SMOKE ON THE WATER, BUT WHERE IS THE FIRE

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    It would perhaps surprise Pakistanis to know that the rising crescendo in Pakistan over India's alleged 'water terrorism' is so far a complete non-issue as far as Indian public opinion is concerned. Other than the strategic community and journalists covering foreign policy, the Indian public opinion is unaware of the concerns in Pakistan over river waters flowing from India into Pakistan. Even the strategic community in India is somewhat bemused by the furore in Pakistan. The debate in Pakistan, which is generating more heat than light, is hardly helping matters. If anything, it appears ill-informed and more rhetorical than real because while a lot of noise is being heard about 'water theft' by India, there is as yet no evidence that would lend credence to this allegation – a classic case of smoke without fire.

An example of this was a TV programme in which, while Pakistan's Indus Waters Commissioner insisted that there was as yet no violation of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) by India, a PMLQ politician on the panel insisted that India was depriving Pakistan of its waters (although he admitted he is no expert on the issue) and the legal expert continued to talk of the spirit of the treaty, prejudging all the time that the spirit of the treaty must have been violated by India. Even the manner in which the issue has been raised in Pakistan's parliament suggests that it is more about grandstanding rather than any grievance based on any wrongdoing on India's part.

Despite all the emotions that water can excite, the IWT is really a technical issue more than a political issue between India and Pakistan. This is not to deny an element of politics that invariably creeps in over the issue of river waters. Over the last couple of years, the IWT is becoming an issue in the politics Jammu and Kashmir with talk of how India and Pakistan have deprived J&K of waters over which it has the first right. Even in the Pakistan administered Kashmir, this issue has been recently raised by the AJK prime minister.

There is also a body of opinion in India that has for long been exhorting the Indian government to use water as a weapon against Pakistan. For people adhering to this view, the water weapon is a fair pay-back for the use of jihad as a weapon by Pakistan. But successive governments in India have desisted from going down this path. At the same time, growing water requirements as well as shortages, and rising energy needs, is forcing the government to exploit all available water resources to their maximum potential.

According to technocrats, while the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – have been exclusively granted to India, a lot of water still spills over into Pakistan from these rivers, which is a bonus for Pakistan if one goes by the letter of the IWT. They say that the government has neglected developing the infrastructure needed to stop this water flowing into Pakistan, water that is required for growing needs of Indian agriculture and drinking water needs of Indian cities. What is more, some estimates suggest that if this water can be utilised properly, it will go a long way in addressing river water disputes between Indian states like Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.

As far as the western rivers – Indus, Chenab and Jhelum – are concerned, the IWT grants certain rights to India on these waters. For instance, India is permitted to build run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants. There are also provisions for using these waters for drinking water as well as agricultural use in J&K. Given the massive energy needs of the Indian economy, the government is now trying to use these waters, but without violating the IWT. And this is the critical point that seems to be missing in the debate that is currently underway in Pakistan over the Indian plans to build a series of dams on the main western rivers and its tributaries.

The issue of IWT is at one level a simple technical issue: if India is indeed violating the IWT, then Pakistan is well within its rights to invoke the dispute clauses and approach the international guarantors and seek the opinion of a neutral expert which will be binding on both countries. The case of Baglihar dam is instructive. Pakistan had objections to the design of the Baglihar dam, objections that India rejected. Pakistan sought the intervention of the neutral expert, whose ruling was accepted by both countries. The fact of the matter is that India is well aware of the diplomatic and political repercussions of violating the IWT and is therefore not interested in violating the treaty. And yet, India wants to use modern engineering techniques that enhance the life of a dam project, techniques that were not available when the IWT was signed. In this, the Baglihar ruling has come as a shot in the arm for Indian dam designs because the neutral expert ruled in favour of such modern techniques.

Pakistan's fears are misplaced also because regardless of the dams that India plans to construct on the western rivers, India cannot stop the water flowing into Pakistan unless it builds the canal infrastructure that can divert this water away from Pakistan. And as yet there is absolutely no such infrastructure that is on the design board. In the case of the Kishenganga river (Neelum) the dam that India is building will keep the total quantum of water in Jhelum the same, only the water will be diverted from Kishenganga into Jhelum. The point of contention in the case of the Kishenganga project is that Pakistan too is building a dam on the same river downstream and the Indian dam will render the Pakistani dam useless. In the case of these two projects, the country that finishes its dam first wins because the other country will have to give up on its project.

While this is something that is part of the treaty, the Neelum-Kishenganga project has become a metaphor that the two countries need to use to think out of the box on the issue of river waters. In other words, rather than follow a competing model, the two countries need to consider following a cooperative model in which a common resource can be exploited jointly to maximise welfare on both sides. The fact is that rising population and, increasingly agricultural and energy needs are raising the water requirements on both sides. At the same time, hydrological factors and environmental factors are reducing the water flows in rivers. This makes it imperative for both countries to use a scarce resource like water optimally.

In the case of water, more is not necessarily better than enough. This means that irrigation techniques need to change from flood irrigation to drip irrigation that uses water far more efficiently. While this will necessitate a change in cropping patterns, it will also mean investing in a modern irrigation technique that takes care of agriculture (which consumes close to 90% of water) and leaves enough for water requirements of growing cities. The problem is that for politicians and bureaucrats it is so more easier to excite and incite people on the issue of water, but so much more difficult to do the hard work to invest in systems that utilise a scarce resource in a more efficient manner.

Perhaps, the time has also come for India and Pakistan to rethink the IWT and rework it in a way that it addresses the issues we will face in the next 50 years instead of harping on issues we faced in the last 50 years. But if this is not acceptable, then at least the two countries can work together on joint projects that will serve both their peoples and becoming a huge CBM that can effect a paradigm change in their perceptions of each other. The salvation and indeed the survival of the subcontinent depends on the ability of the two countries to cooperate and manage a joint but scarce resource like water efficiently and sensibly.

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    <1350 Words>                    22^nd February, 2010

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MARGINALISATION IN KABUL: INDIA'S FEARS AND OPPORTUNITIES – II

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    On the face of it, the exit of the international security forces from Afghanistan and the return of a Taliban regime in Kabul will be a huge strategic setback for India. Not surprisingly, the prospect that Taliban ascendancy will leave India with no feet to stand on in Afghanistan is being welcomed in Pakistan with unmistakable glee. But both Pakistan's triumphalism and India's concerns are somewhat misplaced because there is a very good chance that, more by default than by design, the return of Taliban in Afghanistan will cause far greater harm to Pakistan than the damage it will do to India. Rather than fret about American withdrawal from Afghanistan, India should actually welcome it because this will be the beginning of the end of the unnatural alliance in the War on Terror between US and Pakistan, an alliance that has propped up Pakistan for so long and rewarded it for recalcitrance and double-dealing.

The international community's approach to Afghanistan and, by extension Pakistan, in 2011 is likely to be very different from what it was on the eve of 9/11 in 2001. If Pakistan thinks that it can turn the clock back to the time when the West turned a blind eye to Pakistan's shenanigans in Afghanistan and allowed it a free run in using jihad as an instrument of state policy, it is mistaken. If anything, as and when the Americans pack up and abandon Afghanistan, Pakistan is going to come under even greater international pressure, and what is worse, it will have lost most, if not all, the leverages that it is currently exploiting to make the Americans follow its line on Afghanistan.

Apart from the rising economic costs of fighting the war, there are two big compulsions that will confront the US as long as it remains in Afghanistan: one, body-bags of American troops engaged in anti-insurgency operations; two, supply lines that run through Pakistan. Once the US leaves Afghanistan, it will no longer be hobbled by these debilitating compulsions that are probably preventing it from pushing the Pakistanis too hard. Quitting Afghanistan will, however, not mean quitting the region. In all likelihood, the US will move out of Afghanistan into Pakistan. The kind of investment that the US is making inside Pakistan suggests that the US intends to increase its presence in Pakistan manifold. Even though there won't be US troops present inside Pakistan, there will be a large number of diplomats and spooks who will be keeping a hawk-eye on developments in Pakistan.

Perhaps the Americans are beginning to understand that their real strategic challenge lies not so much in Afghanistan as in Pakistan. Much of the support, sanctuary, resources, recruits, training, and what have you, for the Islamists comes through Pakistan. If the West can control Pakistan, it will be able to get a hold of Afghanistan, even ignore it. Within Pakistan, the problem is really the army. Civilian leaders are sensible enough to realise the destruction fostered on the country by the jihadist policies of the Pakistan army. Left to themselves, the civilians would be more than amenable to move decisively to dismantle the jihadist infrastructure. The problem is that the Pakistan army will not let the civilians decide the national security strategy. And given the structural weaknesses in Pakistan's polity, the civilians succumb easily to the line drawn for them by the military. Therefore, if the West really wants reform inside Pakistan it will have to empower the civilian leadership and make the military subservient and obedient to the civilian authority.

As long as the US remains dependent on the Pakistan for its operations in Afghanistan, it will be difficult for it to force compliance on the Pakistan army. But once the US is rid of its Afghan compulsions, the boot will be on the other foot. From that point on, the leverages will be in US hands and the compulsions will be all Pakistan's. The single most important leverage that the US holds is aid and trade. The US is already giving nearly $ 5 bn per annum in direct assistance to Pakistan. Add to this the multilateral funding, the assistance that US allies give Pakistan and the Friends of Democratic Pakistan programmes and the figure reaches close to $ 10 bn per annum. This huge amount of money is just enough to keep Pakistan afloat.

If the US pulls the plug on Pakistan, it can ravage the Pakistani economy. And one is not even talking about the market access that US and its allies give Pakistan or the defence equipment that Pakistan gets from the West. The bottom line is that the Pakistanis need the Americans more than the other way round and this factor will come into play once the Americans withdraw from Afghanistan. The compact between the US and Pakistan will start to loosen up because the Americans will lean more heavily on Pakistan and insist that it delivers on its side of the bargain – keeping a tight leash on the Islamist mafias and militias. This will be a catch-22 situation for the Pakistanis: if they try to deliver on American demands, it will pit the Pakistanis against the Islamists, even those Islamists who for tactical reasons continue to act on the behest of Pakistani intelligence agencies and often assist and protect Pakistani interests by attacking Indians in Afghanistan; on the other hand, if the Pakistanis continue with their double-game, it will pit them against the US and its allies.

The Pakistanis are, of course, convinced that they will be able to deliver in large measure to the American demands. As they see it, with the Americans out of Afghanistan the issue at the heart of the conflict will be removed and things will settle down in the Afpak region. What is more, the Pakistanis believe that with Afghanistan being outsourced to them by the Americans, not only will Pakistan gain its much desired 'strategic depth', it will at the same time earn top dollar from the West for its services. The problem is that while all this sounds good in theory, its practise will be an altogether different thing.

The main reason for Pakistan's confidence is the influence they have on the Taliban supremo, Mullah Omar, who all the Islamists acknowledge as the Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful). The Pakistanis think that they can use Mullah Omar to break the Taliban-Al Qaeda alliance and get the international jihadists and Islamists expelled from Afghanistan. This, the Pakistanis feel, will be enough for the Americans. Mullah Omar who is probably in the safe custody of the Pakistanis has always dissuaded his followers from targeting Pakistan. But while Mullah Omar has stayed loyal to his Pakistani benefactors, and might continue to follow Pakistani diktats after regaining power in Afghanistan, the big question is whether his followers will follow this line? Even now, there is a large section among the Islamists who pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar but don't listen to him when it comes to attacking Pakistan army.

Unlike Mullah Omar, who having enjoyed Pakistani hospitality might be amenable to break links with Al Qaeda, his followers, who have been fighting on the ground and who have been radicalised over the last nine years, are not likely to follow Omar's edicts either in letter or spirit. Field commanders like the Haqqani's will want to keep their links with their fellow combatants in Al Qaeda alive. They are also likely to espouse Islamist causes all over the world because after having defeated the sole superpower they will be inclined to spread their virulence in lands near and far. At the very minimum, both Islam as well as tradition will be used to provide sanctuary to all sorts of terrorists, fugitives, desperadoes from around the world, making the Afpak region Terror Central all over again. If Mullah Omar opposes the Islamists, he could be repudiated, accused of selling out and even removed from the scene. After all, history is full of instances of self-proclaimed Amir-ul-Momineens being assassinated by their followers.

Notwithstanding the self-serving gloss being put by the Pakistanis on the motives of the Taliban – that they are fighting a war of national liberation, that they do not subscribe to Jihad International, that many of the combatants are seeking revenge for the deaths of their loved ones, that Pashtun xenophobia is driving the resistance etc. – the incontrovertible fact is that the primary motivation of the Islamists is a extremely barbaric and intolerant interpretation of Islam that is incapable of living in peace with any other peoples who do not subscribe to their world view. Therefore, if Mullah Omar treads the moderate path on Pakistani instructions, he will be going against his own followers. And if he sticks to the radical path then he will be going against his benefactors in Pakistan. In either case, Pakistan will get sucked into the Afghan quagmire, which in turn will increase its dependence on American monetary and military assistance.

Pakistan can, of course, choose to defy the rest of the world and cast its lot with the jihadists. Unlike the jihadists, the Pakistanis have a lot to lose and cannot really afford to face the wrath of the world. The Pakistanis know that once the international community walks out of Afghanistan, the entire burden of an economically unviable Afghanistan will fall on Pakistan's head, a burden that Pakistan cannot afford without international assistance, which will not be forthcoming unless Pakistan delivers on the concerns of the international community.

The reason why India doesn't need to lose too much sleep over being forced out of Afghanistan is that the dialectics of the situation will ultimately benefit India. If Pakistan succumbs to American pressure, it will continue to be engaged in a long war of attrition on its western borders, something that suits India. If Pakistan resists American pressure, it will be isolated in the world, and the international community will have to fall back upon India to put a firewall around the Afpak region. All India needs to do now is to hold its nerve and position itself to exploit the situation as it evolves in its favour.

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    <1700 Words>                        28^th February, 2010

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MARGINALISATION IN KABUL: INDIA'S FEARS AND OPPORTUNITIES - I

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Concerns being expressed in India over its imminent marginalisation in the future set-up in Afghanistan are understandable, but only in a static geo-strategic context in which the pre 9/11 world is the point of reference. Before 9/11, Pakistan ruled the roost in Afghanistan through it Taliban proxies. Afghanistan was transformed into a hub of Islamist terror groups who received sanctuary, ideological indoctrination and motivation, and most of all, terrorist training in camps that were run as a joint venture between jihadists and ISI operatives. India, which faced the brunt of the export of Islamic terrorism by Pakistan, had gone blue in the face trying to draw attention of the international community to the dangers that the radical Islamist terror groups posed to the civilized world. The Americans and all the other Western countries knew what was happening but chose to ignore the emergence of Taliban controlled Afghanistan as Terror Central simply because they were not being directly affected by the terrorism emanating from there. But then 9/11 happened and everything changed.

    A decade after that epochal event, the Taliban with lots of help from Pakistan, are poised to make a comeback in Afghanistan. The Americans, staring defeat in the face, are all set to abandon Afghanistan to the depredations of the Taliban, albeit under the fig leaf of "reintegration and reconciliation" and the hope that the Taliban will live up to their promise of severing links with Al Qaeda. The fear in India is that once the Americans quit Afghanistan, and outsource it to Pakistan, there will be a return to the bad old days when Afghanistan served as the base camp for terrorists from all over the world. The exit of the Americans will remove the purported reason of conflict between the Islamists and their patrons, the Pakistan army. What is more, it will also ease the pressure (domestic or international) on the Pakistan army to clean up the swamps of Islamist terror that exist in Pakistan. The Pakistan army will be more than happy to make its peace with the Islamists and allow them to function with impunity, provided they don't peddle their terrorist wares inside Pakistan.

The way the Indians see it, the Pakistani establishment will be quite comfortable making deals with the Islamists and leaving them to their devices. So much so that it really has no problem with the emergence of tiny Islamic emirates in remote parts of the country. Such emirates will keep the potentates and warlords of these medieval enclaves satisfied with their fiefdoms and leave them with little reason to mess with the Pakistani state. Anyone who doubts this just needs to look at the attitude of the Pakistan army towards the Taliban in Swat.

The fact is that the Pakistan army did not appear to be very agitated over the Taliban takeover of Swat. It was not until alarm bells started ringing around the world after the Taliban entered Buner, that the Pakistan army was forced to launch an operation against the new rulers of Swat. The military offensive in South Waziristan, Bajaur and other Tribal Agencies was partly forced upon the Pakistan army by the Americans and partly motivated by the Pakistan army's need for reining in Jihadists who were targeting mainland Pakistan under the misguided notion that the Pakistan army was actively and sincerely aiding the American war effort. With the Americans gone, the Pakistani Taliban will also become more amenable to peace deals with the Pakistan army. If they continue to resist, the Pakistan army will have them removed from the scene by not only mounting operations against them but also by exploiting cleavages within the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban and propping up a pliant warlord against a recalcitrant one.

The Indians fear that while all this is happening, the Americans and other Western countries will conveniently turn a blind eye to the activities of the Taliban and their Pakistani associates, who under Pakistani influence will have expelled the Al Qaeda, or at least have kept them under a very tight leash. The urge for jihad of the Islamists will be used initially to purge Afghanistan of those who dissent with the Taliban version of Islam. After the general massacres in Afghanistan are over, and complete domination is established over that hapless country, the energies of the jihadists will be directed to Islamist causes in places like India, Russia, perhaps China, Shi'ite Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Indonesia and what have you.

It is precisely to prevent this scenario from unfolding that India invested so heavily in Afghanistan. The Indian interest in Afghanistan has always been that it shouldn't fall prey or become a playground for Pakistan's policy of using jihad as an instrument of state policy against India. Afghanistan also served as an important listening post for India which was able to keep a close watch over developments inside Pakistan. Since India does not share a land border with Afghanistan, it is close to impossible for India to get militarily involved in Afghanistan. Given this limitation, India used its soft power and its financial clout to support regimes in Afghanistan that resisted Pakistan's onslaught. India's development activities in Afghanistan – roads, schools, hospitals, scholarships for higher education, technical training and capacity building of Afghan civil servants, communications and power projects etc – have created a lot of goodwill among common Afghans. Unfortunately, the massive investment that India has made in improving the lives of Afghans is likely to run aground because the Americans have allowed Pakistan to get away with its double game on the issue of Taliban.

The Pakistanis know that they can only destroy Afghanistan, not develop it. Not surprisingly, Pakistan's army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani has made it clear that Pakistan has no problem if Indians continue their development activities in Afghanistan, but with the implicit caveat that such activities will have to be with the concurrence and under the supervision of the Pakistanis. Clearly, like in their own case, the Pakistan army don't mind the moolah flowing in but cannot quite countenance the influence that comes with it, even less so if it involves India. Perhaps the Pakistan army believes that they can dictate terms to the Indian government, just like they do in their own country where the civilian government is reduced to a glorified municipality.

Without delving too much into the delusions and illusions that the Pakistan army suffers about India, the reality is that once the Americans throw in the towel, India will have to cut its losses and leave Afghanistan. Rather than spend good money after bad in Afghanistan, it probably makes more sense for India to use this money to start building up its defences against the export of terrorism from Pakistan that is bound to re-start in the coming months.

Of course, the scenario painted above is really the worst case scenario for India and is predicated on things returning to the pre-9/11 situation. India must therefore start to prepare for the worst case scenario. This involves not only putting in place a security architecture that can effectively combat terrorism flowing in from Pakistan but also bolstering the Indian military machine to acquire an overwhelming, overbearing and overpowering superiority over Pakistan. What is more, India should stop frittering its resources on what is for the foreseeable future a hopeless cause – Afghanistan.

But while preparing for the worst, India has good reason to hope for the best. Indeed there are very good chances that instead the worst case scenario unfolding, exciting new strategic opportunities will open out for India with Pakistan's greater involvement in Afghanistan. And the reason for that is simple: it is no longer the pre-9/11 world. Next week, we will lay out how the likely victory in Afghanistan of the Taliban, and by extension Pakistan, is not such a huge strategic setback for India that it appears to be at this point in time. Rather it could eventually translate into a huge strategic gain if India holds its nerve and plays its cards to exploit the unfolding situation to its advantage.

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    <1350 Words>                    11^th February, 2010

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DIALOGUE, DECEPTION, DISARRAY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    In an effort to capitalise on the gains made in the Istanbul and London conferences on Afghanistan, Pakistan has gone on a diplomatic overdrive to not only allay any distrust, fear and suspicion in the West of Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan, but also acquire a lead role in determining the future course of events in that country. While the Pakistani diplomats are working the seminar and lecture circuit to sell their viewpoint in the West, the Pakistan army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, has taken a public relations initiative of his own. In a rare briefing to Islamabad based foreign correspondents, he sought to beguile international public opinion by projecting a rather benign and benevolent approach of Pakistan towards Afghanistan – "our objective is to have peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan...We cannot wish for Afghanistan anything that we don't wish for Pakistan... We want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not want to control it... A peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan a strategic depth."

    Having run out of answers, and perhaps even options, on Afghanistan, the West has all but shut its eyes to the Pakistan army's deception. But it is not only the Pakistan army that is indulging in deception; all the players in Afghanistan are engaged in deceiving their partners, their public and most of all, themselves. How much of the deception is witting, and how much unwitting, is debatable. What is clear, however, is that there is utter disarray in the political and military strategy of the international coalition. The Obama administration has already done three reviews of its strategy in less than a year and still appears as confounded as it was when it started the review process. Nothing exemplifies this better than the self-defeating plan to reintegrate and reconcile with the Taliban and the subsequent self-serving clarifications issued by the architects of this plan that effectively nullify whatever little they had hoped to achieve through the policy of trying to salve some grace and dignity while throwing in the towel.

    The reality is that no great intrinsic value can or should be attached to a dialogue between combatants in terms of its potential for stopping a war and bringing about a peaceful solution. A dialogue only helps usher in peace by accepting and formalising the situation that obtains as a result of fighting on the ground. What a dialogue does is that it provides a channel of communication that comes in handy to decide the modalities and terms of surrender or, in the event of a military stalemate, of a deal. In Afghanistan, there is no military stalemate – the Taliban are on the ascendant while the resolve of the coalition forces to stay the course and pacify that country and rid it of the Islamist menace is weakening by the day. This means there is little incentive for the Taliban to enter into any sort of power-sharing deal with their adversaries and opponents. What is more, any assurance that they give to sever their links with Jihad International Inc., a.k.a. al Qaeda, will be nothing but a ploy to hasten their victorious return to power. These assurances will be observed more in their violation than anything else. After all, how is the international coalition going to ensure that the Taliban stick to their pledges?

    Even though the possibility of the Taliban accepting a power sharing deal is negligible, for a dialogue to have any chance of working, it must be held with the relevant people. But when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says that there will be no talks with the "really bad guys" (read Mullah Omar and warlords like Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin) because they are "not ever going to renounce Al-Qaeda and renounce violence and agree to re-enter society", then the entire logic of the reintegration and reconciliation plan stops making any sense. Quite aside the unconfirmed reports of CIA officials having used the ISI to hold direct talks inside Pakistan with the top leadership of the 'bad guys', Hillary Clinton's stance begs the question as to what purpose will be served talking to people who are bit players in the Islamist insurgency and don't really call the shots.

People like the former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef, and others like them have been living under a close watch of the Allied forces for years now. It is reasonable to assume that by now these characters would already have been milked for whatever they are worth. What can they deliver at this late stage when the imminent withdrawal of the Western forces is staring everyone in the face what they could not deliver when the situation was not so dismal. What possible influence can these fellows have on the second rung Taliban leadership that the West is trying to wean away from the 'bad guys'? The lure of lucre must not be over-stated in present day Afghanistan. In all likelihood, there could be many who will take the dollars and continue to support the Taliban leadership, more so since it is almost a truism by now that a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan is inevitable. In any case, the whole idea of publicly announcing the policy of using bribes to drive a wedge in the Taliban ranks makes one hold ones head in disbelief over the desperation, if not mindlessness, that is guiding the reintegration scheme.

Even more perplexing is the complete dependence on Pakistan for bringing peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan's usefulness hinges on its ability to influence not so much the 'reconciliables' as the 'bad guys' who receive support, sustenance and sanctuary inside Pakistan. After all, Pakistan's 'strategic assets', are the 'bad guys'. And, having preserved and even used (as in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul) these assets in the face of such great odds, what are the chances that the Pakistanis will discard these people at this stage when they are on the verge of winning the war? The big question that the Americans seem to be ducking is that if indeed the Pakistanis continue to exercise influence on the 'bad guys', then aren't the Americans fighting in the wrong country and also allying and relying on the wrong country. On the other hand, if the Pakistanis don't actually pull the strings of the 'bad guys', or if they aren't in a position to influence the 'bad guys', then what is it that the Pakistanis are bringing that they are being given a seat on the high table.

While it makes a very good copy when Gen Kayani says somewhat disingenuously that Pakistan doesn't want a Talibanised Afghanistan ("we can't want something for Afghanistan which we don't want for ourselves"), the question is why the Pakistan army continues to retain the Taliban option and treat the most violent Taliban groups with kid gloves? The bottom line is that the Pakistan state and society will have a big problem on its hands if the Taliban resurgence is due to the support they have received from Pakistan because as and when the Taliban take control of Afghanistan, Pakistan will almost certainly be sucked into the vortex of fanaticism that the Taliban represent. On the other hand, Pakistan will have an even bigger problem on its hands if they have not assisted the Taliban victory because then it will have to contend with a force that after having defeated the greatest military machine ever in the history of mankind will look upon the Pakistan as ripe for the picking. For anyone to imagine that this won't happen is nothing but self-deception and self-delusion.

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    <1250 Words>                        4^th February, 2010

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