seemed to recede into the background.

    This is not to deny that Pakistan's relentless use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy poses a big threat to peace and security in the region and as such is a matter of serious concern to India which has faced the brunt of Pakistan's export of terrorism. It is also true that post 26/11, a lot has changed in India as far as Pakistani sponsored terrorism is concerned. Indeed, India is on a short fuse, and to the extent that this sentiment was conveyed to the Americans in full measure, the outcry in the media over Obama's nuanced approach towards Pakistan served the purpose. But to expect the US president to indulge in unrestrained 'Paki-bashing' while he was on Indian soil was trifle unrealistic. Not only is the US dependent on Pakistan for its logistics lines to Afghanistan, it also harbours fond hopes of the Pakistan army putting an end to the sanctuary and support it is giving to the Taliban/Al Qaeda insurgents fighting against the ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

    It was not as if Obama glossed over Pakistan's complicity in terrorism, only his subtlety was lost on his hosts. After all, by staying in the Taj Mahal hotel and addressing the Indian and American CEOs at the Trident, Obama had sent out a strong and unmistakable message against terrorists and their patrons. While his not blaming or naming Pakistan for its involvement in the 26/11 attacks could be compared to someone paying tribute to the victims of the 9/11 attacks without condemning Al Qaeda, Obama made suitable amends for this oversight later on during the visit. The Joint Statement not only calls for "elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan" but also states that "all terrorist networks, including Lashkar e-Taiba, must be defeated" and Pakistan must "bring to justice the perpetrators of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks."

    If what Obama said on terrorism must have sounded jarring to the Pakistanis, he would have added injury to insult by what he did not say – the 'K' word – at least not in the way the Pakistanis expected or hoped. If anything, Obama's take on resolving the Kashmir issue was almost entirely in sync with India's position. Although Obama offered to "play any role that the parties think is appropriate", he was quite candid in stating that "the United States cannot impose a solution to these problems". His endorsement of the Indian line that talks between Indian and Pakistan should first concentrate on building confidence before they grapple with an issue like Kashmir should have dashed the desperate efforts of the Pakistanis to try and convince the Americans that the road to Kabul went through Kashmir.

    It is actually quite bizarre for a Pakistan which is on the verge of an economic and political meltdown and is dependent on handouts from the West to meet its day-to-day expenses to expect the US or other Western countries to lean upon India to appease Pakistan. After all, if these countries haven't been able to stop the double-game being played by a tottering Pakistan, how delusional is it for the Pakistanis to imagine that these countries can pressure a rising (if you accept Obama's hyperbole, then 'risen' and 'emerged') power like India to surrender its vital interests and compromise on its territorial integrity and unity to satisfy Pakistan?

Contributing to the failure of the Pakistani gambit to link Kashmir with Kabul is the fact that nobody in the West seems to know what exactly India is supposed to do to assure Pakistan that India doesn't have any hostile intention towards Pakistan provided Pakistan stops sponsoring terrorism into India. Clearly, nothing short of India abandoning Kashmir to Pakistan and disbanding its army is ever likely to satisfy Pakistan. In the given situation, the choice before Pakistan is simple: either Pakistan learns to accept the realities and adjusts to them by entering into a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with India; alternatively, it continues with its ruinous hostility towards India and consequently its slide into anarchy and bankruptcy.

Apart from the 'K' word, the Pakistanis have been raising the bogey of Indian Army's 'Cold Start doctrine' to deflect pressure on them to stop their sponsorship and support to Islamist terrorist groups and undertake military operations to wipe out the terrorist safe havens in places like North Waziristan. Rather disingenuously, the Pakistanis use the Cold Start doctrine as an excuse to avoid redeploying the troops required for draining the terror swamps in FATA and other parts of Pakistan from the eastern front with India to the troubled western borderlands. As far as India is concerned, the Cold Start doctrine's value is similar to that of the nuclear weapons. While the latter serves the purpose of deterring conventional warfare, the former appears to have been successful in deterring, or at least severely degrading, the proxy or sub-conventional war that Pakistan had been waging against India. The Cold Start doctrine will remain in the cold storage as long as Pakistan behaves; but if Pakistan continues to spawn terrorism into India, then surely it must expect retaliation, of which Cold Start is but one component. Paradoxically, far from being a destabilising factor in Indo-Pak relations, the Cold Start doctrine has actually introduced stability in the region by holding out the prospect of swift retaliation by India in the event of an audacious terror attack on Indian soil by Pakistani proxies.

By deterring and dissuading Pakistan from adventurism by using its own national power and means holds a lesson for India. Instead on depending on the US or any other country to intercede on its behalf to make Pakistan behave, India needs to have its own game plan in place to protect itself from malign actions of its adversaries. Such a plan of action must not only be centred on tackling the threat, but also on grabbing the opportunity for normal relations with countries like Pakistan, should such an opportunity present itself. In its dealing with other countries India must avoid raising the 'P' word; rather it should let other countries initiate discussions on this issue. When India mentions the 'P' word, it inadvertently hyphenates itself with Pakistan. On the other hand, if India studiously avoids mention of the 'P' word, it will be in a better position to not only dictate terms to its interlocutors when they raise the issue, but also make them see the logic and correctness of the Indian stand on the issue.

*********************************************************************

    <1270 Words>                    12th November, 2010

*********************************************************************


 

Wednesday, November 03, 2010

FIREWALL AFPAK

By

Sushant Sareen

    It is by now quite clear that the US and its allies have run out of ideas in Afghanistan and appear to be committing the cardinal sin of reinforcing failure in the manner in which they are pursuing the war. Simply put, right from 9/11, the Americans have been fighting the wrong war and in the wrong country. This is not to say that the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2001 was a mistake, only that it was not an end in itself. Liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban should have been only the first step in combating Islamo-fascism and terrorism that was symbolised by the Taliban / al Qaeda compact. A far bigger battle – to use Islamic terminology, Jihad-e-Akbar – was to confront the entire infrastructure (including the ideological streams) that gave rise to the forces of radical Islam. But this was a battle that was never joined, at least not in any significant manner.

Unfortunately, the Americans never seemed to realise that real problem lay in Pakistan, from where the forces of terror received support, sustenance and sanctuary, not to mention the ideological justification for jihadism. Ironically, the Americans enlisted the biggest source of jihadist terrorism – the Pakistan army – as an ally in the War on Terror. More than anything else, it is this fact that has led to a situation where the most formidable military machine that the world has ever seen is on the verge of an ignominious defeat at the hands of a rag-tag bunch of fanatics.

    As things stand, the current strategy of the Western forces in Afghanistan is not working. And yet if they are persisting with the non-strategy, it is with a hope and prayer that in a couple of years time they will have in place an effective Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) that can take over bulk of the security functions from them. If this happens, the West can drawdown their presence in Afghanistan and keep only a small force in place to assist and advice the ANA and ANP. But what if this is not how things play out? What is the fallback position? There are as yet no answers to this all-important, if troubling, question.

    One fallback position is probably the reintegration and reconciliation policy. Cut through the clap-trap, and this really means wooing the Taliban and entering into some sort of a deal with them. Here too the hope and prayer is that the Taliban agree to stick to the terms of the deal and do not try to re-impose their rule on the whole of Afghanistan. Perhaps the West can even live with this. But what they are adamant on is that the Taliban break-off their relations with the al Qaeda. But expecting the Taliban to sever their ties with al Qaeda is a delusion. The fact of the matter is that even if Mullah Omar himself agrees to expel the al Qaeda, he will be repudiated by the militant commanders who are currently fighting under his banner but who have in the last decade struck a very close relationship with the al Qaeda.

    In a recent TV interview, the former Pakistan army chief (only for a couple of hours) Gen. Ziauddin has revealed that way back in 1999 the Pakistan security forces were all set to catch Osama bin Laden. Ziauddin, who was then the chief of the ISI, has said that at that time the cabal of generals surrounding Gen. Pervez Musharraf – people like Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed and Lt. Gen. Aziz – had told him to lay off Osama because catching him would harm Pakistan's national interest. Even more important was the revelation that Mullah Omar had told Ziauddin that if he moved against Osama he will be killed by his followers. This was in 1999 when ostensibly the al Qaeda was living on Taliban mercies. Today, after a decade of fighting together against a common enemy – the West – only the most delusional mind will imagine that the Taliban will give up the al Qaeda.

    Clearly then, the reintegration and reconciliation policy has failure writ large on it. If anything, it will tantamount to defeating the very purposes for which the war was being fought. Worse, it will allow the Taliban to slide into power without, in a manner of speaking, a shot being fired. The big question then is what are the options before the US and its allies? One possible option is the 'partition plan' which has been floated by the former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill in his article "A de facto partition for Afghanistan". But there are serious problems with this plan.

For one, it is unlikely if the partition plan with find favour with any of the Afghans. Whatever their differences with each other, there is hardly an Afghan, whether Pashtun or non-Pashtun, Shia or Sunni, pro or anti Taliban, who supports a partitioning of Afghanistan. Secondly, the Blackwill plan advocates partitioning Afghanistan along ethnic lines and calls upon the US to defend the predominantly non-Pashtun West and North and leave the Pashtun-dominated South and East to the depredations of the Taliban. It ignores the fact that the geographical space that the Pashtun's occupy extends beyond the Durand line in the East up till the Indus river. In other words, a Taliban dominated Pashtun entity in Afghanistan will invariably extend into the Pashtun areas under Pakistani control which constitute a natural hinterland for the Afghan Pashtuns. Effectively, Blackwill's plan will not just partition Afghanistan but could end up splitting Pakistan along the Indus, with a Taliban dominated Pashtun state (de facto if not de jure) in the North West and an independent Baloch entity coming into existence in the South West of Pakistan.

Third, a partition plan in which the US and other foreign forces will continue to be present in Afghanistan, albeit in the North and West, will continue to give the Islamists from around the world a legitimate cause to continue with their war. Fourth, a war in Afghanistan between the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns will almost certainly destabilise Pakistan, the impact of which on regional and global security has not been catered for in the Partition plan. Fifth, a partition of Afghanistan will raise serious issues about how US will work its logistics lines for the 40,000 – 50,000 troops. While the cost of logistics for such a large force running through the Northern route will be less than the estimated $120 billion per annum being incurred presently, they will still be huge – around $ 40-50 billion.

All that the partition plan hopes to achieve can be better obtained through a 'firewall' strategy and that too at a fraction of the cost. Under the firewall strategy, all foreign forces will pull out of the Afpak region, i.e. no boots on the ground except for a handful of military advisors and intelligence operatives. The fallout of a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, and eventually Pakistan, will be contained by building a massive firewall around this region so that the Islamists and their Pakistani patrons stew in their own juice.

In large measure, parts of the firewall around Afpak are already in place; all that needs to be done is to further beef up these firewalls. On the Western side, Iran will serve as a natural firewall. Once the US quits Afghanistan and perhaps also Pakistan, the Iranians' problems with the Sunni extremist Taliban will erupt and force Iran to firewall its border with Afghanistan. In the north, the US can help the Central Asian States monetarily and technically to build up their capacity and their border defences to prevent the Islamists from entering their countries. In the east, India already has firewalled its borders with Pakistan and further efforts can be made to make the border defences foolproof. In the south is the Arabian sea where the US and India can work together to prevent the Islamists from breaking out. The aerial route can be blocked by enforcing an Iraq type no-fly zone by bringing into operation the existing UN resolutions against the Taliban. The only possible outlet will be China, which will face the dilemma of containing the Islamists who are active in Xinjiang and keeping its relationship with the West intact on the one hand and on the other hand staying true to its 'all weather friendship' with Pakistan.

Building the firewall around Afpak doesn't mean abandoning the region to the Islamists. All it means is that the Americans will fight the Islamists indirectly by backing all those forces that want to resist the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, the firewall plan will build a far wider and probably more robust regional security alliance in which the burden of the US will be shared substantially by important regional players all of which will have a stake in keeping the Taliban and their virulence at bay.

The one big advantage of the firewall plan which will follow a withdrawal of US troops in the region will be that it will free the US from its dependence on Pakistan and put an end to the Pakistani game of 'looking both ways' on the issue of Islamic terror groups. With Pakistan losing its main leverage – the logistics supply lines that run through its territory – the US will be in a far better position to dictate terms to the Pakistanis to come clean on clearing the mess. The choice before Pakistan will be clear: either they end the double game and exterminate the Taliban and other Islamist militias that they have been promoting and protecting or else they pay the price for this policy.

*********************************************************************

    <1610 Words>                    4th November, 2010

*********************************************************************