Sunday, November 22, 2009

PEACE IS PRECARIOUS, PROCESS APPEARS DEAD, FOR NOW

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    If the intention behind the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai was to kill the peace process between India and Pakistan, then the terrorists who planned and perpetrated the outrage have achieved their objective. The two countries had made a lot of progress, or so we are told by Dr Manmohan Singh, Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Khurshid Kasuri, to reach a mutually acceptable deal on the most contentious of all issues between them – Jammu and Kashmir. While the understanding on J&K reached in the 'back-channel' hasn't still been repudiated by either side, it will, for all practical purposes, remain buried in some highly classified file in some inaccessible room in New Delhi and Islamabad (more likely Rawalpindi), for the foreseeable future.

So long as the public sentiment in India doesn't get over the deep hurt and sense of violation caused by the Mumbai terror strikes, and there isn't a satisfactory closure on the fate of the plotters of this dastardly attack, bringing the peace process back on the rails will take some doing. Even if the Indian leadership decides to bite the bullet and resume the stalled dialogue, chances are that there will be a lot of talking at each other rather than talking to each other. Meaningful action against groups and individuals responsible for Mumbai is perhaps now an inescapable sine qua non for a meaningful dialogue between India and Pakistan.

If Kargil was India's first televised war, Mumbai was India's first televised terror strike. The 60 hour long, live and saturation coverage of an act of mass murder in which Indians from every strata of society were mercilessly butchered, unleashed the sort of public fury among the middle and upper classes that is quite unprecedented in India. On the firing line was the political class in India, and of course, Pakistan, from where the attackers came. The government was swift to control the political damage. Heads rolled and a tough line was taken on Pakistan, which was, and still is, in keeping with the public mood.

The denials, obfuscation, flip-flops (for instance over the visit of ISI chief) by Pakistan hasn't helped matters. The counter-propaganda in the Pakistani media – remember the 'lawyer' who claimed that Ajmal Kasab was 'kidnapped' in Nepal by the Indian intelligence agencies and the rather silly, and utterly malicious, 'al faida' type of analysis by 'embedded' journalists with a reputation of asking questions based on hand-outs from the infamous 'agencies' – only hardened the Indian position. In the end, the Mumbai attacks not only killed people; it also killed the desire for good and friendly relations with Pakistan in many an Indian heart.

The suspicion and lack of faith and trust in Pakistan among Indians deepened after the non-serious prosecution and subsequent acquittal of Jamaatud Dawa chief, Hafiz Saeed, and the absence of any genuine crackdown on the Lashkar-e-Taiba. To make matters worse, the recent arrest in the US of two men of Pakistani origin (Tahawwur Rana and David Headley aka Daood Gilani) who were working for the LeT and were planning to launch terror attacks in India – the targets include the National Defence College in Delhi and Doon School in Dehradun – has convinced Indians that the ban imposed on LeT is an eyewash.

This distrust, in many ways, lies at the heart of the problem. It is natural for Pakistanis, who are themselves reeling under devastating terror attacks on practically a daily basis, to wonder why the Indians are making such a big deal about Mumbai. But the way the Indians see it, what the Pakistanis are facing is the result of their proxies – Taliban and their affiliates like the splinter groups of Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Mujahideen etc – going out of control; on the other hand, the terrorism in India is the handiwork of groups like the LeT which still operate pretty much like an auxiliary force of the Pakistani intelligence agencies.

Therefore, for anyone to imagine that the people of Mumbai and India have put 26/11 behind them and that a watered down version of Indo-Pak dialogue can resume sometime soon would be a mistake. It isn't always possible to pull off an Agra after a Kargil. No one knows this better than Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, especially after the flak he faced from all directions over Sharm-el-Sheikh. His effort to try and resurrect the peace process ended up leaving him somewhat isolated on this issue within his own party.

Making the resumption of some sort of a dialogue with Pakistan politically palatable is only part of the problem that Dr Singh faces. The other part of the problem is that the Indian national security establishment is divided between the realists and the idealists over the utility of talking to Pakistan. The latter are of the view that there is no option but to use the dialogue process to resolve differences and improve relations with Pakistan. They believe that having faced the blowback of Jihadist terror, the Pakistani establishment has changed tack and is left with no choice but to wind up the jihad factory. They have also been encouraged by some of the efforts made by Pakistan to bring to book the perpetrators of 26/11.

The idealists accept that it is trifle unrealistic to expect Pakistan to carry out a purge of all the jihadists at the same time. With the Pakistani security forces stretched to the limit, opening another front in Punjab or other parts of the country is not quite feasible at this point in time and could easily destabilise even those parts of Pakistan that are relatively stable. In any case, they are of the view that India should try and strengthen the hands of the civilian politicians and reciprocate the desire for good relations that has been expressed from time to time by the top political leadership, both in government and opposition.

The realists, however, point out that these arguments are alibis that hold no value. They say that no purpose will be served by talking to the civilian leadership because it is not a credible interlocutor and is too weak to deliver on anything at all. The credibility of the government has also been severely compromised by what is perceived in India to be an 'establishment-driven' campaign to ensure that the political leadership cannot take any initiative on critical foreign policy issues without the approval of the military. Serious doubts are cast by the realists over the intentions of the Pakistan army to wind up the jihadist infrastructure that targets India. They argue that as long as the Pakistan army continues to treat as its biggest enemy, as also the biggest threat to Pakistan's security, it will sabotage any peace initiative by a civilian dispensation in Pakistan.

Being an idealist, Dr Singh is probably inclined to another attempt at peace with Pakistan. Whether he will succeed is altogether another question. With the wounds of 26/11 being opened by the media coverage of the first anniversary of these attacks, any initiative at this point in time (say, in Trindad and Tobago) would probably be a case of terrible political timing. But even if the Gordian knot preventing a resumption of the dialogue process is cut, peace between India and Pakistan will remain precarious, hostage to terrorists who will probably try everything to destroy any chance of peace between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. And given the public mood, the next spectacular terror strike could well unleash an Armageddon in the subcontinent.

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    <1250 Words>                    16th November, 2009

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Friday, November 20, 2009

REVENGE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    If the results of the February 2008 elections and the subsequent formation of the PPP-led coalition government could be touted as the 'revenge of democracy', then surely the orchestrated and very vicious campaign against president Asif Zardari in the media, streets, drawing rooms and indeed corridors of power in Pakistan is the 'revenge of the establishment'. The knives are out for Mr Zardari. The only thing that now remains to be settled is whether the infamous 'establishment' will rest content after depriving him of all powers and reducing him into a mere figurehead as head of state, or Mr Zardari's removal (voluntary or forced, violent or bloodless) from the Pakistan's political landscape alone will satisfy it. The only problem is that if he chooses to dig in his heels (something that his past track record and people close to him suggest he will do), then there is no easy way of getting rid of him. But whatever the method selected – street power, judicial coup, military intervention, physical elimination, political manipulation – its repercussions will severely destabilise the country in times to come.

It won't be wrong to say that in many ways Mr Zardari is himself responsible for his predicament. A couplet of the Punjabi poet, Munir Niazi succinctly sums up the Mr Zardari's state: "the people of the city were cruel and merciless, but I too had a death-wish". His biggest mistake was that he tried to do the impossible – effect paradigm shifts in politics, diplomacy, and national security strategy but without disturbing the power structure which props up the system. Worse, he didn't shake the system when he had the chance, which was in the first couple of weeks of coming into power when the 'establishment' was on the defensive and would have been unable to strike back. Clearly, if Mr Zardari imagined that he could keep the powers-that-be in good humour and still get his way, he was going to end up falling between two stools, as indeed he has.

    Not only did Mr Zardari blow the chance of castrating the political role of the Pakistan army and establishment when it was down and out, he riled civil society and lost goodwill of the public by holding out on the restoration of the judges. This was an issue which he could have used to not only put the army in its place but also win kudos while doing this. He compounded his mistake by failing to manage the media, which because of its right-wing, Islamist orientation is firmly embedded with the military establishment. Mr Zardari somehow wasn't able to appreciate that the predominantly Punjabi 'Media Mujahideen' were always going to be hostile to him and would never reconcile to a Sindhi president. The unkindest cut of all is that the people who never had a good word to say for either Zulifkar Ali Bhutto or Benazir Bhutto are today using them to paint Mr Zardari as an unmitigated disaster, something that they used to say for both his wife and father-in-law when they were alive and in power.

On the issue of national strategic policy, Mr Zardari's very bold, almost revolutionary, enunciation of the sort of ties he wanted with India was probably unacceptable to the establishment. Within weeks of his party coming to power, he told an Indian interviewer that Kashmir needs to be put on the back burner. He followed this up by saying that India didn't pose any threat to Pakistan, something that questioned the entire national security strategy of the Pakistani establishment. As if this was not enough, he renounced (even if only verbally) the 'nuclear first use' policy of Pakistan. And then, for the first time the Pakistanis acknowledged the involvement of Pakistani nationals in the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai and also moved against the top leadership of the terrorist organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, something that against would not have gone down well with the Pakistani military establishment.

It was not only his policy on India that caused disquiet in the Pakistani establishment. Mr Zardari's closeness to the Americans too went against him. The Pakistan army wanted to play the lead role vis-a-vis the Americans and was not willing to let the civilian government forge an independent relationship with the US keeping the military out of the loop. Indeed, the entire furore over the Kerry-Lugar bill was not so much against the conditionalities in the bill as it was against Mr Zardari. The fabricated opposition to the bill was the establishment's way of telling the government where it gets off. Too much reliance on the Americans is in any case not a very good idea. The Americans back you only if you don't need their backing and yet do their bidding. But if you are dependent on the Americans for your survival then your ability to deliver naturally is called into question. What is more, if you become a liability rather than an asset then you tend to lose your utility and the Americans don't bat an eyelid before they cut their losses and start backing another horse.

    While the tussle with the establishment was bound to take place within a few months of taking power, Mr Zardari could have kept an upper hand in this tussle if his political strategy had not foundered. The mistake he made was not that he tried to effect political reconciliation in a country that was perhaps not quite ready for it; his mistake was that he was unable to maintain the political momentum with which he built coalitions in the centre and the provinces. The broad-based, and often contradictory, alliances he stitched up were not entirely altruistic and had an element of political insurance built into them so that if one partner walked out of the coalition, the government would not get reduced to a minority. While this gave him space for political manoeuvre, the utility of this space was only so long as he could keep all coalition partners together because the moment one big partner walked out his dependence on the rest of the coalition partners became that much more which then opened the government to all sorts of political pulls and pressures and blackmail.

Unfortunately for him, while Mr Zardari was adept in power politics of the palace he was unable to combine this with an ability to connect with the street, something that his rivals and partners like PMLN and MQM were able to do. His ability to connect with the street was compounded by the bunker mentality that he seems to have developed. To an extent, by cloistering himself in the Aiwan-e-Sadr, he has effectively allowed the prime minister to become the public face of the government, something that is in keeping with parliamentary norms. But it is also seen in public as displaying fear for personal safety which naturally doesn't go down well in a country at war with itself. Of course, the accusation of having a bunker mentality is an example of the no-win situation in which Mr Zardari finds himself. If he steps out and addresses public meetings and takes an interest in government activity and projects, he is accused of becoming an active and political president of the type Musharraf was, which is not in keeping with parliamentary norms. But if he doesn't do this and stays out of public sight, he is accused of a bunker mentality.

In other words, Mr Zardari has become a punching bag and there is no longer any logic, reason, rationale or sense on the issues on which he is being targeted. For instance, he is accused of not surrendering the powers that Musharraf vested in the presidency, but no one is willing to say how Mr Zardari can surrender these powers without any constitutional amendment which is not possible without bringing other smaller parties on board which have their own demands which they insist on dovetailing with any constitutional package that is brought before the parliament. Or in the case of the infamous NRO which has been used so effectively against Mr Zardari. But somehow what is conveniently ignored is that if this law was present when the coalition was formed, if it was there when Benazir Bhutto came back to Pakistan, if it was there when Asif Zardari became president, then how come no one made it an issue at that time and why has it suddenly become such a cause celebre.

There can be no two opinions that there has been a lot of mismanagement and mal-governance by the civilian government. But surely the blame for this must rest on the head of the prime minister and not the president. Surprisingly, while on the one hand the PM is said to be ham-strung by the powers of the president, on the other hand when the PM reshuffles the bureaucracy, sacks his NSA, removes political appointees of the president who have some controversy surrounding them, no one asks how he is able to assert his authority if he is so powerless. To absolve the PM of any blame for things like sugar crisis, inflation, energy crisis, and a host of other issues and make Asif Zardari the fall-guy is nothing but a politically motivated campaign to put pressure on the president to quit.

It is now only a matter of time before the establishment gets rid of Mr Zardari. As things stand, despite there being no easy way of removing him from the scene, only an inveterate and incorrigible gambler will put his money on Mr Zardari staying in the Aiwan-e-Sadr till 2013 when his term expires. Of course, once he goes, the very same people who are vilifying him will discover his virtues, as indeed they have done in the case of his wife and father-in-law.

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    <1630 Words>                    20th November, 2009

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Saturday, November 07, 2009

WRITTEN, PRODUCED AND DIRECTED BY THE PAKISTAN ARMY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The signals had started coming in quite a few months back that the Pakistan army had once again started manipulating the politics of the country and re-emerged as the final arbiter of the . The main reason for this was to disabuse the political class of any notions that it may have harboured about being empowered by the people to decide upon all matters of state, including the national security strategy. The Pakistani military and intelligence establishment has long considered formulation of the national security policy of the state its sole preserve and cannot even countenance any encroachment by the political class in this domain. As and when any civilian government has tried to intrude in this forbidden sphere of policy making, the Pakistan army has put in motion a series of events that either culminate with the ignominious and unceremonious ouster of that dispensation, or else emasculate the political government to a point where it manages nothing more than municipal functions.

The script for fixing a civilian government has by now been finessed to point that it is executed almost like a well-rehearsed military manoeuvre. And it works every time. Ironically, this entire process of destabilising an elected government is assisted by the hubris of those in power who invariably deny, even dismiss, any suggestion that the wheels of destabilisation of their government have been set in motion. By the time they realise that the chair is being pulled from under them, it is too late, and they are either thrown out on to the street, or in a prison, from where the lucky ones are sent into exile and the unlucky ones to the gallows. The process usually commences through the instrumentality of journalists who are firmly embedded in Aabpara (ISI HQs) and media barons who have an axe to grind with the government of the day. The objective is simple: give a dog a bad name and hang it!

Lurid stories of all forms of corruption (some true but most of them unsubstantiated and very often nothing more than insinuations) are planted in the press. These are then followed by carefully constructed and plausible sounding conspiracy theories woven around rumours of the moves that are underway against the government. In the Pakistani political system, the maxim 'conjecture becoming a reality', translates into what a Pakistani journalist calls 'rumours being premature facts'. As a result, these stories start acquiring a life of their own and are blown up to a point where the government loses all credibility, legitimacy and moral authority to continue in office. More importantly, it starts losing political support in the parliament and state assemblies and popular support in the street.

After a perception of popular revulsion against the government has been manufactured, the final act of deposing the regime is reduced to becoming a matter of minor detail. It could be through dismissal of the government by the president, 'horse-trading' and browbeating of legislators and alliance partners to switch loyalties and reduce the government to a minority, using the law courts to disqualify the head honchos of the ruling dispensation, and last but not the least, a military coup. In the present case a military coup can be ruled out for the moment. The army's hands are full because of its involvement in the military campaigns against the 'bad' Taliban. It is also unlikely that the international community will turn a blind eye to any direct military intervention in Pakistan's politics. Most of all, the hangover of the Musharraf era continues to persist because of which a return to a military dictatorship will not be acceptable.

Dismissal of the government by a presidential fiat is also not on the cards. The target of the Pakistan army's political offensive is not so much the PPP-led government as it is President Asif Zardari and the considerable powers he wields, including those of dismissing the government and making appointments to all crucial positions like that of the services chiefs. Therefore, unless Mr Zardari wants to shake up the system and take everyone down with him, there is no reason for him to dismiss his party's government and dissolve the assemblies. If push comes to shove, Mr Zardari could use this as the 'ultimate weapon'. But it is entirely possible that this weapon could end up in a fizzle. Since any such drastic action by the president will come only when Mr Zardari is on his way out, it could simply end up in the dustbin after being declared illegal by the 'independent' judiciary.

Given that the current phase of politics in Pakistan is that of revolving door political governments and the army is not inclined to enter the centre stage of politics but is content with pulling the strings from the sidelines, dissolving the assemblies will inflict a general election, which under the prevailing security situation appear impossible. This means that any change, either in the government or in the presidency, has to be affected in-house. The only way this is possible is either through the judiciary or through political manoeuvres in which parties in the governing coalition switch support and dissidence within parties is orchestrated to a point that a leadership change becomes inevitable and unavoidable.

The judiciary, with all its pretensions of being independent and neutral, is uniformly hostile to the president and his associates. What is more, the president also has to contend with the right-wing and Islamist predilections of many of the judges, which inclines them to favour the establishment and the conservative political forces. While on the face of it, President Zardari enjoys immunity from prosecution, there are enough legal loopholes that can be exploited to get rid of him. If the corruption cases against him are reopened as a result of the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance lapsing, a challenge could be mounted on the eligibility of his candidature for president. Whether it is disqualifying Mr Zardari or some other legal tactic that is used against him, the important thing is that when it comes to getting rid of or fixing an inconvenient or undesirable person, the Pakistani courts and judges are quite adept at interpreting the law according to their whims and fancies.

Assuming that the judges desist from taking any action that shakes up the system, and resist any extra-constitutional moves against the current political dispensation, the military establishment can always use its considerable influence and power on the political class to effect the changes it desires. The manner in which the MNAs from FATA (who do not belong to any party and traditionally support the government of the day) have detached themselves from the ruling coalition was the first indication of which way the military establishment is nudging pliable politicians. Confirmation came when the MQM announced its opposition to the NRO and even advised Mr Zardari to resign and 'make a personal sacrifice for the sake of democracy'. Taking a cue, other smaller political players like the PMLF leader, Pir Pagaro, who has no compunctions in proclaiming his toeing the establishment line, have also distanced themselves from the PPP.

The numbers game in the national assembly is so precarious that the withdrawal of support of just a couple of parties or people can bring the government crashing down and this message has gone home to both the president and the prime minister. In a rear-guard action, they have tried to recover some of the lost ground by reaching out to their allies and even their opponents. And the price they are willing to pay is a surrender of all presidential powers, which will effectively reduce the presidency to a mere figure-head. If the military establishment cannot see the back of Mr Zardari without creating a right royal mess, then reducing him to a cipher is the next best thing for them. This they seem to be well on the course of achieving. And along with it, their monopoly over the national security policy (read relations with Americans, Afghanistan, India and nuclear programme) and their control over the politics of the country, even if this is from the sidelines.

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    <1360 Words>                    7th November, 2009

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Tuesday, November 03, 2009

TERROR-IFYING PROSPECTS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Anyone who ever thought that an asymmetric war or a proxy war is a very low cost option and far more effective than good, old-fashioned conventional conflict just needs to look at the experience of Pakistan, and perhaps also the US, to understand how false this notion is. The US spent some US$ 5-6 billion to fund the Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against the Soviets – by all accounts chicken-feed to defeat another super-power. Unfortunately, the forces of fanaticism unleashed by the Afghan 'Jihad' – al Qaeda and its local variants like the Taliban, the Lashkars, the Jaishs', et al. – have only created a new global strategic adversary, one that is in many ways far more destabilising and destructive and far less decipherable than the old adversary. Worse, these fanatics are now exacting a ruinous price from the very countries that at one point or another supported, sustained and sponsored their 'unholy wars', whether in Afghanistan or in Kashmir, or for that matter in any other part of the world.

    At last count, the US is spending some US$ 60-70 billion every year on the war in Afghanistan. Add to this the cost of the Iraq war and the figure runs into a couple of trillion dollars since 9/11. As far as the Pakistanis are concerned, the blowback of the 'low-cost' jihadist infrastructure that they nurtured so assiduously over the years, has cost the Pakistani economy anything between US$ 35-40 billion since 9/11. Even if this figure has been somewhat exaggerated in order to squeeze the maximum money out of the Americans and Europeans, it does not change the fact that the Pakistan economy is having to pay a terrible price for its setting up of the one product line in which no other country can compete with it – jihadist terror.

It can of course be argued that while the losses are notional in the sense of lost business opportunities, trade and investment flows, capital flight and a very uncertain economic scenario, the funds inflow is real and to that extent Pakistan is reaping the benefit of its nuclearised jihad factory. After all, the Pakistanis have already received over US$ 15 billion in direct economic and military assistance from the Americans. There is now the US$ 1.5 billion per annum that Pakistan will receive as economic assistance for the next five years under the Kerry-Lugar bill. In addition, some US$ 2 billion per annum of direct and indirect military assistance will also be available to Pakistan to fight the War on Terror. Then there are the aid packages from the so-called 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan and of course the loans from the multilateral institutions. Since everyone knows Pakistan can never repay its loans, ideally these loans should be considered grants, or if you will, disposable income!

Given that the dollar is still the world's reserve currency, the US is able to fund these wars by working double, even triple, shifts at the printing presses of the Federal Reserve. But for how long? Already moves are underway being made to challenge the dominance of the dollar. As if that wasn't enough, the wars being fought show no sign of an early closure, and certainly not on a victory note for the US. Given its utterly muddled approach, the best that the US can hope for is a long, holding operation, all the while sinking in money into the bottomless pit called Afpak. Even this would be well worth the investment if at the end of this holding operation, Afghanistan and Pakistan emerged something like Germany and Japan after the Second World War. What are the chances of even a rocket scientist calculating the probability of such an outcome?

    The predicament of Pakistan is even worse, caught as it is between the obsession of a very large number of its people with 'jihad' on the one hand, and the obsequiousness of its ruling classes towards America on the other. If it leans too much towards the US, the jihadists will destroy it from within; but if it casts its lot with 'jihad', then the US could pull the plug on it from without. Not surprisingly then, Pakistan has chosen to travel on two boats at the same time. The dollars and military assistance flowing in from the US is keeping the ship of state afloat, if only just. At the same time the military leadership continues to ride the 'jihad' boat and keeping its 'strategic options' afloat by not moving against either the top Taliban commanders like Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbadin Hekmetyar on the western front or the 'loyalist' jihadists like the Lashkar-e-Taiba on the eastern front.

The effort now, as it was in the past under General Pervez Musharraf, is to broker an agreement between the US and the 'good' Taliban so that the best of both worlds is available to Pakistan – the dollars and munitions continue to provide the necessary ballast for the Pakistani state, which in turn will underwrite that after its allies (Mullah Omar and company) are re-installed in Kabul they will no longer allow Jihad Inc. to use Afghanistan as its global headquarters. Alas, things are not so simple because regardless of the Pakistan military leadership's infinite capacity for self-delusion and self-deception, the fact is that the al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Punjabi Taliban or jihadists fighting against India cannot be delinked from each other.

If anything the Taliban (Afghan or Pakistani) and jihadists (good, bad and ugly) are but a localised version of the virulence that al Qaeda symbolises at the global level. And while they might have differences, and even clash, on issues of tactics or on identification of the immediate enemy, their long term objectives are the same – the establishment of an Islamic emirate that stretches from Pakistan to Central Asia to the middle east and to use this as a base from where to attack the infidels all over the world. Therefore, if the Americans withdraw from the region before cleaning the mess, as appears to be the case, this whole region will be consumed by the fires of jihad. The assurances given by the Taliban and the guarantees given by Pakistan on al Qaeda and other radical Islamist outfits not being allowed in Afghanistan have as much value as a Zimbabwean dollar simply because everyone knows that once America withdraws from the region, it is unlikely to return in a hurry.

Contrary to conventional wisdom in India, any US abandonment of Afghanistan will not give Pakistan it's much desired 'strategic depth'; rather it will push Pakistan into a strategic black hole. Economically, an unsustainable Afghanistan will depend on an already bankrupt, and increasingly dysfunctional, Pakistan. And militarily, the Islamists will make major inroads inside Pakistan. At that stage, Pakistan could do one of two things: one, it could try and control affairs in Afghanistan, and resultantly get caught up in the Afghan quagmire; alternatively, Pakistan could try and buy some time by diverting the Taliban and other sundry jihadists towards India. While the latter could trigger a conflict between India and Pakistan, which even if it doesn't turn nuclear will badly destabilise the entire region, the former could sound the death knell of Pakistan as we know it. The fallout of either event on India will be unimaginably horrific, making events 26/11 look like a Sunday picnic.

There is of course a possibility, remote though it may be, that Pakistan reforms itself and over the next few years actually makes serious efforts to get rid of the jihadist culture, with lots of help from not only the West but also India. But for that to happen Pakistan will have to make a break with its deeply ingrained militaristic culture. Since this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, India needs to start putting in place a security architecture that pre-empts and insulates it, to the maximum extent possible, from a failed or imploding Pakistan. The future security and prosperity of India hinges critically upon this. Otherwise, be prepared for suicide bombers blowing up in shopping malls, hotels, schools, temples, offices, trains, buses and every other place possible.

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    <1360 Words>                    3rd November, 2009

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