THE PROBLEM WAS ALWAYS PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The Afghan warlogs made public by the website Wikileaks only reconfirms what has been known for years now – the complicity of the Pakistan army and intelligence agencies in supporting, funding, providing safe havens, and even directing the actions of Islamist terror groups operating in Afghanistan. To this extent there is hardly any novelty in these documents. The real value of the warlogs lies in their exposing the scale and extent of the Pakistani military establishment's links with Islamist terror groups and corroborating the recent report of the London School of Economics that has laid bare the fact that the ISI was hand-in-glove with the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

The Pakistanis of course went into paroxysms of rage over the LSE report and some columnists even wanted the Pakistani government to sue the author of the LSE report for 'maligning' the name of Pakistan. The reaction in Pakistan over the wikileaks is once again predictable – it's old hat, it is unprocessed and raw information, it is tainted information because it has been provided by the Afghan intelligence which is under Indian influence etc. But clearly, to argue that the warlogs don't really count as a smoking gun – something that most Pakistanis and their American apologists are doing – is nothing but a refusal to acknowledge reality for what it is.

    While the Pakistani denials were to be expected, what is really shocking is that despite having full knowledge of Pakistan's complicity and connivance with Islamist terror groups, the US administration and army have done precious little about it. Not only have they continued to let US soldiers get targeted by Pakistan's proxies; they have rewarded Pakistan for its double game with military and economic assistance amounting to billions of dollars. In other words, the US taxpayers, who are reeling under the worst economic crisis in living memory, are funding a country whose army and intelligence agency not only plans the killing of US soldiers but also directs the attacks. And all this under the utterly misplaced, if not self-serving, belief that the US is 'encouraging' Pakistan to do the right thing and has over the last year or so been successful in bringing about a change in the strategic direction of the ISI and Pakistan army.

Strangely enough, the fact that the 'strategic shift' in the ISI's thinking has coincided with the Taliban insurgents gathering greater strength and causing ever greater casualties of American soldiers doesn't seem to have registered either with US President Barack Obama or the US Chairman Joints Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. While Obama doesn't want the warlogs to derail his strategy (what is it?), Mullen has said that the intelligence over Pakistani links with the Taliban was taken into account in the 'strategic review'. But if in the face of all the evidence and intelligence pointing to Pakistan's double game, the 'strategic review' is all that the so-called best brains in the US strategic community could come up with, then clearly the US is fighting a lost war for a lost cause.

    The American administration however defends its policy on Pakistan by singing paeans in praise about Pakistan's partnership in the war on terror. Quite aside the fact that Pakistan was and is more of a partner of the Taliban than the Americans, it raises the important question as to who is fooling whom. From the warlogs it is clear that it isn't so much Pakistan fooling the Americans (who after all knew what the Pakistanis were up to) as the US officials fooling not just themselves but also their own people. And in their desperation to prove that this pusillanimous approach is working, they point to the 'sacrifices and casualties' of the Pakistan army in the war on terror. But they conveniently gloss over one critical fact: Pakistan has so far suffered casualties only in military operations against Taliban elements who were targeting Pakistan. They are yet to undertake any major military operation against safe havens of the Taliban groups that are targeting the NATO troops in Afghanistan.

For instance, in South Waziristan, the area of military operations was limited to only those places where the TTP faction of Baitullah Mehsud was dominant. The area under the control of Maulvi Nazir, an ally of the Pakistan army whose fighters are active only in Afghanistan was completely untouched. In Swat too, the Pakistan army moved only against the Mullah Fazlullah group after it started posing a direct challenge to the army and there was a clamour within Pakistan and pressure from without – Hillary Clinton accusing the Pakistan government of abdicating its responsibility – that forced the Pakistan army to move against the Taliban. And even after the Pakistan army conducted operations, almost the entire leadership of the terrorist groups disappeared, or was allowed to disappear. Many of these people have taken refuge in areas controlled by the 'strategic assets' of the Pakistan army which leads to the inescapable conclusion that just as the Americans are turning a blind eye to the double game that Pakistan is playing, the Pakistanis are turning a blind eye to the double game that the Taliban are playing.

The US strategy, or rather the lack of it, in Afghanistan clearly shows the sheer helplessness and cluelessness of the US army and administration in the face of the double-game that the Pakistanis have been playing with them since 9/11. There are three possible explanations for such impuissance. The first is that the Americans simply cannot comprehend that they are being taken for a ride. But with all the information that they have of Pakistan's involvement in providing support, sanctuary, sponsorship, training, direction of the Taliban war effort, this sounds rather implausible.

The second reason could be the very real possibility of some very pivotal players determining US policy are on the take of the Pakistanis and they are constantly providing justification and cover-ups for Pakistani acts of omission and commission in the war on terror. This is not as unthinkable or bizarre as it may sound. After all, the Pakistanis are known to have spent millions of dollars to bribe members of the 9/11 commission to water down the scathing references to Pakistan in their report. Incidentally, one of the members of the 9/11 commission piloted the bill in the US congress tripling aid to Pakistan and another is arguably the most Pakistan friendly US ambassador ever to be posted in India. The person in charge of managing the aid under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill is another inveterate India-baiter in the US establishment and is rumoured to have been a favourite of the Pakistanis.

The third reason could be that the US feels that it really doesn't have any option except to try and 'encourage' Pakistan to give up its double-game. Quite aside the fact that the US still has plenty of teeth left to force compliance on a weak, vulnerable and fragile state like Pakistan, this pathetic lament by the Americans over the lack of options has indeed not only 'encouraged' but also emboldened the Pakistanis to give up their double game. Only, the Pakistanis have not quite done this in the way the Americans wanted. The Pakistanis have now shed the double game and are now openly playing a single game, one which aims to bring the Taliban and terrorist groups like the Haqqani network to power in Kabul.

Facing almost certain defeat in Afghanistan, the Americans seem to be veering around to the view that they must try and stabilise Pakistan and avoid taking any action that could severely destabilise Pakistan. While this objective is laudable, the strategy that the Americans are following – turning a blind eye to Pakistan's connivance with Islamist groups in Afghanistan – is hardly going to help achieve that objective. Tolerating Pakistan's double game will not win the war in Afghanistan, but neither will it help bring stability in Pakistan. If the US is forced to withdraw from Afghanistan without vanquishing the Taliban, which is what is likely to happen if the current non-strategy continues, then not only will a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan be inevitable, it will have a deeply destabilising effect on Pakistan where the Islamists will run riot, eventually taking over the Pakistani state. Even if Afghanistan descends into civil war resulting in a de facto partition, the Taliban controlled Pashtun south and east will pull Pakistan into the vortex. Therefore, anyone who imagines that Pakistan will be able to resist the onslaught of the Islamists is only hallucinating.

Clearly, the time for soft options is over for the US. The only alternative before the US is to start cracking the whip on Pakistan to compel it to fall in line. This means the US must start micro-managing Pakistan army operations and force Pakistan to clean up its act. To sweeten the blow the US, along with rest of the international community, can offer $10 billion in purely economic assistance for the next ten years to rebuild Pakistan – i.e. the marshal plan that President Zardari keeps talking about. But if Pakistan doesn't agree, the US should be willing to use the big stick, promising to inflict such terrible pain on Pakistan that it will devastate that country. This could include Iraq-like sanctions, naval blockade, assisting separatist movements inside Pakistan – the list is long.

Many of these measures can be taken under the rubric of the UN because of Pakistan's failure to follow the various UN resolutions against terrorism. If anything, there is much greater justification to use sanctions against Pakistan than against Iran. But if the Chinese block UN sanctions against Pakistan, the US should be ready to act unilaterally against what is currently an 'international migraine', but will almost certainly become a brain tumour unless the cancer is removed. While there is no doubt about the serious risks of this 'operation' killing the patient (read Pakistan), the failure to undertake such an operation will also kill the patient. The question now is will the US continue with its current symptomatic treatment of the cancer of Islamic terrorism, or will it administer the necessary, if risky, treatment required to save the world, and also Pakistan, from this galloping cancer of radical Islamism.

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    <1705 Words>                    30^th July, 2010

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A DESULTORY DIALOGUE

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Lowbrowed behaviour doesn't mix well with high diplomacy. Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi's public show of petulance at being thwarted by the tough and unrelenting stand taken by the mild-mannered Indian External Affairs Minister, SM Krishna, certainly left a bad taste in the mouth. Worse, it effectively scotched any chance of putting a positive spin on the foreign minister level talks. Despite the failure to bridge differences over critical issues like terrorism and Kashmir which blocked the joint statement, the two sides had managed to agree on a few things, which though minor, could have helped to give a small push forward to the dialogue process. In the end, the 'all-or-nothing' approach of Qureshi left India with no choice but to call his bluff and walk away from the table without any agreement on any issue.

Much like Gen Pervez Musharraf, who in 2001 was left nonplussed by Atal Behari Vajpayee's firmness, Qureshi too seemed to have been completely taken by surprise by Krishna's refusal to be either charmed or pushed by his Pakistani counterpart's hard-sell and compromise on the mandate given to him by the Indian cabinet prior to his talks in Islamabad. Both Musharraf's 'ambush diplomacy' in Agra in 2001, and Qureshi's "dictation diplomacy" (in which he parroted the lines dictated to him by the puppeteers sitting in the GHQ, Rawalpindi) were typically the result of miscalculating and misreading India's intentions in restarting the dialogue with Pakistan. More than anything else, it is this feeling that the Indians are reaching out to Pakistan from a position of weakness that leads the Pakistanis to invariably over-play their hand on the negotiating table.

    To be fair to the Pakistanis, the terrible timing of the Indian leadership's decision to once again reach out to Pakistan is in large measure responsible for fiasco in Islamabad. India took the initiative for talks with Pakistan after the London conference on Afghanistan where the Pakistanis were accorded a central role in deciding the future course of events in Afghanistan and India was practically sidelined. The Pakistanis couldn't stop crowing about the success of their double-game in the war on terror, which is now increasingly the only game that the Pakistanis are playing in Afghanistan what with the Pakistani army's lobbying for adjusting terrorist groups like the Haqqani network in Kabul. Such was the hubris in Pakistan that one analyst went to the extent of describing Pakistan as the centre of South Asian politics!

Agreeing to a dialogue with Pakistan under these circumstances was a sure recipe for disaster. Suffused with triumphalism over the success of their Afghan policy, it was quite natural for the Pakistanis to imagine that India was on a very weak wicket and was coming under tremendous US pressure, and that Pakistan could actually push India to agree to make concessions on issues like Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, if there is anything positive about the failure of the talks in Islamabad, it is that the balloon of triumphalism in Pakistan has been punctured. Mr Krishna has disabused the Pakistanis of their delusion and conveyed in very clear and emphatic terms not only India's red lines, but also that India will deal with Pakistan on its own terms and if the Pakistanis really desire good relations with India then it must take the minimum necessary steps to allay India's concerns over terrorism.

Another positive that can be derived from the dialogue in Islamabad is that it would have informed the Indian leadership of the power equations in Islamabad and confirmed the pointlessness of expecting the elected civilian 'government' to deliver on anything. Although Mr Qureshi tried very hard to convince the world and his own people that unlike Mr Krishna, he had the full authority and confidence of his principals, no one is fooled. It was actually quite funny to see Mr Qureshi pretending to be in charge of making Pakistan's foreign policy, more so since everyone knows that he is a mere show boy and the real policy is made by the GHQ in Rawalpindi. Indeed, Mr Qureshi's boorish behaviour after the joint press conference was probably his way of trying to please his masters and prove his 'patriotic' credentials. There are reasons to believe that given the political situation in Islamabad, with questions being raised over the longevity of the current dispensation and talk of a possible in-house change doing the rounds, Mr Qureshi was also trying to project himself as a possible candidate for the post of Prime Minister in the event that a change in Islamabad becomes inevitable.

Of all the people, Mr Qureshi would have known what was on offer on the table before the talks started. He was being economical with the truth when he said that the Indian side was not 'prepared'. Quite to the contrary, the Indian side was very well prepared and in the talks between officials, the Indian side had informed their Pakistani counterparts how far India would go and the red lines they would not cross. If despite this Mr Qureshi thought that he could charm Krishna to go beyond his mandate, the fault was Qureshi's, not Krishna's. It is the norm that when foreign ministers meet, it is to endorse the agreements that have been reached by officials and perhaps to move forward to the next stage of engagement.

By all accounts the Indians had shown enormous flexibility, perhaps more than they should have, and the Pakistanis knew that in a sense the Indians were ready to hold a 'composite dialogue' (discuss all issues) except that it wouldn't be called a 'Composite Dialogue' and the structure of engagement would be different from the past. But one thing the Indians were not ready to give in on was terrorism. For India, Pakistani assurances were nothing more than lip-service and India wanted to see action on the ground before India could open the dialogue track on Kashmir and Siachen with Pakistan. The Pakistanis however insisted on firm timelines for talking on Kashmir, something that the Indians could not commit on without adequate satisfaction on the terrorism issue. It was this insistence of the Pakistanis that acted as the deal breaker. To blame the failure of the talks to the remarks of the Indian Home Secretary, as indeed the Pakistanis have done, is nothing but a red herring.

As things stand, the dialogue process with Pakistan is not derailed, it is only stalled. The talks can be started as soon as the Pakistanis get down the high horse they are riding. Having taken the decision to restart the dialogue with Pakistan, it would be difficult for India to suspend the dialogue in reaction to Mr Qureshi's churlish behaviour. At the same time, India and Pakistan will need to rethink the structure of the dialogue. If the idea is to build trust and confidence, then the formal, ministerial level structured dialogue will not be very helpful. While this track must certainly continue, it is important that the two countries also put in place a mechanism for their officials, even politicians, to meet in an informal setting where they try and develop a better understanding of each other's positions. In other words, perhaps it might not be a bad idea for Mr Qureshi to actually come to India for a 'pleasure trip' and invite his counterpart to the same in Pakistan.

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    <1230 Words>                    23^rd July, 2010

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RESTRUCTURING THE DIALOGUE PROCESS WITH PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Notwithstanding India's expressed desire for a "serious, comprehensive and sustained dialogue" with Pakistan, there is deep scepticism over External Affairs minister SM Krishna's visit to Islamabad to try and address the new 'core issue' – the yawning 'trust deficit' – bedevilling relations between India and Pakistan. Other than the visit restarting the process of a political engagement between the two countries, very little is being out of Mr Krishna's visit. In the Indo-Pak context, low expectations are not necessarily a bad thing, because not only does it avoid the almost destructive hype that inevitably surrounds any Indo-Pak interaction, it allows both sides to claim success even without having achieved anything substantial.

    There are two big problems that the resumed engagement with Pakistan will have to contend with. The first is the political, security and diplomatic environment in which these talks are being held. The second is the apparent disconnect between trying to bridge the trust deficit and the way this objective is sought to be achieved.

Politically, in India there isn't too much public support for re-engagement with Pakistan. While the main opposition party, BJP, is not going on the warpath to oppose the dialogue with Pakistan, it is also not supporting it. Even within the ruling Congress party, the support for the dialogue is very iffy. The mandate given to Mr Krishna by the Union cabinet is very limited.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, the political realities in that country raise serious questions over the credibility of the civilian government as effective interlocutor. It is by now an open secret that the civilian government's ambit is limited to handling what are best described as municipal functions. Anything remotely related to national security is now almost entirely being handled by the Pakistan army. And yet, in spite of the fact that the Pakistan army runs Pakistan's India policy the Indian leadership is extremely reluctant to open a channel of communication, must less engage, with the Pakistan army.

Although Indian officials who visited Pakistan with the Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and later Home Minister P Chidambaram were pleasantly surprised by the reasonableness of the Pakistani officials – no recriminations, no remonstrations, no recidivism and most of all, no revanchism (over Kashmir) – they are neither convinced of Pakistan intentions nor are they willing to accept on face value Pakistani expressions of goodwill and sincerity. For good reasons, India sees this as part of a good-cop-bad-cop routine being played by the Pakistanis – civilian interlocutors playing nice guys and military interlopers playing the bad guys – and not as a sign that good sense has finally dawned on the Pakistanis that they need to normalise relations with India in their own interest.

After all, there is as yet neither anything on the ground to suggest that Pakistan is ready to address India's core concerns on terrorism, nor any indication of any positive change in Pakistan's attitude or thinking towards India. Quite to the contrary, not only are reports pouring in that Pakistan has restarted the jihad factory directed against India, the Pakistan army chief is on record that India, and not the barbaric Taliban, is the enemy that poses an existential threat to Pakistan.

Diplomatically, Pakistan's cockiness knows no bounds, infused as it is with the misplaced triumphalism over the pivotal role it believes it is on the verge of acquiring in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis are convinced that with Western nations looking to them to provide a safe and honourable exit from Afghanistan, Pakistan is ideally placed to press home its demands on India with the influential members of the international community, especially the US. Indeed, the Pakistanis cannot stop crowing that India has restarted the dialogue under US pressure, which they think will extend to extracting concessions from India on issues like Jammu and Kashmir.

Perhaps, this is one reason why the Pakistanis have repudiated the 'progress' made on Kashmir in the back-channel during the Musharraf era. After all, why go in for a compromise, when you stand the chance of gaining something without giving up anything? It is of course quite another matter that the Pakistanis have inadvertently done India a favour by junking the back-channel deal on Kashmir. Without Pakistan renouncing its irredentist claims on Jammu and Kashmir, a deal of the sort worked out on the back-channel would have allowed Pakistan to follow a salami-slicing approach on an integral part of India.

It of course goes without saying that the Pakistanis might be grossly over-estimating not only their diplomatic clout but also India's susceptibility to US pressure. There are very clear limits, not to mention red lines, on how much pressure the US can put on India. While the US factor could have been one of the reasons why India decided to once again try to engage Pakistan, it was not so much pressure as it was a gesture from India to the US which is clutching at straws to find some balance in Afghanistan. In other words, by accepting the US suggestion to reopen a dialogue with Pakistan, India has effectively called Pakistan's bluff that its strained relations with India are preventing it from focussing its attention to the troubled Pashtun tribal belt straddling Afghanistan.

The sooner the US disabuses itself of the notion that improved atmospherics between India and Pakistan will lead to Pakistan shifting its focus from the eastern to the western border, the better. After all, if this didn't happen during the 2004-2008 period when relations between India and Pakistan were the most relaxed in decades, it is unlikely to happen now when the two sides have barely started trying to put together another peace process. On the flip side, the impression that US pressure has been at play in nudging India to the dialogue table with Pakistan, has emboldened Pakistan to a dangerous point where it thinks it can once again use with impunity its jihadi proxies against India in Afghanistan as well as Kashmir.

While the political, security and diplomatic obstacles in the path of the latest Indo-Pak dialogue are obvious enough, there is another factor that will come in the way of any forward movement – the mismatch between the stated objective of the dialogue – bridging the trust deficit – and the manner in which this objective is sought to be reached. In other words, what is that big idea that is going to be on the talks table that could lead to the two countries moving towards building g trust and confidence between them. As things stand, the two delegations will probably end up discussing the same old issues, taking the same old positions, and walking away after agreeing on a few minor things – exchange of prisoners, release of fishermen, etc.

Clearly, neither side seems to have worked out how to bridge the trust gap without treading the beaten path. Nor for that matter have the two sides figured out what they think they must do or can do to gain the trust of the other side. An agreement on another set of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is a good thing. But frankly speaking, the CBMs haven't really helped in building any confidence at least not in the strategic sense of the term. The trouble is that given the complete absence of trust between them, it is futile to expect either India or Pakistan to undertake any sort of bold initiative that ushers in a paradigm change in their bilateral relationship. In other words, we are condemned to going around in circles.

One possible way out is to restructure the dialogue in a way that the two countries engage each other in a formal but unstructured strategic political dialogue which focuses beyond immediate disputes and problems. This means that while the two foreign offices continue to handle the existing issues and problems, and the security agencies can keep doing what they must do to counter the hostile action from Pakistan, a parallel but official and yet informal and unstructured dialogue focusing on strategic issues be started at the political level, as also between the military and intelligence agencies. These parallel dialogue tracks can be used to explore any possible convergence of strategic interests by developing a better appreciation of each other's concerns and compulsions and try and see if anything can be done to address them.

To be useful and effective, this 'strategic dialogue' can and must be an officially sponsored and empowered 'Track 1.5' (perhaps under the Ministry of External Affairs) with a wide representation from the strategic community, military and intelligence officials, academics, politicians, even media personnel. This group will engage with their counterparts in Pakistan on larger strategic issues which are not limited to only the narrow Indo-Pak context. In other words, their discussions will focus on how either side views global and regional developments like Pakistan-China relations, Indo-US relations, piracy in the Arabian sea, unrest in the Middle-East, climate change, the list is endless. The discussions will be unstructured in the sense that the agenda for the talks will be very general, and the setting informal. The mandate of the group will not be reaching an agreement on any issue. Instead, the group's job will be to get a better understanding of how the other side views issues of common concern and to then see if there are any points of possible convergence of interests as also allay certain misconceptions in the other side of strategic objectives of the other side.

Will such an alternative dialogue process work? Probably not, but then is the idea is to bridge the yawning and ever growing trust deficit, then doesn't it make more sense to try a new and different tack, rather than keep treading the beaten path.

NEVER ENDING ENDGAME IN AFGHANISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

With the Americans having conceded a central role to Pakistan in the latest round of the never-ending 'endgame' in Afghanistan, the spectre of Taliban returning to power in Kabul is all too real for countries with vital interests in Afghanistan to ignore. Unfortunately, despite sharing deep antipathy for the Taliban, important regional powers like India and Iran are unable to read from the same page on how to counter Pakistan's pernicious game-plan in Afghanistan which also holds extremely serious ramifications for their own security. This has a lot to do with the fact that as of now India and Iran's interests in Afghanistan are like skew lines and both seem to be waiting and watching how events unfold in Afghanistan before they decide their next move.

At a recent trilateral dialogue in New Delhi between members of the strategic community of Afghanistan, India and Iran, it became clear that the Iranians, more than anything else, were interested in seeing the back of the Americans from the region. The Iranians appeared to be in a denial mode of Pakistani proportions i.e. everything will sort itself out once the Americans exit from the region. Of course, quite like the Pakistanis, the Iranians too haven't thought things through on what will happen once the foreign forces abandon Afghanistan to the brutality and barbarism of the Taliban, much less the impact of this on their own country.

Unlike Iran, which considers the US as a bigger and more immediate threat than the Taliban – many Afghans allege that Iran is covertly supporting and providing sanctuary to sections of both Taliban and Al Qaeda against the Americans – India sees the US presence in Afghanistan as a stabilising force which is required to keep the Taliban at bay. Another point of divergence between India and Iran is Pakistan. While the prospect of Pakistan calling the shots on what happens in Afghanistan is anathema for India, Iran is much less antagonistic to seeing the Pakistanis in the driving seat in Afghanistan and feels that it can do business with Pakistan.

With the US in a withdrawal mode, the conviction that they will leave (timing is hardly important) is driving the strategising of regional powers. The defeatism that has descended on the foreign forces, fuelled in no small measure by the too clever by half peace deals and plans that the British are hard-selling to the Americans, has become a self-fulfilling prophecy and is, in a sense, making the US irrelevant to the future plans of regional players like India in Afghanistan. So much so that even the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, appears to have lost confidence in the Americans. He appears increasingly inclined to go over the head of his American benefactors to try and strike some sort of a deal with the Pakistanis who are pushing for an accommodation with Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is not only the de facto head of the infamous Haqqani network and a close ally of both Al Qaeda and Taliban supremo Mullah Omar, but also a 'strategic asset' of Pakistan.

Karzai, like most other Afghans (including large sections of the Taliban), has little love lost for Pakistan. But he is left with very little choice except to try and see if he can gain something by playing along with the Pakistanis. He probably understands that he will survive so long as the Pakistanis see some utility in him. Karzai is too steeped in the treacherous world of Afghan politics to be not under any illusion that while the Taliban and their allies might open a dialogue with him, they will do a 'Najibullah' on him the moment they get a chance.

While Karzai is probably hoping that a dialogue with sections of the combatants splitting the Taliban movement, warlords like Sirajuddin Haqqani have entered into a dialogue for their own reasons. Quite aside the Afghan culture of combatants holding a dialogue even as they fight, Haqqani readiness to talk to Karzai on Pakistani nudging is nothing if not classical deception. He knows that the insurgency in Afghanistan has reached the tipping point. The last thing that the Islamists would want at this stage is a military offensive by Pakistan in their redoubt of North Waziristan which could disrupt and degrade the potency of the insurgency by denying the insurgents a safe haven. The charade of talks is only a ploy to forestall any possibility of a military operation in North Waziristan.

Like Karzai, India too is being forced to re-evaluate and re-work its policy options in Afghanistan. India's problem is that until now it has been riding on the back of the US to build its influence in Afghanistan. But now the seeds of an independent Afghan policy, not dependent on the Americans, are germinating. But what shape this policy takes – whether India adopts an aggressive 'forward' frontier policy or slips into 'masterly inactivity' or even decides on a half-way house between these two extremes – is still not clear. To a large extent, the policy will depend on the objectives India sets for itself in Afghanistan. Strategically, India would like to see a stable and friendly Afghanistan which doesn't become a playground for Pakistan's sinister strategic designs in the region. Interestingly, this objective can be achieved not only if Afghanistan remains stable, friendly and immune to Pakistan's baleful influence but also if Afghanistan descends into chaos and civil war, something that will most likely happen as and when the foreign forces quit leaving behind enormous quantity of arms and ammunition and propping up proxies to carry on the fight.

One big problem that India faces in following a 'forward policy' is that it has to tie up with Iran and/or Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours to implement such a policy. But with Iran operating on quite a different plane than India, the complexities of a 'forward policy' increase, more so because of the logistics involved in operating through Central Asian states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Perhaps, if and when the American withdrawal starts, Iran too might review its policy on Afghanistan and find it in its interest to tie up with India. Until then, India will, more or less, have to play the 'Great Game' in Afghanistan on its own.

The sense of resigned acceptance developing in some policy making quarters in India to imminent marginalisation in Afghanistan because of the apparent compact between Hamid Karzai and the Pakistani military establishment is quite needless simply because all is never lost in Afghanistan for all times to come. The situation in Afghanistan is always fluid and can change rapidly, practically overnight, making underdogs top-dogs and vice versa. The chances of Pakistan being able to manage Afghanistan for any length of time are, therefore, negligible, even less so given Pakistan's bankrupt economy and its society which is at war with itself? Eventually, Pakistan will get sucked into the Afghan vortex. The real existential challenge to Pakistan is not from India; it is from Afghanistan, and it must be India's endeavour to force Pakistan to divert all its attention, energy and resources from its eastern border with India to its western border with Afghanistan.

Given the dialectics of Afghanistan, it perhaps makes a lot more sense for India to build leverages that converts Afghanistan into a strategic black-hole for Pakistan. In other words, instead of trying to keep Pakistan out of Afghanistan, India needs to devise a policy that aims to draw Pakistan deeper into the Afghanistan quagmire.

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    <1250 Words>                    9^th July, 2010

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