A GAME THEORY FOR PAKISTANI POLITICS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    With the exit from the government of the Maulana Fazlur Rehman led faction of the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUIF), the perpetually buffeted – by an overbearing military, an hyper active and interventionist judiciary, a hostile media and fickle and demanding allies – PPP-led coalition government in Pakistan is facing yet another bout of instability. The wily Maulana has walked out of the coalition at a time when it was contending with multiple crises. Not surprisingly, questions have once again been raised questions over the survivability of the government, more so because another crucial coalition partner, MQM, is literally straining at the leash to break away from the coalition.

Adding to the troubles of the government is the coalescing of the opposition parties, and some members of the ruling coalition, against the Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST) bill that the government must get passed through parliament to get the next tranche of the Structural Adjustment loan from the IMF. The failure to impose the RGST could lead to a drying up of the aid tap. It is feared that the economic meltdown and hyper inflation that will result if aid flow stops might unleash large scale street disturbances and economic rioting that will almost certainly have an impact on the political system in the country.

    At a time when Pakistan is staring down the edge of an abyss, it is saddled with a government that is perceived to be both horrendously corrupt and astoundingly incompetent, and therefore increasingly untenable. An impression that the current government's days are numbered has been steadily gaining currency. Going by recent historical record, the life of an elected government is generally around three years, and if history is any guide to future then the PPP government has almost reached its sell-by date. But while all the signs on the ground and reports in the media would suggest that the government is on its way out, the problem is that despite predictions of mortality of the regime for nearly a year and a half now, the government has managed to survive. Therefore, as things stand, there is no simple answer to the question of whether the government will collapse or will survive for some more time, and perhaps even complete its full term in office. An educated guess of the future trajectory of Pakistani politics can be, however, made with the help of what can be called the game theory of Pakistani politics.

    The political game in Pakistan has an iron law – actually a paradox – according to which the stronger a government, the more vulnerable it is and greater the chances of its ouster because of a crisis; conversely, a weak and tottering government is actually stronger, not so much in terms of its ability to govern or deliver but in terms of its chances of survival in office. 'Strong' civilian governments in Pakistan, which appear to have covered all their bases and tied up all the loose ends that could unravel their hold on power, invariably tend to overplay their hand. This invites a reaction from opponents who defend their interests by acting either alone or in concert with other affected players. Weak governments, on the other hand, are always compromising and giving in to pulls and pressures in order to survive. Plus, they are not considered a threat by the other players who want such governments to continue as long as they have not tied up other loose ends of their political game plan.

Of course, there are some complexities in this iron law which add to the difficulties in making the right call on the longevity of a government, especially a civilian government, in Pakistan. One complexity arises from the multitude of players in the political game – Pakistan army, major political parties and personalities, judiciary, and the US; while some analysts would count the media as an important player, the reality is that the media is nothing more than a comprador, manipulated and misused by the major players for their objectives. The political calculations made by the main players, either individually or in conjunction with other players, and the decisions they take on the basis of these calculations can complicate the outcome of the game.

The other complexity is the perception factor. If the perception is that the government is weak and can be brought down easily, there is little incentive for the other players to pull it down, at least not until they have got what they wanted either from the government or from the situation that exists on the ground. The perception of a weak government leads to a situation that gives rise to a counter perception that the government is here to stay, i.e. 'a strong government'. But the moment a government is seen to be a 'strong government', the anti-forces create conditions and hatch 'conspiracies' to pull it down. If the anti-forces succeed, the government falls; but even if they fail, they end up weakening the government to a point where it is seen as a pushover and not a threat to any of the other main players.

While factors like political and constitutional circumstances, political skill and wild cards (natural disasters, accidents, sudden death of an important player etc.) also play an important role as swing factors, their real significance lies in their role as inputs that change the perceptions of the major players and thereby their calculations and decisions. Ultimately, whether or not a government survives becomes a function of the combination of the perceptions and calculations of the players and the interplay of interests and insecurities of the players.

A classical manifestation of the theory outlined above is the current state of politics in Pakistan. The incumbent government is arguably one of the weakest governments that Pakistan has seen and yet it has managed to defy the odds and held on to office by riding out all the political storms. Compared to the 'strong' regimes like those of Nawaz Sharif and Gen Musharraf which were unable to survive the major crises that confronted them – Kargil in the case of Nawaz Sharif and the dismissal of the chief justice and the lawyers' movement in the case of Musharraf, the Zardari led dispensation has lurched from one major crises to another, but survived for far longer than anyone had ever imagined when the hostile propaganda spearheaded by the malleable media started around a year and a half back. So much so, that until a few weeks back the anti-forces had become so disheartened that they were forced to concede that the Zardari regime is here to stay i.e. it is much stronger than the perception. But as soon as the perception of 'strong' government started doing the rounds, a new set of crises erupted which threaten the survival of the government. In other words, while the hostile media campaign did weaken the government, this weakness helped it survive; on the other hand, when the media projected the government as unshakeable, at least for the time being, it suddenly started getting jolts from all sides.

Admittedly, the government has been helped by a set of fortuitous circumstances – no acceptable alternative to the incumbent, constitutional complexities in derailing the political system, disturbed internal security situation that militates against any move that disturbs or destabilises the political scene, the support of the US for the government, the unwillingness of Nawaz Sharif to take any precipitate political action that could easily end up derailing once again the parliamentary system, Asif Zardari's ability to roll with the blows, and retreat to fight another day, as also his deft political moves to disarm his opponents (by reaching out to them and offering them concessions and rewards) and exploit their differences with each other to prevent them from ganging up against him.

Even so, the ruling coalition is so fragile that it can be ousted without much trouble. But this is precisely why there doesn't seem to be any great urgency to get rid of the government. In other words, the government is going nowhere just yet, at least not until the other players decide that the time has come for its ouster. The day such a decision is taken – either because the interests of the other players (especially the army) mandates toppling the government, or because the drift in governance brings the country to the brink of collapse and chaos and necessitates a military intervention – the government will collapse in a matter of days. But until that day, it serves the interest of all the players in Pakistan's political game to keep this government in place and extract concessions that further their personal and political interests, let the government earn opprobrium for tough and unpopular decisions, and after having milked the PPP-led coalition for what it is worth, dump it.

*********************************************************************

    <1470 Words>                    23^rd December, 2010

*********************************************************************

PIPEDREAMS ABOUT PIPELINES

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The superlatives being attributed to the signing of the Inter-Government Agreement (IGA) and the Gas Pipeline Framework Agreement (GPFA) for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline appear rather farfetched especially when seen in light of the obstacles that stand in the way of implementing this mega-project. On paper, the benefits of the TAPI pipeline are undeniable for all the countries that fall in the route of the pipeline. But political and strategic considerations on the one hand and economic factors like gas price, transportation, taxation and transit fees, security of supply etc. on the other hand are together unlikely to let this project ever become a reality. Unless these obstacles are removed, the fate of the TAPI pipeline proposal won't be very different from that of the much vaunted Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline.

    Unlike the IPI project, the TAPI has certain advantages. For one, there is no opposition to it from the US and its allies. If anything, the West has been pushing for the project as an alternative to the IPI pipeline, more so in the wake of 9/11 after the US forces entered Afghanistan. But even during the Taliban era, the US oil major UNOCAL was pitching for the Turkmen pipeline project and was involved in a rather murky competition with an Argentine company Bridas for the pipeline contract. After the Taliban regime was toppled, the project was once again revived when in 2002 an IGA and GPFA were signed between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to build what was then known as the TAP pipeline. But soon it became clear that the pipeline would not be economically viable without including India in it.

To rope in India, the Asian Development Bank was brought in. For India the project held both economic advantage (cheap and abundant energy supply which would bridge the future gas demand and supply gap in India) as well as diplomatic benefit (a symbol of regional cooperation, an affirmation of India's commitment to rebuilding of Afghanistan and as a means to become an important player in the energy sector in Central Asian states). With the West supporting the project, finding the funding the project and the companies for implementing it will be a cakewalk, something that is not the case with the IPI where international companies and financial institutions would risk US sanctions by dealing with Iran. But these positives are far outweighed by the negative factors associated with the project that could prevent it from getting off the ground.

    Although India has signed the new IGA and GPFA, there are a large number of critical issues that will need to be sorted out before India signs the all important Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) which will decide the techno-economic issues like route of pipeline, price of gas, security of supply, fixing liability in the event of disruption of supply etc. So far the only issue that has been resolved is that of the availability of gas in the South Yoloten-Osman gasfield which has replaced the Daulatabad gasfield that had been earmarked in 2002 and on which there were serious questions being raised over the size of gas reserves. But without complete satisfaction on all the other issues outlined above, which will involve torturously long and detailed negotiations that can take a year or more, the work on the pipeline project cannot start.

Under the GPFA that India has signed, India will be buying the gas on the Turkmen border and then handing it over to the consortium to transport it to the Indian border where it will take the delivery of the gas. This is a totally untenable proposition unless accompanied by iron-cast guarantees on safe passage of gas and provisions for compensation to India in the event of disruption of supply. There will also be issues regarding the fixation of transit fees and transportation costs that will be charged by Afghanistan and Pakistan which will need to be thrashed out before the pipeline is constructed and the gas starts flowing. If the IPI is anything to go by, where the Pakistanis asked for ridiculously high transit fees from India, then India could easily lose interest in the TAPI project.

    Even if the techno-economic issues are sorted out and adequate safeguards are built into the GSPA to India's satisfaction, there are very major political and strategic challenges that will have to be surmounted for the TAPI pipeline to see the light of the day. While the Americans are backing the project and see it not only as an important component in rebuilding Afghanistan but also for strengthening their hold over the Central Asian energy sector which is currently dominated by the Russians and which is being keenly eyed by the Chinese, their timing has gone horribly wrong. Perhaps if the project had been implemented in 2003-04 when the Islamist terrorism in Afpak region was in retreat, it would have served as a monument to a new Afghanistan. But since that time, the security situation has regressed enormously with the resurgence of the Taliban / Al Qaeda terrorists. What makes the pipeline project appears even more undoable is the fact that the proposed route of the pipeline will run through the Taliban heartland of South Afghanistan.

    The project will also have to contend with withdrawal of at least the bulk of the NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014. With the construction of the pipeline not likely to start before 2012-13, by which time the drawdown of NATO troops would have commenced, a huge shadow of uncertainty hangs over the entire project. With the security situation expected to deteriorate, it would almost certainly militate against the construction of the pipeline. Of course, the incumbent Afghan government has been promising adequate security to the pipeline and has pledged to dedicate around 7000-8000 troops to guard the pipeline. But to rely on the assurances of a government whose writ doesn't even run in Kabul for providing security to the pipeline would be quite foolhardy. The only way for the pipeline to come up would be if it gets security guarantees from the Taliban. But would India like to be part of a project that becomes a milch cow for the Islamist terror groups?

    It would be equally reckless on India's part to depend on a hostile and increasingly unstable Pakistan to provide security to the pipeline or even to live up to its commitment to prevent any disruption in supplies. In this context, it may be recalled that in attempting to convince India to join the IPI project in the mid 1990s the then Pakistani president told the Indian High Commissioner that even in event of a war between India and Pakistan the disruption of supplies would not be for more than a couple of weeks because that is how long the two countries could fight!

The proponents and supporters of the TAPI project also make the argument that the international binding agreements that will govern the pipeline project will force Pakistan to ensure gas supply to India. But a compelling counter argument is that these international agreements will not be worth the paper they are written on if Pakistan implodes or descends into chaos and anarchy or comes under the sway of jihadist forces, as increasingly appears likely. Even if such a drastic fate was not to befall Pakistan, it will be of little comfort to India. Given the flagrant violation by Pakistan of all international agreements, treaties and conventions against export of terror to its neighbours and rest of the world, and its audacious support, sustenance and sanctuary to Islamist terror groups in defiance of the international pressure, who can guarantee that Pakistan will honour international commitments and obligations on uninterrupted gas supply to India?

Asides of Pakistan's natural proclivity for thumbing its nose at international norms of behaviour, there is also a possibility that Pakistan might use the gas line as a lever against India to prevent the hydropower projects being constructed in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. And if Pakistan does resort to such disruptions, the costs in terms of loss of production of units that depend on the Turkmen gas would balance out any benefit that India hopes to derive from the project.

It is not as if all these factors have not been taken into account by the Indian government. But if despite these factors India has joined the TAPI pipeline then it is because, for now at least, India is 'stringing along' the other countries involved in the TAPI project. The objective is to not to be excluded out if the pipeline ever gets built. At the same time, India is neither pinning any hopes nor planning its growth strategy on the gas that may or may not flow through the TAPI pipeline. In other words, there are no pipedreams in India about the pipelines.

*********************************************************************

    <1480 Words>                     16^th December, 2010

*********************************************************************