POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS IN PAKISTAN

The art of the impossible    

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    A meeting in Lahore between the Federal Law Minister Babar Awan and the former chief minister of Punjab and PMLQ leader, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, has shaken up the political scene in Pakistan by opening up the possibility of new political alignments which had until now been dismissed as impossible. While a marriage, even if of convenience, between the beleaguered PPP and the fragmenting PMLQ, cannot be ruled out, tying the knot is easier said than done. After all, not only is a lot of bad blood between the rank and file of the PPP and PMLQ that will have to be washed away – for instance, Asif Zardari had called the PMLQ 'Qatil League' while the Chaudhry Pervez Elahi has more then held PPP responsible for the break-up of Pakistan – there is also a big ideological barrier that will have to be crossed before the two parties can jump into bed with each other.

If the leadership of the two parties can manage the glaring contradictions that militate against an alliance between them, it will lead to far-reaching changes in the political power structure inside the country, not just in the centre but also in Punjab and Sindh. It is of course another matter altogether whether these changes will lead to greater political stability or if it will become the precursor to greater instability. But even if the meeting between Awan (clearly acting on behalf of Asif Zardari) and Elahi doesn't lead to anything more than an exchange of views over a cup of tea, it will have achieved a major objective: signalling that the PPP has a range of options which it can exercise if it is pushed against the wall, either by its allies like MQM or by its opponents like PMLN.

    The immediate provocation for the PPP to open channels of communication with the PMLQ was the steady hardening of opposition by the PMLN and the restiveness of the MQM which had almost quit the coalition before Asif Zardari managed to pull them back. There was a growing sense within the PPP that the MQM was no longer a reliable ally and that alternatives to the MQM had to be worked out so that in the event of a pullout by the MQM, the coalition at the centre would have the numbers to retain its majority in the National Assembly. The move, spearheaded by the chief of the PMLF, Pir Pagara, to reunite the various Muslim Leagues had also spooked the PPP because it depends on a split Muslim League to win its seats in Punjab. A unified conservative vote would effectively reduce PPP into a marginal player in Punjab where nearly 70-75% of the vote is cast in favour of right wing conservative parties.

After winning the approval of PMLQ President Shujaat Hussein for this reunification move, Pagara was in the process of approaching Nawaz Sharif to play his role in unifying the Muslim Leagues. The meeting between some PMLQ leaders with Shahbaz Sharif had further added to the discomfiture of the PPP which was receiving reports that Nawaz Sharif had given the go ahead for building up support to move a motion of no-confidence against the PPP government to effect an in-house change in government. The fact that PMLN had also started building bridges with the MQM only convinced the PPP that the opposition was coalescing to bring down the government.

Amidst all this manoeuvring, Nawaz Sharif made the mistake of declaring that while he was in favour of reuniting the Muslim Leagues, he could not countenance the inclusion of people like the Chaudhry cousins, Sheikh Rashid, and some others, as becoming part of the unified Muslim League. On their part, the Chaudhries too were averse to a unified Muslim League in which they would have to play second fiddle to the Sharifs'. The PPP took advantage of this opening created by Nawaz Sharif's inflexibility to shaking hands with people who, according to him, deserted him and joined hands with Gen. Pervez Musharraf to break the PMLN and form the PMLQ which ruled the roost as the King's party during the Musharraf regime.

By reaching out to the PMLQ, the PPP could have scotched the moves to reunify the Muslim League. But there are other advantages that will accrue to both PPP and PMLQ if they actually are able to strike an alliance, provided of course in the process of joining hands the two parties are able to keep their flock together. The PPP will be able to get rid of the MQM's constant arm-twisting and will get a free hand to launch a clean-up operation in Karachi to end the wave of target killings in that city. At the centre, the PMLQ will replace the MQM and lend a more solid majority to the ruling coalition. The two parties will also be able to form their own government in Punjab, where although the PPP is part of the PMLN-led coalition, it is feeling sidelined in the decision making in the province which is considered Pakistan's 'controlling authority'. The PMLQ which has been fragmenting – there are currently four distinct factions in the Q League, all of which are pulling the party in separate directions – might be able to unify the party with the glue of power in both Islamabad and Lahore.

While the advantages of a tie-up between the PPP and PMLQ are clear, what is not so clear is whether the leadership of the two parties will be able to take their party folk along in the new political arrangement. The task of tying up with PPP is somewhat more difficult for the PMLQ than the other way round. For one, there are differences between Shujaat and Pervez Elahi on an alliance with PPP, with the latter keen on getting back in the driver's seat while the former is more circumspect about embracing the PPP. Even if the cousins forge common ground, how many of the party men will they be able to take along with them? Unlike the PMLN in which the party revolves around the Sharifs', and the PPP where Asif Zardari is the undisputed boss, the Chaudhries are only first among equals. If anything, PMLQ is an agglomeration of politicians who are who are individually influential in their pocket boroughs and do not depend on the Chaudhries to win their elections. Given that many of the top PMLQ leaders are viscerally opposed to the PPP, coupled with the fact that joining hands with the PPP won't earn them any favours with the 'establishment', there is little incentive for many Q leaguers to follow the lead of the Chaudhries on the issue of an alliance with the PPP.

Then there is the issue of the existing divisions within the Q. There is one faction of the Q – Likeminded – which is keen on forging its own path and cultivating its own identity and which refuses to accept the leadership of the Chaudhries. The likeminded group is somewhat irrelevant as far as the current power politics is concerned because of most of the top figures in this faction are not members of any legislature at this point in time. A second faction is what is known as the 'forward bloc' which comprises of those lawmakers who want to rejoin the PMLN. A third faction comprises of those who are leaning towards the PPP. And finally, there is the faction which remains loyal to the Chaudhries. Perhaps the only reason why the PMLQ has not split formally until now is the anti-defection law, which has been further strengthened after the passage of the 18^th Amendment under which the party president enjoys unbridled powers over his party legislators and can have them disqualified for the slightest infraction. Another reason why the 'forward bloc' has not switched sides is because it has felt ditched by Nawaz Sharif who, after initially leading them on, has left them out in the cold.

While the fear of losing their seats could play a big factor in keeping the Q League together, a lot will depend on the political calculations of the legislators. If the lawmakers think long-term and come to the conclusion that they will be signing their political obituaries by joining a PPP-led coalition, they might well decide to cast their lot with the Sharifs' and try and get re-elected on a PMLN ticket from their constituencies in the by-elections. This gambit will of course entail the risk of fighting another election – hardly a palatable prospect for any politician if he can avoid it – that once they resign enmasse to join the PMLN, it is possible that Nawaz Sharif might not give them the party ticket to win back the seats they sacrificed. In either case, a mini general election that will be caused by mass disqualification could throw up some rather unpleasant political configurations in the legislative assemblies from the point of view of the ruling coalition. In other words, the entire political calculus driving the realignment could end up in a disaster.

Conversely, if the PMLQ lawmakers give priority to the present over the future, and go with the bird in the hand, there will still be problems as far as providing good and efficient governance is concerned. In a political system that runs on dispensing patronage, there will probably very little latitude available to spread the political goodies among supporters, what with bankruptcy staring Pakistani state in the face. If, however, political expediency rules over the imperatives of sensible economics, as is likely to happen, then it will only worsen the state of affairs in Pakistan and push the state further towards failure.

There will also be the attendant issues of competition for the same political space. In a sense, the political space occupied by the PPP and PMLN did not clash as much as it will in the case of the PPP and its ally ANP on the one hand and the PMLQ on the other hand. The PMLN is primarily a GT road party and dominates in the Raiwind (Lahore) – Rawalpindi belt which extends a little into Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa along the GT road (Hazara division). The PPP and PMLQ however have a pan-Pakistan footprint and therefore more clash of interest. There are serious local rivalries between the two parties all over Punjab and even worse in Sindh. Papering over these rivalries is going to take some doing and on current record appears to be a mission impossible.

All things taken into account, while the prospect of a political deal between the PPP and PMLQ appears to be very clever, almost Machiavellian in scope, it's hardly the sort of political arrangement that has a long shelf life. But then in a country obsessed with a mythical past and which puts a huge premium on the present, power politics by definition has a short shelf life, more so when the only agenda before an incumbent is to ensure the completion of his term in office. Therefore, if a PMLQ-PPP alliance is able to ensure the survival of the PPP-led coalition for the next two years, it will have served its purpose.

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WHAT MUSHARRAF LEFT UNSAID

 

    Gen Pervez Musharraf's mea culpa in an interview to Der Spiegel need to be seen as the ranting of a loquacious former military dictator harbouring fond, if utterly unrealistic, hopes of making a comeback in his country's politics. Although the interview to Der Spiegel was full of self-serving half-truths, it nevertheless revealed the inherent shallowness of the military strongman. Peeling away his pretentions of being a statesman, the interview showed him up as a purveyor of kitsch politics. What is worse from Pakistan's point of view, the interview reaffirmed Pakistan's image as a rogue state. While what Musharraf said, including his sensational confessions on raising terrorist groups and exporting Islamic terrorism to India, is important, equally important is what he left unsaid during the course of the interview.

The times of military coups in Pakistan are over

Yes, they are but only until another man on the horseback decides to end the charade of democracy and assume power directly rather than running the show from the sidelines. As for the judiciary, strutting about in its new found empowerment and 'independence', setting 'a bar on itself to not validate a military takeover', this is something that will only be known when the next coup takes place. The standard operating procedure in Pakistan after a coup-maker usurps power is that he disbands the sitting judiciary and packs the benches with pliant judges who then 'validate' the coup. Far from the current judges not validating a coup, they appear hell bent on inviting one, albeit under the ridiculous pretence of protecting the rule of law by the dubious invocation of article 190 of the constitution which calls upon all executive and judicial authorities to aid the Supreme Court! The Supreme Court of Pakistan is playing the same role that bureaucrat-politicians like Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar Mirza played in the 1950s when they invited the military to intervene in the politics of the country.

The non-performance of the government is the issue

Sure it is an issue, but who is to decide this issue – the courts, the military or the people? Successive civilian governments in Pakistan have been dismissed or overthrown on precisely this pretext. Of course, since non-performance alone doesn't sound very convincing, the charges of corruption and in some cases, anti-state activities (security risk) are added to make the putsch more saleable. The Musharraf regime's performance, when measured against the seven point programme he laid out after overthrowing Nawaz Sharif's government in 1999, was, to say the least, dismal. The mess that he left behind is one of the major factors for the poor performance of the current government.

We have a culture of vendetta and vindictiveness in Pakistan

And Musharraf epitomises this culture. His hatred for Benazir Bhutto was born out of the disciplinary action that Benazir's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had taken against his father who was found involved in some dodgy transactions while posted in a diplomatic mission in Indonesia. While Musharraf did not follow Gen. Ziaul Haq path by sending Nawaz Sharif to the gallows, he ensured that Nawaz Sharif was put away in prison for 25 years. During the time Nawaz Sharif was in prison, he was humiliated and treated like a common criminal. After Nawaz Sharif was sent to exile, Musharraf refused to let him return even for his father's burial. Musharraf's cronies tortured Nawaz Sharif's associates to get them to implicate Nawaz Sharif in more cases. The treatment meted out to Gen. Ziauddin Butt, the man who replaced Musharraf as army chief for a few hours – properties seized, pension annulled, and thrown into solitary confinement for two years – is probably Musharraf's definition of humaneness. The murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti by Musharraf's hit-men from the Pakistan army was also borne out of his ego clash with the Baloch sardars.

The West blames Pakistan for everything

This is typical of the denial that pervades the Pakistani psyche of the wrongs committed by them. Worse, it displays the rather puerile mindset that has become the hallmark of the Pakistani establishment, especially when it comes to India. What can be more infantile than a former head of state, even though a illegitimate military dictator, to indulge in silly rhetoric of the sort that Musharraf does when he says "nobody asks the Indian Prime Minister.....". Well, nobody asks the Indian Prime Minister because India doesn't pose a threat to the civilized world by running a nuclear Wal-mart, exporting terrorism, and extorting handouts from the rest of the world not because of any merit but because of its nuisance value.

Pakistan is always seen as the rogue

Not without good reason. Musharraf himself admits later on in the interview that Pakistan formed terrorist groups and turned a blind eye to their depredations in India because the Pakistan government wanted India to discuss Kashmir. If use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy is not the hallmark of a rogue state, what is? This is a classic case of negotiating with another country not on the basis of logic and arguments but by pointing a gun to its head. Actually, Pakistan negotiates with two guns – one pointed at the head of its interlocutor and the other one pointed at its own head. Amazingly, Pakistan seems to be getting away with this two-gun diplomacy. First it was only India which since the days of Ayub Khan has fallen for the nonsense that it must make a gesture to Pakistan and understand the compulsions of the Pakistani regime otherwise the mad Mullahs will take over. Now even the Americans are falling for this tactic.

It is the right of any country to promote its own interests

Of course it is. But has Pakistan promoted its interests by supporting, training, funding and providing sanctuary to Islamic terror groups? Strange way of promoting national interest, especially since Musharraf himself has on a number of occasions argued that these terror groups pose an existential threat to Pakistan. Worse, the use of terrorism has effectively lost Pakistan whatever little sympathy there was among some sections of Western public opinion for Pakistan's position on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. There is hardly any country in the world which is now ready to back the Islamist cause in Kashmir because of the rippling effect this will have on jihadist movements worldwide. But in a sense Pakistan, which is today an international basket case, has indeed promoted its interests by 'looking both ways' on the issue of Islamic terrorism. Pakistan's USP today is that it is the epicentre of Jihad Inc. and this is what bestows upon it the billions of dollars in arms and aid that keep the country afloat.

There is no such thing as a moderate Taliban

But wasn't it Musharraf himself who advocated the cause of the moderate Taliban after 9/11? This statement of his is typical of the flip-flop-flip that Pakistanis adopt according to convenience on the issue of terrorism. Shortly after saying that there is no such thing as a moderate Taliban, the same Musharraf, in another interview, batted in favour of negotiations with moderate Taliban! And this is the man that George W Bush was 'thick' with?

Why, nine years after 9/11, does Pakistan remain a breeding ground for international terrorism

Simple, because Musharraf looked both ways on the issue of terrorism and the current military leadership continues to follow the Musharraf policy. Actually, Musharraf had given hints of this policy just after 9/11 when in an address to his nation to explain that he was junking the Taliban he invoked the treaties that Prophet Mohammad had signed for reasons of expediency and which were revoked as soon as the circumstances changed. The Pakistanis made a show of aligning themselves with the Americans but continued to support, sustain and sponsor their Taliban allies. Fortunately for the Pakistanis this double game was somewhat hidden by the fact that some of the Islamist groups turned their guns on Pakistan, and the subsequent actions of the Pakistan army against these renegade elements was used to convince the world that Pakistan was indeed fighting the Islamists. But the reality was quite different. And it is this continuing flirtation with the Taliban that has made Pakistan the breeding ground of international terrorism.

Mr Khan [the nuclear technician] is a characterless man

This is quite royal coming from Musharraf. Only the most gullible will buy Musharraf's line that the Pakistan army and intelligence agencies were totally unaware of the nuclear supermarket that was being run by the rogue technician. Clearly, Khan became the fall guy for the proliferation network that was being run by the Pakistan army to get missile technology from another rogue state – North Korea – and money from countries like Iran and Libya.

MILITARY AND MILITANTS JOIN HANDS TO TARGET NATO CONVOYS?

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

It has been a double whammy for the American war effort in the Afpak region: not only have the Americans been made to eat humble pie and 'apologise' to the Pakistanis for the helicopter attack on a Frontier Corps (FC) border post in Kurram agency, they have also had to suffer an ill-disguised blockade by the Pakistan army of NATO logistic supply lines that run through Pakistan. Worse, the NATO supply convoys have come under fierce attacks inside Pakistan with over a 100 oil tankers having been burnt in different parts of Pakistan in the last one week since the blockade of the supply lines began. While NATO supply containers have been routinely coming under attack inside Pakistan for quite some time now, and looted supplies have been openly sold in the markets of Peshawar and Quetta, the attacks on NATO oil tankers last week indicate that something far more sinister is behind these attacks, which have until now been conveniently placed at the doorstep of the Islamist militants.

A closer look at the recent spate of attacks on NATO supplies suggests that the decade long double-game being played by the Military-Militant Alliance (MMA) in the war on terror is finally coming out in the open. And if this is not the case, then it means that the Taliban network inside Pakistan is far more extensive and far more lethal than previously imagined. Until now, most analyses of the spread of the Taliban network in Pakistan have limited the area of operation of the Islamist terror groups to the tribal badlands straddling Afghanistan (FATA), the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and South Punjab. Although many Islamist groups are known to have a significant presence and network in Central and North Punjab (Lahore, Faisalabad, Chakwal, Rawalpindi, Attock) as well as in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan and in Karachi, their influence and operations in these areas have been downplayed and not considered a major threat to the stability of the Pakistani state.

But if indeed the latest attacks on NATO convoys have been carried out by the Taliban and other Islamist groups aligned with them, then it clearly means that the Taliban are a pan-Pakistan phenomenon and have not only acquired the ability and reach to hit targets at will but are practically knocking on the door of the national capital, Islamabad. After all, if the Taliban are able to burn dozens of NATO oil tankers on the heavily guarded GT road and that too next door to the Pakistan army run Defence Housing Authority colony then it is time for alarm bells to start ringing, more so since this is not an isolated incident and similar attacks have taken place in the past as well.

Equally worrisome is the impunity with which the so-called militants have burnt NATO tankers in places like Shikarpur in Sindh and in the Baloch dominated areas of Balochistan. There have so far been little or no reports of Taliban networks in rural Sindh. The Shikarpur attack therefore suggests that the Taliban have extended their tentacles into Sindh as well. As far as Balochistan is concerned, it is a well known fact that the provincial capital Quetta is the headquarter-in-exile of the Afghan Taliban leadership. But while the none-too-hidden activities of the Taliban Shura in Quetta offers a plausible explanation to the targeting of NATO convoys in and around Quetta and in the Pashtun regions of Balochistan, it beggars belief how they can launch spectacular attacks on NATO convoys in the presence of the oppressive security cordon by Pakistani security and intelligence agencies to keep Baloch freedom fighters at bay in and around the provincial capital.

Even more strange are the attacks by Taliban in Baloch populated areas like Mastung, Khuzdar and Kalat. These are areas where there is no known Taliban presence. Baloch nationalists and ordinary citizens in these areas are struggling to shake off the oppressive and repressive yoke of Pakistan army, which has placed an almost blanket security cover over the region. There are multiple checkpoints all along the highways which are manned by the military and FC. Under these conditions how could dozens of Islamic militants riding on motor-cycles or in double-cabin SUVs come out of nowhere, burn down a score or more of trucks and then disappear into the thin air?

It is simply disingenuous to suggest that perhaps these attacks were staged by either criminal gangs or by Baloch freedom fighters. The latter have no problems with the West and have never expressed any intention of attacking NATO convoys. Harping on the possible involvement of the criminal gangs is also stretching the limits of credulity. At best, the criminal syndicates role in the attacks would be limited to buying the looted NATO supplies at a low price and then flogging these goods in the local markets. This only leaves the Pakistani security forces as the prime suspect in staging these attacks, either directly or through their jihadist 'strategic assets'.

Clearly, the Pakistan army is bringing into play its main leverage over the US – the supply route – to go for broke in Afghanistan. For the moment, Pakistan appears to be succeeding, what with the Pentagon falling over backward to appease the Pakistani generals. At the same time, the Pakistanis are keeping wriggle room for themselves by resorting to the subterfuge of projecting the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani as a pro-US general who is under pressure from his more hard line colleagues to turn the squeeze on the Americans. This is exactly the tack that was adopted after the 26/11 attack when reports filed by a Pakistani journalist acknowledged that though the attack was originally planned by the ISI, it was hijacked by the Al Qaeda after Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha junked the plan on taking command of the ISI.

Be that as it may, the blockade of NATO supplies and the targeting of NATO convoys is classical brinkmanship which should be quite familiar to anyone acquainted even remotely with the culture and mindset of the Punjabi dominated Pakistani military. Fortunately for the Pakistanis, the failure of the Americans to understand the nature and character of the Pakistani state and society has made them blink this time. Perhaps it is this lack of understanding of how Pakistan operates which is leading the Americans to mollycoddle the Pakistan army. Why else would the Pentagon provide the Pakistan army alibis by talking about elements within the ISI and Army who 'might be interacting with terrorist organisations in ways that aren't consistent with what the government and military are doing'? That this is happening despite the fact that the Pakistan army as an institution is hand in glove with the very Taliban who are killing US soldiers in Afghanistan is, to say the least, rather strange.

Unless the Americans wake up and smell the coffee, an ignominious defeat in Afghanistan is unavoidable. The first thing that the Americans need to do is call the Pakistani bluff. Alongside, the US needs to start applying pressure where it really hurts the Pakistanis – economically, diplomatically and militarily. Third, the US must re-evaluate its strategy in the Afpak region. Resolving to stay the course and persist with the current non-strategy, as US President Barack Obama has done recently, is only reinforcing failure. Finally, the US should be prepared to read the riot act to the Pakistanis and force compliance on them or else promise to make a 'horrible example' – to use Henry Kissinger's evocative warning to Zulifikar Ali Bhutto – of Pakistan. This is imperative even if the US wants to save Pakistan from itself.

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    <1275 Words>                8^th October, 2010

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Getting 'stoned' by the stones

By

SUSHANT SAREEN (Senior Fellow, VIF)

            Since June, the stone-pelting in Kashmir seems to have left the Indian establishment stupefied. The government, both in the state and at the centre, has been reduced to a state of paralysis, almost as though they have been 'stoned' by the stones. To add to the confoundedness of the government, parachute journalists, with little sense of history and even less sense of reality, have been indulging in needless breast-beating about the situation in Kashmir and making recommendations, not to mention analyses, which are not just downright stupid but also dangerous, if not treasonous. The loss of  perspective on what is actually happening in Kashmir has led to panicky responses at all levels of the government, which increasingly seems to be losing not just its nerve, but also its will as well as its wits in handling the unrest in the Valley.

             There are three great myths about the latest round of stone-pelting: one, that it's a peaceful protest; two, the security forces are using disproportionate force to control the disturbances; and three, it is a completely new phase in the unrest in Kashmir in which for the first time young people are coming out on to the streets, ready to face bullets. These three myths exemplify the complete loss of perspective that has afflicted even normally sober and sensible people in India.

            First and foremost, there is nothing, repeat nothing, peaceful about stone pelting. Yes, stones are not as lethal as the bullets used by terrorists. But stones injure and maim and can even kill. For those who consider stone-pelting a peaceful demonstration, one can only challenge them to face a barrage of stones with the equanimity that they expect from the policemen on the streets of Kashmir. Better still, a stone-pelting demonstration should be carried out in front of their houses. Assuming that in keeping with their commitment to not use disproportionate force, these bleeding hearts should allow the mob to do as they please (something that is implicit in the way they castigate the police's management of the stone-pelting crowd), including setting their offices or homes on fire, as has been done by the 'peaceful' protestors in Kashmir on the few occasions when the police was ordered to stand down. One can be sure that faced with such 'peaceful' demonstrations against them, these bleeding hearts will rush for protection to the police whom they have no compunction in vilifying today.

            As far as use of disproportionate force is concerned, the facts on the ground clearly indicate that the force used to contain the stone-pelters is far from being disproportionate. In the last 100 odd days, there have been around 100 deaths in police firing – an average of one death per day. The 'disproportionate force' argument would hold weight if the police and paramilitary forces were to fire indiscriminately on the stone-pelting crowd and kill a few dozen people in every such encounter. Also, compare the casualty rate of 1 per day with the casualty rate during the days of armed militancy when every single day there used to be ten or more violent deaths in Kashmir caused mostly by the terrorists who used to target their rivals and civilians.

            Third, while the jihad in Kashmir has now taken a new form – bullets having been replaced by stones – the average age of the stone-pelting jihadi in 2010 is the same as the average age of the gun-wielding jihadi in 1990. When terrorism started in Kashmir in the late 1980s, the average age of the terrorists was not 40 years or 60 years, but around 20-22 years, exactly the average age of the neo-jihadis or the stone-pelters. It is important, therefore, not to go overboard in trying to analyze the latest round of unrest in Kashmir and coming out with findings that fly in the face of the ground reality. 

            Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging the political and administrative incompetence of the state and central governments, or understanding the political dynamic in which the opposition PDP is exploiting the situation to stoke the fires further in order to push the Abdullahs' into political oblivion, the army has become the fall-guy. Even though the army is nowhere involved in crowd control, a needless clamour has been raised for withdrawing the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). This is nothing but a red herring.

            Given that NC won most of its seats in the J&K assembly from Srinagar in the Kashmir valley, what is preventing the elected representatives of the party from reaching out to the people who elected them and who are today on the streets, pelting stones? Where are the workers and cadres of the political parties? Isn't it strange that the Kashmiri politicians who are lobbying in New Delhi – NC to save its government and PDP for support to form a new government – are nowhere on the ground trying to pacify the public and prevent violence from spiralling out of control and causing needless casualties? Aren't the Congress ministers in the Jammu and Kashmir cabinet, also culpable because of their tolerance of the continuing misgovernance, rather absence of governance, by the Chief Minister? What steps have the Congress ministers taken to improve administration in the state and either guide the Chief Minister or hold him to account for the drift in the affairs of state?

            While there are innumerable questions that can be asked from the politicians in Jammu and Kashmir, there are some extremely important questions that the political class and civil society in Delhi also needs to answer. Why is it that the media and civil society which is so outraged every time Raj Thackeray and his goons talk of the Marathi Manoos and resorts to violence, are so tolerant and understanding of similar tactics being adopted by the Kashmiri stone-pelters? Equally important is the question as to why politicians, especially the Communists, who find it unpalatable to share a stage with Narendra Modi because in their book he is the epitome of communalism, don't bat an eyelid in reaching out and holding a dialogue and even compromise with the Kashmiri separatists like Syed Ali Shah Geelani or Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who are not only raising anti-India slogans but are also unabashed and unapologetic practitioners of the Pakistani brand of Islamo-fascism in which all minorities are treated as untermensch?

Why is it that so much understanding is shown for the "alienation" and ''discontent'' among Kashmiri youth, but the same consideration is missing when it comes to youth from other parts of India who too  have their share of grievances, only they don't denounce India or go about setting fire to government property for a lark and some money, which in Kashmir is being doled out hand over fist by agent provocateurs? How come it is kosher for the stone-pelting mobs in Kashmir to attack police stations and government buildings but blasphemy when Shiv Sena and MNS goons attack media outfits or multiplexes in Mumbai to vent their 'grievances'? Or is it the case that while law enforcement agencies are fair game, media outfits and entertainment centres are a holy cow? No, we don't hold a brief for the Shiv Sena or the MNS and consider them as repulsive and as antithetic to the idea of India as the Kashmiri stone-pelting mobs. But why have double-standards?

            In the ultimate analysis, there is absolutely no reason for the government of India or the political establishment to behave in a knee-jerk manner over the disturbances in Kashmir and try to appease the separatists, both of the hard  and the soft variety. It is important to recognise that the virus of Islamic terrorism that has seeped into Kashmiri society will take long years to go. Kashmir will be won by the side with the greater will, capacity, courage and commitment. Sadly, the manner in which the government is responding to the situation in Kashmir betrays an unfortunate absence of all of these attributes.

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Category: Jammu and Kashmir

Keywords: Kashmir, APSPA, Terrorism, Omar Abdullah, stone-pelting

SOCIO-ECONOMIC UNDERPINNING OF JIHADISM

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

The rise of the Jihadist movement in Pakistan is driven primarily by ideological and religious factors. Decades of indoctrination of a virulent version of radical political Islam has motivated thousands of people – young and old – to take the path of violent jihad to capture political power and through it transform the society, economy and culture in order to bring about what they consider to be a pristine Islamic order. But underpinning the quest for an ideal Islamic state in Pakistan are also the harsh socio-economic realities that make jihad extremely attractive to the mass of underclass that sees jihad as the only way out of the deprivation and morbidity that comes with a low-level existence in which the vast majority of Pakistanis find themselves caught.

The Islamists cleverly manufacture and exploit grievances (some real, many imagined) to build support for their cause. But while the support for Islamist causes is found across a cross-section of Pakistani society, bulk of the feedstock of jihad comes from an underclass for whom jihad is an expression of dissent, even rebellion, against an unequal, unjust and unfair social, political and economic system which has been fostered by a corrupt, uncaring and self-centred elite and propped up by the bourgeoisie. Ironically, the social, political and economic oligarchy that rules Pakistan, and which has blocked any real opportunity for advancement to those at the bottom of the ladder, has inadvertently given rise to the very forces that today threaten its hold over the power structure in Pakistan. This they have done partly through their neglect of the social sector, partly through their rhetoric on Islam, and partly through the use of jihad as an instrument of state policy and the power shift effected by this policy in favour of non-state actors who are today challenging the state.

According to a former Pakistan army officer who is better known by his nom de guerre 'Col Imam', the feudals in South Punjab denied the children of their peasants' education in normal schools but allowed them to go to the madrassas that were proliferating in the area. These same children are today part of the larger Punjabi Taliban phenomenon. Like in FATA, where the taliban have wiped out the Maliks, Col. Imam believes that in South Punjab too, a similar transformation in the social power structure is going to take place, with the Punjabi Taliban replacing the local landlords and elite as the real power wielders.

The fear that the ranks of the jihadists could swell in the aftermath of the 'mother of all floods' that have swept through Pakistan has once again brought the focus back on to the socio-economic factors that are fuelling the jihad factory inside Pakistan. Even top officials in Pakistan, from President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani to foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Pakistan's ambassador to the US Hussein Haqqani, have been ad nauseam warning the world that if it did not come to Pakistan's aid fast enough, the Islamists would exploit the extreme distress in which some 20 million people find themselves after the floods.

There are a number of studies that link radicalism and militancy to poverty, joblessness, bad governance, failure of the state to provide social goods like education and health, and the failure of education and the 'system' to create social mobility. What emerges from these studies are interesting trends relating to the social base of jihad, the educational background of the jihadists and the conditions in the regions which have been in the eye of the jihad storm.

An analysis of the profile of jihadists suggests that most of the leaders and cadres are not from the abjectly poor sections of society. The very poor in Pakistan are probably too poor and too oppressed to rebel against the existing order. Most of the jihadists, therefore, belong either to the lower or the lower-middle classes. A majority of them are not unlettered but are half-educated and semi-literate. While many of the jihadists have attended state schools, the leadership is generally held by people with some madrassa education, at least in the Pashtun areas and South Punjab. Spatially, some of the most troubled areas – South Punjab and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – are also the most backward in terms of social, economic and political development, and are areas where inequity, injustice, oppression and barriers to social mobility are very high. Paradoxically, despite the continuing existence of an oppressive socio-political power structure, in some of these areas the hold of the traditional elites has been breaking down as a result of a combination of economic and political factors and the emergence of new socio-political forces that have begun challenging the traditional elite.

Among the most significant transformations to have occurred in Pakistan has been the steady loss of power of the feudal elite. Contrary to popular perception, feudalism is alive in Pakistan not so much as an economic mode of production but more in terms of the attitudes associated with feudalism. The loss of economic control has, however, meant that the feudal attitude has become something of an anachronism, and is being challenged by the rise of new socio-economic realities. The rise of Islamist militias is one such reality. In South Punjab, for example, the extensive network established by the Sunni extremist organisation Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) has given it a pivotal role in local politics.

The head of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), the latest avatar of the SSP, Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, has claimed that nearly 25 Members of National Assembly (MNAs), including a couple of federal ministers, got elected with the support of the ASWJ. Ludhianvi was courted by the Punjab Law Minister, Rana Sanaullah, during a by-election in Jhang in South Punjab, while other SSP members were seen supporting the PPP. The old feudal elite can no longer depend on their traditional status either to keep the underclass in check, much less win elections without any effort. The story in the more developed Central and North Punjab is no different with old landed families struggling to maintain their dominance in local politics. Although some of the old political families continue to win their elections, the important point is that they do so only because they have compromised on their power and have reached out to the new political forces those have emerged in their areas.

In FATA, the jihadists systematically wiped out the tribal Maliks and Khans who served as the lynchpin of the Pakistani state which used to depend upon their influence and power to maintain its writ over the tribes through the jirga system. The Maliks were notorious for their corruption and were completely unaccountable and a reaction to them had started developing in Waziristan way back in the 1970s. With the rise of the jihadists, the Maliks came in cross-hairs of the militants. Hundreds of Maliks were killed, and most of the others ran away from the FATA region to save their lives, with the result that the mullahs replaced the Maliks as the power elite in FATA. The reason for targeting the Maliks was quite clear: they were the only people who could pose any kind of a challenge to the domination of the jihadists by mobilising the people of the area to form tribal lashkars to take on the militants. By eliminating the Maliks, the jihadists effectively ended any possibility of opposition to their dominance over the entire tribal belt. This was exactly the trajectory that the 'Mujahideen' had adopted in Afghanistan where the tribal chieftains were replaced by the jihadists.

In Swat, while the Taliban movement was built around the demand for imposition of Shariat, there was also a socio-economic dimension to the support that the Swat Taliban leader Mullah Fazlullah received from the people. Unlike the 'establishment' mullahs who have traditionally opposed land reforms in Pakistan, Fazlullah won over a lot of recruits by promising them land redistribution. The Taliban storm-troopers targeted the big landlords in Swat and either killed them or forced them to flee, after which they occupied their land. By exploiting the conflict between the landless tenants and the wealthy landlords in Swat, the Taliban not only won grass-root support for their movement, they also hit at the socio-economic and political power structure that was dominated by the landed gentry which could have become a major obstacle in the path of the Taliban. Apart from one big landowner, Afzal Khan Lala, who successfully resisted the Taliban onslaught, all the other big landholders turned out to be pushovers for the jihadists.

Not just in Swat, but in the entire Pashtun tribal belt, the jihadists have attracted support by holding out the promise of a more equal and just social order an important component of their political programme. Indeed, the absence of justice has been one of the primary factors for the rise of the Islamist groups who have exploited the arbitrary, corrupt and unfair justice system to win support for their cause, a fact that has been admitted by none other than the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court. For instance, the now slain head of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, used not only Islam to consolidate his power base, he also targeted big landowners to give the TTP an image of being a people's movement. In the Khyber agency, the head of the Lashkar-e-Islam, Mangalbagh, acquired a Robin Hood-like reputation which pulled in a lot of young people to his fold. According to the Pakistani journalist, Rahimullah Yusufzai, Mangalbagh used to criticise the Maliks and would always try to solve the problems of the common tribesmen.

Although all politicians in Pakistan, including the big landowners, never fail to pay lip-service to the cause of a more just and equitable social and political system, their social background has ensured that nothing of the sort will ever happen as long as they control the levers of power. Unlike the politicians, the promise of social justice that the jihadists hold out sounds far more credible. For one, the politicians represent status quo which makes any revolutionary reform in the social system extremely unlikely. The jihadists, on the other hand, seek to change the system which means that what they are promising has a pretty good chance of coming true. Secondly, given the lower and lower middle class backgrounds of almost the entire jihadist leadership – Baitullah Mehsud was a gym trainer, Mangalbagh a bus conductor-cum-cleaner, Mullah Fazlullah was a chair-lift operator – makes it easy for the people to identify with them and believe in what they promise since they are from the same background.

A study into the mindset of jihadists by a Pakistani clinical psychologist, Sohail Abbas, has revealed that the value system of the lower middle class exercised a dominating influence on the militancy. According to this study, "this class...is able to provide leadership and inspiration to the teeming masses...[it] has been an important actor in the religious movement in the country. It is deeply influenced by and now controls the mosque-religion." Abbas has found that anger against the exploitative socio-political system has been exploited by the religious groups who have "succeeded in mixing jihad with political change by the implicit promise of a Taliban type government in Pakistan".

With the normal social and political processes failing to address the growing morbidity and hopelessness in society, jihad has become an instrument of empowerment against the real and perceived depredations of the venal elite and the struggle for a genuinely Islamic system is seen as the only way to change the status quo and also gain spiritual fulfilment.
Despite the fact that other than slogans and targeting the landed elite, the jihadists have not really laid out in detail how they will ensure social justice, provide employment opportunities, improve the education system and healthcare etc., the jihadists have managed to give a sense of empowerment to their supporters. There is enough anecdotal evidence of how people on the margins of society, powerless to change their lot, have overnight become 'men of respect' after having joined a Jihadist outfit – the social status of the family improves, the police is wary of them and the local influential sections of society don't mess with them. In other words, jihad offers a sense of purpose and social mobility that is simply not on offer otherwise. The case of the Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving terrorist involved in the 26/11 attack in Mumbai, is a classic case in point.

While lack of gainful employment opportunities has been another major factor that has drawn the youth towards jihadist outfits, there has also been a steady rejection of the fatalism that had been infused in the people by the traditional, syncretic school of Islamic theology which is commonly referred to as Barelvi or Sufi culture, which had in the past played a critical role in keeping social unrest from boiling over. Not only has 'Sufi' Islam been receding in the face of the onslaught by the more radical, jihadised versions of Islam, it has now come to represent the 'establishment'. Sufi Islam's popularity in the past was in large part because it represented dissent against the doctrinaire Islam of the established religious
and political order. But with the descendants of the Sufi saints having become the ruling class, the jihadist philosophy espoused by the radical Islamic groups has replaced Sufi Islam as the expression of dissent.

Clearly, if Pakistan is serious about combating the growing power and influence of the jihadists, then it must simultaneously address not only the ideological dimension of Islamism, but also the socio-economic dimensions of the problem that are fuelling the Islamist insurgency. Fighting talibanisation through only the use of military force, while important, even unavoidable, is at best only a holding operation. While the Pakistani establishment is tirelessly making a pitch to rest of the world to pump in money to finance development in the country so that the socio-economic factors behind jihadism can be addressed, the fact remains that taking care of socio-economic factors without coming up with an effective counter ideology to radical Islam is a strategy that is doomed to fail. Conversely, evolving an ideological framework to counter the Islamist without concomitant socio-political and economic reform too will not succeed. The problem however is that other than a torrent of verbiage, there is absolutely no sign of the Pakistani state having taken even the first step to concurrently address both the ideological and the socio-economic dimensions of jihadism.

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    <2570 Words>                    10^th September, 2010

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