ASIF ZARDARI – HOW MUCH LONGER?

by

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The epitaphs being written of Asif Zardari after the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the infamous National Reconciliation Ordinance void ab initio are perhaps somewhat premature at this stage. Despite panic buttons being pressed by the PPP rank and file after the judgement, things seem to have settled down some. This does not mean that the legal minefield that has been laid out for President Zardari has disappeared. Indeed, the hostile courts will remain hanging like a sword of Damocles over the head of the PPP chief and his close associates. But the looming threat of the government being destabilised by the joint effort of the military establishment and some powerful media barons has receded for the time being. How long the ruling dispensation will be able to cling on in office - it has already lost power – is still not clear. What is clear, however, is that even if by some miracle or fortuitous circumstances the PPP-led coalition survives its full term, it will be as nothing more than a glorified municipality.

The ruling coalition, which always expected the NRO to be shot down, reacted rather strongly to the short order of the 17 judge full bench of the Supreme Court not because the law was declared ultra vires to the constitution but because the judgement appeared to have singled out President Zardari for special attention. The observations by some of the judges on the cases against Mr Zardari and the directive to reopen the cases in the Swiss courts only confirmed the suspicions that the entire legal challenge to the NRO was mounted in order to fix the co-chairman of the PPP. Interestingly, the one-sided nature of the court ruling created the perception that that the PPP leadership was being targeted by the judges (many of them with right-wing, Islamist leaning and who consider PPP as an anathema) which has in a sense worked in the favour of the PPP. The barrage of criticism – on the legal merits of the judgement (made by the Human Rights activist, Asma Jehangir) as well as the proclivity for grand-standing by the judges who appear to be even more populist than the politicians (made by one of leaders of the Lawyers movement for restoration of the judiciary, Ali Ahmed Kurd) – has raised serious questions over the fairness of the judgement.

Put on the defensive, the judges are now making efforts to be seen to be even-handed. The first indication of this was the notice they issued to the authorities for putting the name of Nusrat Bhutto on the Exit Control List. This was followed up by reopening all the cases of loan write-offs from 1971. If followed to their logical conclusion, the loan write-offs case will end up disqualifying practically all the members of parliament. Not surprisingly, the politicians, cutting across political lines, now seem to be closing ranks against the judiciary. For the moment, the biggest opposition party, PMLN, is playing to the gallery by speaking in favour of the judiciary. But the PMLN leadership also knows that unless the judiciary is reined in, they too will have to put up with judges running amok. More importantly, the PMLN leadership, especially the Sharif brothers, will almost certainly face disqualification if the loan write-off case is pursued seriously by the judges.

Clearly, the judges' zeal for populism is creating a situation where the politicians might be left with no choice except to castrate the judiciary and deprive it of many of the powers that the judges are arrogating to themselves. What is more, the military establishment too could end up siding with the political class against the judges. After all, if the courts reopen the infamous ISI pay-offs case – the Mehran bank scandal – then a lot of former senior officials will have their necks on the block. If it was only old cases like the Mehran bank scam, perhaps the current military leadership would not lose too much sleep. But there is every chance that cases and petitions will be filed that could affect the current military leadership, in particular the army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani. Already there are questions being asked as to why the Supreme Court is no longer pro-active on the 'missing persons' case. There is also pressure on the judges to prosecute Gen. Musharraf on charges of treason for violating the constitution, something that will also pull in his henchmen like Gen. Kayani.

The Pakistan army has already signalled that it is not in favour of the overturning the current system. Apparently, this was the message that Gen. Kayani delivered through the leading light of the Lawyer's Movement, Aitzaz Ahsan, to the chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, on the eve of the July 31 judgement in which the courts were ruling on the 'emergency' imposed by Gen. Musharraf on 3^rd November, 2007. But while the Army is not interested in destabilising the current system, it had a lot of reservations against the national security policy of the PPP-led government. The Pakistan army resented the growing closeness of President Zardari and the US. It was also not comfortable with Mr Zardari's India and Kashmir policy or for that matter his unequivocal opposition to the Islamists (read Taliban) and his efforts to improve relations with the Karzai regime in Afghanistan. This was the reason why the dirty tricks department of the military became active against the government.

Over the past few months, the military orchestrated the entire campaign of vilification against Mr Zardari and his close associates and brought them under so much pressure that they have now thrown in the towel as far as making policy or taking decisions on issues of national security are concerned. As things stand, the army has once again started wielding complete control over issues relating to national security – namely, relations with US, India, Afghanistan, the nuclear programme and strategy, the War on Terror, policy on Kashmir. Giving a new dimension to the doctrine of separation of powers, the civilian government of Pakistan will now be responsible for everything except foreign, defence and security issues, which will be the sole preserve of the military. Even political initiatives that have a bearing on national security – for instance, the Balochistan package or the political reforms package in Gilgit-Baltistan – require a clearance from the Pakistan army.

With the civilian government going out of its way to placate the army – India-bashing is once again the flavour of the season and Kashmir issue is slowly but surely coming back on the centre-stage – the generals have got what they wanted. It would now be counter-productive for the army to force the government out of office. While there is little doubt that the army would like to see the back of Mr Zardari, it might well decide to tolerate him as a necessary evil. Pushing Mr Zardari out now could well upset the entire political applecart, more so after Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani has thrown his weight behind the President. Gilani has understood that he won't be able to survive in office for very long – a few months at best – if Mr Zardari is ousted. Ideally, the army would like a light-weight like Mr Gilani to continue. But the number game in the national assembly militates against such an arrangement. The army is also apprehensive that move against Mr Zardari could easily lead to a reaction in Sindh, something that the army would like to avoid at a time when it is already embroiled in combating two insurgencies in FATA and Balochistan.

If the current dispensation collapses, this will leave basically two options. The first is a new election. Given the current security situation a new election doesn't seem very feasible. And even if it is held, it will most likely sweep Mr Nawaz Sharif's party into power. This is not exactly a very welcome prospect for the army because Nawaz Sharif is unlikely to be a pushover. The army also fears that he will wreck his vengeance on military officers who crossed his path when he was ousted by Gen Musharraf. Even worse, he will go out of his way to end the army's political role. The second option is what is known as the 'Bangladesh model' – a government of technocrats backed by the army. But this option gives rise to two important questions. First, the so-called 'Bangladesh model' was originally the 'Musharraf model' who in until the 2002 elections had a cabinet of technocrats. Neither the 'Musharraf model' worked miracles, nor the 'Bangladesh model'. So what will change now?

The second question relates to the courts. The 'Bangladesh model' has no constitutional sanction. Unless the courts approve such an arrangement by once again resurrecting the 'doctrine of necessity', they will be constrained to strike it down. And if they don't strike it down, the courts will lose every shred of credibility and legitimacy. Of course, under the guise of the 'Bangladesh model' the army could overthrow the current judiciary. But this would again bring the situation back to square one where the army could end up being pitted against the public, something it cannot afford especially when it needs the public support in its fight against the 'bad' Taliban.

Given the dialectics of the situation, it therefore serves the interest of everyone if the Zardari/Gilani combine continues to occupy their offices but without wielding any real power. The only spoiler in this whole thing could be the Supreme Court. Unless the judges take a step back and desist from opening multiple Pandora's boxes, they will almost certainly end up destabilising the entire system. What remains to be seen is whether the judiciary survives this destabilisation or whether the politicians and military establishment gang up and fix the judiciary, which in turn will have its own repercussions for the Pakistani state structure. Either way, Pakistan will face great instability and unrest.

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    <1650 Words>                    28^th December, 2009

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TALIBAN: PAN-ISLAMISTS OR PASHTUN NATIONALISTS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Are the Taliban an Afghan/Pashtun nationalist movement, which notwithstanding the extremely reactionary, even barbaric, sort of an Islamist ideology to which it subscribes, is fighting a war of national liberation against foreign occupation forces? Or, are the Taliban an Afghan/Pashtun manifestation of a radical pan-Islamic movement that seeks to spread its virulence to all corners of the globe? The answer to this fundamental question will be critical in deciding the future course of the 'war on terror'. If the international community can reach a determination that the Taliban have no agenda of either exporting or imposing their brand of Islam to other parts of the world and are merely resisting foreign occupation, they would be tempted to pack their bags and abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban. On the other hand, if the international community is convinced that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will become the headquarters of Jihad International, from where radical Islamists will spread their venom all over the world, then the only option left will be to comprehensively defeat the Taliban.

    Normally, the answer to the above question should be a no-brainer: puritanical IsIamists like the Taliban abhor the concept of ethnic or national identity and subsume such identities under an over-arching Islamic identity. And yet in recent months, the Taliban, and their supporters and spokesmen in Pakistan, have been trying to peddle the line that they only fighting to liberate their country from the clutches of foreign forces and pose no danger to any other country of the world. In a statement issued in September, Mullah Omar said: "Our goal is to gain independence of the country and establish a just Islamic system...The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants that the true sons of this land should have participation in the government and in government-making...We assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not cause it hands to cause jeopardy as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us...They [enemy media] accuse us of our being a threat to the countries of the world. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to clear all these doubts provided a conducive atmosphere is available"(http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefa_mullahomar0909.pdf).

In another statement on 25^th November 2009, Mullah Omar said "pushing away this aggression and defending our country is our legitimate and national right and we will use our rights to defend with all the methods and sacrifices..."(http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_mullahomar1109.pdf). After US president, Barack Obama, announced an additional 30,000 troops for Afghanistan, the Taliban issued another statement in which they said: "The aim of the Mujahideen is to have a free and independent country and Islamic government which represents the aspirations of the Afghan people...the so-called advocates of democracy and human rights are not ready to give these natural rights to the Afghans and to the Mujahideen...The Mujahideen, as a part of their policy will ensure that the next government of Mujahideen will not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, including the neighbours, if foreign troops pull out of Afghanistan." (http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaTaliObamaBush1209.pdf).

    So, how seriously should these statements be taken? Are these eyewash meant to deceive the international community or have the Taliban really changed their world-view? Do these statements really signal a break between the Taliban and al Qaeda and the transformation of the Taliban from an Islamist militia to a nationalist force which adheres to an Islamist ideology? Or is all this part of a psychological warfare to hoodwink their adversaries into believing that they their only aim is to oust the foreign forces from their soil. Clearly, if Mullah Omar and company are only interested in Afghanistan and are fighting a national war of liberation then it implies that Pashtun nationalism and not pan-Islamism is the driving force behind the Taliban. But despite the signals that the Taliban are trying to send through these statements, there is little or no evidence on the ground that would suggest that the Taliban have severed their linkages with al Qaeda or that the Islamists fighting in Afghanistan have no global agenda. Given the deep linkages between the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda – for instance, the Haqqani network is at the forefront of the Afghan Taliban militancy and is also one of the main backers of the al Qaeda leadership - to imagine that these links will be severed in exchange for a  complete US withdrawal is nothing but delusion.

Interestingly enough, a line similar to the one being peddled by the Taliban is also being floated by official and unofficial spokespersons of the Pakistani military establishment. This begs the question whether the tail is wagging the dog, or whether the dog is wagging the tail (of course, which is the dog and which is the tail is a matter of interpretation). But more importantly, are the Pakistanis fooling themselves or the world when they make a distinction between the Taliban and al Qaeda or between the Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban. It is entirely possible that the Pakistani intelligence agencies feel that their assets embedded with Taliban groups like the Haqqani network have given it all the inputs that suggest that the Afghan Taliban are not on the same page as the Pakistani Taliban as far as launching attacks on Pakistan is concerned. But it is equally possible that misleading information is being deliberately fed to the Pakistani intelligence agencies by its agents who have thrown in their lot with the Islamists. Perhaps reverse indoctrination of the ISI assets, coupled with a tendency for downright denial of the threat that the Taliban pose to Pakistan is making the Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking that their enemy are the local Taliban and not the Afghan Taliban. In a way, the Pakistanis are probably suffering from a malaise that is so common in south Asia – the touching belief that if you don't mess with the local goon or warlord and instead cooperate with him then he will not trouble you.

In their obsession with gaining 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and preventing India from gaining a foothold in that country, the Pakistanis either don't seem to or don't want to understand that as far as the future security and stability of Pakistan is concerned it makes little difference whether the Taliban are Afghan nationalists or Pan-Islamists. In either case, Pakistan will suffer if the Taliban gain ascendance in Afghanistan. If Taliban are the local chapter of the radical pan-Islamist network and philosophy, then Pakistan will face the heat because the Taliban will almost certainly seek to spread out into Pakistan and try to capture it for ideological reasons. On the other hand if the Taliban are Pashtun/Afghan nationalists then again it should be a cause of great worry for the Pakistanis because it raises the spectre of a resurgent Pashtun nationalism – this time led by Mullahs steeped in local culture and not by intellectuals spouting Marxism – which in turn will holds horrendous implications for the Pakistani state.

For the moment, however, the wavering resolve of the Western countries to stay the course and drain the swamp of radical Islam in Afghanistan has convinced the Pakistanis that since the Americans are going to quit sooner rather than later it makes sense for Pakistan to not initiate any major military operation against the Afghan Taliban. After all if the Taliban are going to be the next rulers in Afghanistan, the Pakistanis wouldn't want to rub them the wrong way at this juncture. The Pakistanis are today in the mode of 'strategic defiance' of the Americans. The way they see it, the Americans are in such a precarious condition that they can't afford to dictate terms to Pakistan anymore and have no choice but to play by the rules that the Pakistanis set for them. And while the Pakistanis depend critically on American financial and military assistance, they feel that they are in a position where they can defy the Americans and yet partake their money. But this is a myopia of the worst sort because it doesn't take into account of what will happen after the American's leave and the aid tap dries up even as the 'independent' Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan seeks its own economic viability in a bankrupt Pakistan.

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    <1375 Words>                    18^th December, 2009

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BALOCHISTAN - CONCESSIONS VERSUS SECESSION

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

In a last-ditch effort to find a political solution to the explosive situation that exists in Balochistan province, the government of Pakistan has unveiled a package of economic, political, administrative reforms titled "Aaghaz-e-Huqooq-Balochistan". The very title of the package is an acknowledgement of the shabby treatment meted out to Balochistan for the last six decades. On the face of it, the AHB package appears to be a sincere effort on the part of the PPP-led government to address grievances of the disaffected Baloch. But whether this package will achieve its objective of bringing back the Baloch to the national mainstream of Pakistan and end the wave of separatist sentiment sweeping through the Baloch belt of the province will critically depend both on whether the infamous 'establishment' (read Pakistan army) will allow the measures to be implemented on the ground and on the acceptance or otherwise of these reforms by the Baloch.

Baloch nationalism has been an abiding feature of the political landscape of Balochistan. Four times in the past, the Baloch have gone on the war path to win their independence from Pakistan. Each time the Pakistani state has brutally crushed the insurgency. But despite the repression and the shenanigans of the Pakistani establishment to break or buy out the Baloch, the idea of an independent Balochistan has always stayed alive in the minds of the people of the province. If anything, it is the ham-handedness of the Pakistani establishment that has probably helped to keep the flame of Baloch nationalism lit.

Ethnicity intertwined with a sense of political marginalisation and economic deprivation continues to be a potent force in keeping the flames of Baloch nationalism alive. The Baloch feel that they have been denied representation in the government and perceive it as an alien government. There are hardly any Baloch in Army or top federal jobs, even most of the provincial jobs are held by outsiders. As a result the ratio of unemployment in Balochistan is highest in the country. They fear being marginalised in their own province by Pakhtuns and other Pakistanis and feel that the resources of their province are being exploited by outsiders, without any benefit coming their way.

Ostensibly to usher in development in the province, the Musharraf regime started a series of mega-projects in Balochistan – Gwadar port being the most notable. In principle, there was nothing wrong with these projects. But rather than uplifting the lot of the Baloch, they served to alienate them further. The reason was simple. The Baloch had not only no control over these projects, they had no stake in them – the entire labor force was imported from other parts of Pakistan and cronies of the establishment reaped all the benefits from these projects. At the same time the Pakistan army decided to establish a string of military cantonments across the province. This again was seen by the Baloch as a step to tighten the stranglehold of Islamabad on the resources of the province. The mega-projects and military cantonments were also seen as measures to alter the demographic composition in the province and reduce the Baloch into a minority.

With matters reaching a head, an armed insurgency broke out in Balochistan. Partly because of momentous political events taking place in rest of Pakistan and partly because of an unwritten media censorship on the coverage of the incidents in Balochistan imposed by the quasi-military dispensation in the country, an impression gained ground that Pakistan had got over its Balochistan problem. But while developments in Balochistan might not have made the front pages of newspapers, it did not stop the situation in the province from spiralling out of control. Today the situation in Balochistan is in many ways far more serious in terms of its potential repercussions for the Pakistani federation than even the militancy in the Pashtun areas.

The alienation of the people with Pakistan in the Baloch areas of Balochistan is almost total and separatist sentiments are now being openly expressed in colleges, universities, public meetings, TV programmes, newspaper articles and what have you. So widespread is the disaffection with Pakistan that even the moderate nationalist forces are being dragged by the nose to lean in favour of the separatists. Pro-Pakistan nationalist politicians are constrained to tell their Pakistani interlocutors that they are fast getting marginalised and that their pleas for seeking a solution within the Pakistani federation are finding fewer takers by the day.

After the 2008 general elections, attempts were made by the civilian government to reach out and assuage the Baloch. President Asif Zardari not only apologised to the Baloch for all the acts of state repression in the past and promised to address all the issues that agitated the Baloch. Apart from the pro forma development package, he assured the Baloch constitutional reforms that would make provincial autonomy a reality. In addition, the PPP government took steps to free political prisoners, including many of the so-called 'missing persons' who had been kept in illegal custody by the security agencies of the Pakistani state.

Despite Asif Zardari's peace initiative being welcomed accorded a cautious welcome, it was not able to make even a dent on the deep-seated sense of grievance among the Baloch. One reason for this was that the PPP-led coalition government was not exactly a representative government. Worse, the MPAs (Members of Provincial Assembly), including the chief minister, were nothing more than figureheads. They neither enjoyed any credibility among the disaffected people, nor did they have the power to do anything to satisfy the aspirations of the people. So much so that both the chief minister and the governor of Balochistan have stated on the record that they are powerless before the security establishment that pretty much does as it pleases in the province.

In any case, matters had moved to a point where what the Pakistani state was willing to offer to the Baloch in terms of autonomy, a larger share in the federal resources, a control over the province's resources etc. was no longer enough to satisfy the people of the province. Caught as they were in a time-warp of sorts, the Pakistani political authorities seemed unable to comprehend that the Baloch political and social scene had undergone a fundamental change. The disaffected Baloch are no longer likely to be satisfied by action on granting of provincial rights or even autonomy; their demand is now 'Azadi'. Complicating matters for the Pakistani state is another fundamental change: the tribal sardars no longer called all the shots.

In the past if you got the sardars on your side, more than half the battle was won. No longer is this the case. Although many of the tribal sardars continue to have a hold over their tribesmen, there has been a dilution in this hold. A lot of the young people and urban dwellers no longer blindly follow the line set by their sardars. As a result many of the sardars are now constrained to defend the separatists just to retain their relevance. Nationalist sardars like Attaullah Mengal and Khair Bux Marri are no longer the driving force of the separatist movement, only figureheads.

Much of the separatist violence in Balochistan has been claimed by organisations like the BLA, BRA, BLUF, BLF. Interestingly, despite these outfits operating on the scene for a number of years now, nobody seems to have a proper fix on them. There is more conjecture than any hard evidence regarding their form, structure, leadership and membership. The formless structure of the Baloch separatist armies makes them quite an enigma for the Pakistani security forces. They are almost like a phantom organization. And despite the mass arrests of alleged operatives of these organisations, it doesn't seem to have affected their operations or revealed their organisational structure, leadership, cadre, funding, training etc.

The guerrilla warfare tactics of these groups – planting roadside bombs and mines that target military convoys, targeting and eliminating people who are close to the government, ambushing soldiers and officers randomly while they are off-duty, target killings of people working for or supporting the state authorities, attacking and destroying economic infrastructure like gas pipelines, electricity lines, railway tracks, and carrying out reprisals against Punjabi settlers in Balochistan (which has led to an exodus on the Non-Baloch from the Baloch areas of the province) – coupled with mass public support they are attracting is now a major nightmare for the Pakistan establishment.

In order to snuff out the clear and present danger that the rising tide of separatist sentiment poses to the integrity of the Pakistani federation, a two-pronged approach has been adopted: military repression on the one hand and a political and economic initiative on the other hand. Quite aside the fact that the military prong effectively nullifies any good that could possibly come out of the political-economic prong, the strategy of the Pakistan security establishment to prop up counter forces to the Baloch nationalist too could end up making matters worse in the province. Not only is the security establishment using the Islamists, in particular the Taliban and political groups like the JUI sharing a fraternal relationship with the Taliban, to queer the pitch for the nationalist forces, they are also instigating ethnic conflict between the Baloch and the Pashtun in Balochistan. Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that there will be any positive movement towards restoring peace in the province, much less assuaging the litany of grievances that the Baloch harbour against the Pakistani establishment and state.

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    <1580 Words>                    11^th December, 2009

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SURGE IS OKAY, BUT WHAT IS THE STRATEGY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    It is never easy for any politician to commit enormous human and material resources to fight a war that his country is not seen to be winning. His difficulties multiply if his country is going through the worst economic crisis in living memory and the public opinion increasingly veers around to the view that the resources being sunk into a war being fought thousands of miles away could have been used more productively back home. Therefore by persisting with, or should we say expanding, an increasingly unpopular, but necessary, war, US President Barack Obama has undertaken a huge political gamble. If successful, not only will Mr Obama be guaranteed a second term in office but he will also have saved the prestige of the sole-superpower. On the other hand if the gamble fails, and the US is forced to withdraw from Afghanistan without defeating the Taliban, then Afghanistan is likely to once again become 'terror central' from where Islamist terror groups will launch attacks around the world.

Caught between the imperatives of war which demand a surge in the troop levels in Afghanistan, and the compulsions of politics and economics back home, Mr Obama has done a political balancing act in a major policy speech that he delivered at the US military academy in West Point on 2^nd December, 2009. He has given in to the pro-war lobby by announcing the deployment of 30,000 extra troops being demanded by his military commanders in Afghanistan, and at the same time placated the anti-war lobby by announcing that the US will start to draw down troops in Afghanistan from July 2011. In essence, this is what the entire speech boils down to. Everything else – an effective partnership with Pakistan, building the capacity of the Afghan government and transferring responsibility to it, ending the days of handing blank cheques to the Afghan government and holding it accountable on issues of governance and corruption etc. – will depends on the outcome of the troop surge and the announcement of the withdrawal date.

The problem that Mr Obama is likely to face in executing the policy he has announced is that by giving a withdrawal date he has effectively ended up scoring out any good that the surge would have done in the security situation. The Islamist insurgents and their supporters have always believed that the Americans are not going to stay the course in Afghanistan. In giving a withdrawal date, Mr Obama has only vindicated this belief of the Islamists, which they have held ever since they were ousted from power in Afghanistan in late 2001. The insurgents and their strategic planners were convinced that their guerrilla tactics will eventually bleed the US-led international force to a point where they would find their stay in Afghanistan militarily and economically unsustainable. Unlike their adversaries, the Islamists, guided as they are by a demonical and millenarian vision, attach little or no meaning to either life or time. Since they were prepared to fight the 'infidels' and 'crusaders' for as long as it took, the 18 month time frame announced by Mr Obama to start pulling out combat troops is like a bonus for the Islamists.

The big question now is whether the Islamists will ease off for the moment and build up their strength to move in when the foreign troops start to pull out or whether they will increase their attacks to hasten the withdrawal of the foreign troops. But it is not only the Islamists who will be deciding their course of action on the basis of the withdrawal time frame given by Mr Obama. Many of the allies of the Americans will now start to hedge their bets, buying insurance with the Islamists who could well be the future rulers of Afghanistan. This will certainly have a major negative impact on the war effort.

What is more, the uncertainty caused by the imminence of the US exit will only fuel corruption because everyone will seek to garner as many resources as possible, which will come in handy when they have to run for cover after the house starts to collapse. An enhanced crisis of confidence in the ability of the Afghan authorities to resist the Taliban once the US starts to draw down its troop levels is quite natural. After all, if the most powerful military force in the world is made to succumb before the Islamist guerrillas then the possibility of a rag-tag Afghan National Army holding off the Taliban is practically non-existent. Despite all the tall talk of building the capacity of the Afghan authorities and army to run their country, the fact remains that if such capacities haven't been built in the last eight years, there's a fat chance of the Afghans getting into a position where they can run their affairs and resist the Islamist onslaught on their own in the next 18 months. And this raises the question as to what course of action the US will follow if the Afghan authorities are not in a position to take over, much less discharge effectively and efficiently, the responsibilities that are handed over to them by the Americans. In the event, will Mr Obama extend the withdrawal date or will he continue to stick to it?

The issue of withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is only one of the major problems with the policy announced at West Point. An equally big problem is that there is really no major change in the overall strategy of fighting the war in Afghanistan. No doubt, some of the tactics would change. For instance, there is a lot of talk of the additional forces securing population centres and concentrating on Afghan provinces like Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan where the Taliban have made major inroads. But the strategic objective now appears limited to snatching the war initiative by pushing back the Taliban and creating conditions that make the Taliban amenable to a negotiated political settlement that can then pave the way for an orderly exit of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The question, however, is whether thirty thousand extra soldiers will be enough for this job? Or is the troop surge going to end up becoming a classic example of reinforcing failure? These questions acquire greater relevance when it is considered as to what these new troops are going to do what the existing troops have not already tried?

If the additional forces are to not end up mounting what could at best be described as a holding operation but actually change the ground situation, then there needs to be a total overhaul of the strategy of war in Afghanistan. The bottom-line is that the Americans could lose the war in Afghanistan for the same reason why the Soviets lost – the inability to stem the flow of recruits and resources to the Taliban from Pakistan. In other words, unless the supply chain and safe havens in Pakistan is destroyed, the war in Afghanistan can never be won. Equally important is the need to build local support networks inside Afghanistan that effectively combat the Taliban. This is way beyond the capacity of the Afghan National Army. The only people who can do this are probably the war-lords, howsoever repugnant they may be to constitutional purists and the human-rights types. Rather than putting too much in store of a central authority that no one listens to, perhaps it makes more sense to invest in war-lords who can establish order in their local areas.

Suffice to say that Afghanistan is a war that America can still win, but not if it persists with the strategy and policy it has followed over the last eight years.

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    <1285 Words>                    4^th December, 2009

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