AMERICA'S AFPAK OPTIONS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The Americans continue to insist that they are not going to leave Afghanistan in a hurry and will remain committed in the Af-Pak region for a very long time. But all the signs on the ground belie the resolute statements emanating from the US administration, Congress, Pentagon and the think-tank's. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Americans are nowhere close to winning the war. Their military strategy is not working, their political strategy has foundered, and psychologically a defeatist mindset pervades the Western military and political policy-makers. Under the circumstances, nothing short of a miracle can prevent an ignominious, if tragic, defeat for the sole superpower in a place that is often referred to as 'the graveyard of empires'.

The common perception in the region is that it is only a matter of time before the Americans throw in the towel in Afghanistan. Interestingly enough, this is exactly the perception that has guided the Islamist resistance from the moment the Americans entered Afghanistan after 9/11. Nothing that the Americans say or do is now going to alter this perception. Unlike the Americans who measure time in terms of the schedule of Congressional and presidential elections, the Islamists view time through the prism of relativity. Such an adversary cannot be tired down. The only way to win is to ruthlessly eliminate him. But soldiers who get traumatised by the sight of blood and who have to consult a manual before they can fire on the enemy are incapable of fighting, much less winning, against such an adversary.

The reality of the war in Afghanistan is that the Americans are the only ones actually doing the fighting. The European armies are worse than ceremonial armies and are a net drag on the US-led war effort. However, with the costs of men and material mounting by the day, public support for the war in the US is dwindling. Not surprisingly, the politicians are clamouring for pulling out (albeit with some face-saving political solution). And the military brass has run out of ideas on combating the Islamists. In short, everything that can go wrong is going wrong. The planned 'surge' is, therefore, unlikely to help very much and could end up reinforcing failure.

For the moment, however, a last ditch attempt is underway to retrieve the military situation just enough so that the way is paved for some sort of a political solution. Once this happens, or so the theory goes, the Americans can affect an orderly exit from Afghanistan with whatever remains of their pride and prestige. The trouble is that the very talk of a political solution, which will be effective only if it brings on board the real Taliban leadership (read Mullah Omar and company), reaffirms the widespread impression of the imminent defeat of the Americans at the hands of the Islamists. More seriously, an American exit from Afghanistan, either as a result of a negotiated settlement or in sheer frustration over the intractability of the conflict, will have a devastating impact on Pakistan.

Many Pakistani analysts, commentators and politicians (mostly of the vernacular variety and all with right-wing, Islamist leanings) have convinced themselves that an American withdrawal from Afghanistan is a necessary pre-condition for ending the Islamist insurgency in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the fact is that a US exit will probably create more instability and upheaval than its continued presence in the Afpak region. Counter-intuitive though it may appear, a major power like the US can still afford to negotiate with the Taliban and/or abandon Afghanistan; it is Pakistan that can neither afford US negotiations with the Taliban nor a US exit from the region.

While any negotiations with the Taliban will almost certainly be facilitated by the Pakistanis, such facilitation will deal a body blow to not only Pakistan army's operations against the Taliban but also to the developing consensus inside Pakistan to combat the Taliban politically, ideologically and militarily. Negotiations with the Taliban will by definition be from a position of weakness and will be a tacit acceptance of defeat. While it is entirely possible that the Taliban might give assurances to the Americans that they will not allow Afghanistan to become a base for Jihad international by al Qaeda and its affiliates, these assurances will not be worth the paper they are written on. The Taliban know that once the Americans leave, they can merrily violate all their assurances because the chances of the Americans coming back will be negligible. All that might happen is a few air strikes or missile strikes. Instead of bothering them too much, such strikes will only help the Islamists feed the religious frenzy among the people in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While the US will depend heavily on Pakistan to keep a semblance of control in Afghanistan, such outsourcing is destined to fail. If anything, a Taliban regime in Afghanistan will create a strategic black-hole for Pakistan. Instead of Afghanistan lending strategic depth to Pakistan, it will be Pakistan that will lend strategic depth to the Taliban, who will spread their influence inside Pakistan. In other words, the equations between the Pakistanis and the Taliban have already changed drastically. Pakistan no longer has the ability to stand as guarantor and enforcer in Afghanistan. Given that on its own Afghanistan is no longer a viable state, the Taliban will naturally gravitate towards exploiting the resources and riches in Pakistan to gain a degree of viability. In the process, they will ensure that both countries become unviable.

No amount of US military and economic assistance to Pakistan will be enough to stop large swathes of Pakistani territory falling to the Taliban influence. The deep links that exist between important Taliban warlords and the Pakistan army will work only up to a point. Even when the Taliban were deeply beholden to Pakistan, they often defied Pakistan when it came to issues like recognising the Durand line or handing over sectarian terrorists who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. With the Taliban having forced a superpower like the US to retreat, there is little reason for them to kowtow to Pakistani influence, even less so since Pakistan had collaborated with the 'Great Satan'.

Since Pakistan will find it very difficult to survive a Taliban dispensation in Afghanistan, any US strategy must take this factor into account. This means that the US is left with broadly four options: One, the US can continue with the current muddled approach which means pretty much following the policies of the last 8 years with minor tweaks and reviews; Two, the US can try to firewall the Afpak region in order to prevent the virulence of the Islamists spreading. But firewalls are easily breached, more so in the geographical and political region in which this firewall is being attempted; Three, the US can attempt to put the Afpak region under some kind of international trusteeship which will take over this area and reconstruct it and ensure an ideological transformation of both these countries; Finally, the US can just pack its bags and leave. In this last option the US could either break Afghanistan along ethnic lines, or underwrite a loose coalition government in that country or even outsource it to Pakistan.

The immediate consequence of a US withdrawal will be a massive global upsurge of Islamist militancy and influence. Eventually, however, the international community will put in place a global security architecture to fight Jihad international, much in the same way it fought Communist international. As far as India is concerned, if the US is successful in ridding Afpak of radical Islamism, it will in large measure solve India's terrorist problem. On the other hand, if the US loses in Afghanistan, then while on one hand India will become the frontline state against the spread of radical Islam, on the other hand it will enjoy the munificence of dollars pouring in to keep the Islamist threat at bay.

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    <1325 Words>                    19^th September, 2009

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BUSINESS AS USUAL WON'T WORK IN PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

One year after Asif Zardari ousted Gen. Pervez Musharraf and became President of Pakistan, certain trends have emerged which seem to indicate the basic approach that the current dispensation is likely to follow and the trajectory that the country is likely to take. The phrase 'business as usual' aptly describes this approach. In other words, it is highly unlikely that there will be any major change in the policy framework on any of the critical issues that confront Pakistan. This is to be expected from any political government, which having a stake in the system cannot be expected to bring about revolutionary changes in either the system or the structure of government and the state.

The problem in the case of Pakistan is that unless there is a paradigm shift in the policy framework of the state on issues like the ideological foundations of the state, internal security, foreign policy, relations with neighbours, economic management, constitutional reforms, prioritising social and public goods sector, and there evolves a political culture that enables and facilitates this change in policy orientation, the 'business as usual' could end up pushing Pakistan over the abyss. The reason for this is simple. While maintaining and preserving status quo is generally the name of the game for governments around the world, change is constant, even inevitable. Ultimately even the status quo tends to change as a natural consequence of the policies being adopted and the reforms being effected or resisted to keep status quo. Given below is one possible scenario of how things could unfold in Pakistan if 'business as usual' continues and the necessary reforms are not undertaken.

There is continuing drift on issues of governance. Political governments are unable to address the issues of the people. Corruption and maladministration rob the government of legitimacy in eyes of people. Efforts to evolve a working relationship between the ruling and opposition party and avoid a destabilising clash between them come to nought. Political unrest increases with the opposition baying for government's blood and raising the temperature on the street. The army's concerns over the political impasse grows and forces the military to start manipulating the politics to bring about a change in the government, or at the very least, push the government in the direction of good governance. An increasingly interventionist judiciary makes life difficult for the executive by interfering on issues of governance as well as by passing judgements on legal and constitutional issues that adversely affect the government.

The economy continues to be anaemic despite the massive infusions of external aid. The deteriorating law and order situation, high energy costs, lack of domestic and foreign investments, continuing spectre of Islamic terrorism, weak export markets because of global recession and because foreign buyers are skittish about doing business with Pakistani businessmen, all have a deleterious impact on the economy. Unemployment rises, economic distress levels remain high, inflation remains a problem, shortages of food stuffs become rampant (partly because of production constraints, partly because of inability of government to import food and partly because of distribution bottlenecks, profiteering and corruption). Agricultural growth stays weak on account of chronic water shortages, high input costs, low productivity.

The fiscal position remains totally messed up with debt servicing, defence and general administration taking the away Lion's share of the resources leaving very little for education, health, infrastructure and other social and public goods. Low confidence in the economy leads to capital flight as also brain drain. All this impacts on the value of the Pakistani Rupee which depreciates further, making debt servicing close to impossible, fuelling inflation, and badly affecting growth. Under these circumstances, the religious right-wing and radical Islamist parties will increase their rhetoric and find greater resonance in the public especially since they are likely to focus on the issues confronting the common man.

The Islamist insurgency will continue to act as a major drain on the economy. Under intense international pressure the Pakistan army is likely to persist with efforts to make the Islamist revolt more manageable. But since the army is unlikely to succeed in completely cleansing the country of the menace of the Islamists, a sort of cat-and mouse game will continue. The army will establish control in one area only to find the Islamists take control of another area. The war of attrition will have an impact on the army and is likely to extend it to the limits.

In order to forestall the threat from India, the army might ramp up militancy inside India in order to keep the Indians occupied at home. But this is a ploy that can easily backfire because rising tensions with India will force the army to stay deployed in large numbers on the eastern border, something that will have an impact on its operations against the Taliban and other Islamist groups. In order to counter the Indian threat, the Pakistani will increase their reliance on their nuclear arsenal and invest ever larger resources to build up their nuclear arsenal and refine their delivery systems.

Despite the apparent success of the Pakistan army against the Taliban in Swat and other parts of Pakistan, the Islamists will continue to expand their political influence inside Pakistan through militancy as well as through the use of Islamist symbols. The Pakistan army operations are at best a sort of holding operation. Without any worthwhile effort being made by the Pakistani state – the political parties or the army – to effect a paradigm shift in the ideological underpinnings of the state that led to the mushrooming growth of Islamist militias, the military operations will only end up providing symptomatic treatment to the virus of religious extremism that is spreading through the country. Under international pressure, half-hearted measures are taken to shift the ideological and religious orientation of the people towards a more liberal, syncretic and moderate version of Islam. But these measures fail to make even a dent in the growing influence of the Islamists on the Pakistani society.

The steady deterioration in the security situation inside Afghanistan will have a major impact on Pakistan, which will come under increasing international pressure to 'do more' against the Taliban. Although the increasing dependence of the US and other Western powers on Pakistan will lead to lot of aid inflows, these will not be enough to take the Pakistan economy out of the pit in which it finds itself. At best these aid inflows will serve the purpose of keeping the Pakistan economy on a drip – barely alive. The demands imposed by the Americans will only add to the problem of legitimacy and credibility of the government in the eyes of the people. The army is also likely to resist the unending US demands that will only end up pitting the army to enlarge its operations against its own people.

The US will face two stark choices: one, stay the course in Afghanistan and do what it takes to clean up the place; two, cut losses and run, outsourcing Afghanistan to Pakistan. There is also a possibility of the US splitting Afghanistan along ethnic lines to limit the Taliban spread to only the Pashtun belt in Afghanistan, which the Pakistanis can then control through their Taliban proxies. But any US exit is likely to give a shot in the arm to the Islamists worldwide. This would be seen as the reaffirmation that Allah is the only superpower and that the Afghans have forced the withdrawal of the British in the 19^th Century, the Russians in the 20^th Century and the Americans in the 21^st Century. Chances are that an American exit will lead to an Islamist upsurge that could sweep Pakistan. Even if this doesn't happen, a Taliban victory in Afghanistan will almost certainly have a telling impact inside Pakistan where the Islamists will get emboldened enough to increase their operations against the Pakistan army and try and take over the state. In the event, Pakistan will be severely destabilised and a civil war like situation could engulf the country.

The deteriorating security situation coupled with unstable political situation will impose intolerable strain on the Pakistani state. Ethnic nationalist groups disaffected by Pakistan could use this opportunity to declare their own war of independence and separation from Pakistan. The combined effect of all this could be utter chaos and anarchy inside Pakistan, the impact of which will be directly felt inside India.

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    <1415 Words>                 10^th September, 2009

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN: SELF-RULE OR CHICANERY

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    There are two areas under the control of Pakistan where a pervasive sense of alienation, deprivation and disillusionment has infused in the people a feeling of being colonised by the state of Pakistan. The first is the province of Balochistan, in particular the Baloch-dominated areas of the province. The second is Gilgit-Baltistan, which is a part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir but is currently under the illegal occupation of Pakistan.

The misrule and repression unleashed on the people of Balochistan by successive Pakistani governments – both military and civilian – has driven the Baloch, especially the youth, to a point where nothing short of complete independence will satisfy their aspirations. The situation in Gilgit-Baltistan, which civil rights activists often refer to as the 'Last Colony' of the world, also threatened to spiral out of control unless Pakistan took some urgent political measures that would help to keep a lid on the simmering discontent among the people of this region.

It is precisely to prevent Gilgit-Baltistan from becoming another Balochistan that on 29^th August, 2009, the government of Pakistan announced a package of political reforms that will, for the first time since 1947, purportedly give the people of this region a modicum of political autonomy and self-rule. Until this package was announced, Gilgit-Baltistan was denied even the most basic civil, political, constitutional, and legal rights on the grounds that it was not a part of Pakistan.

Of course, such legalese never prevented Pakistan either from separating this region from rest of the occupied part of the Jammu and Kashmir state (euphemistically called Azad Jammu and Kashmir) or parcelling a part of the state – Chitral – and amalgamating it with NWFP, or even administering Gilgit-Baltistan directly from Islamabad through non-local bureaucrats and the Pakistan army and brutally suppressing any dissent in the area; nor for that matter did it stop Pakistan from undertaking projects like the Karakorum highway or now the Bhasha dam that will benefit Pakistan more than it will benefit the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Even more significantly, Pakistan scrapped the state subject rules to settle Sunni Pashtuns in the area in order to dilute the majority of local Shias. Worse, state-sponsored pogroms of Shias were organised to try and keep control over the people and the territory. But instead of cowing down the locals, the repression only created a reservoir of resentment among the people which over the years has manifest itself in the form of a sort of sectarian nationalism.

The methods that the Pakistani state adopted in Gilgit-Baltistan defied all political logic. After all, the people of the region were only demanding that they be integrated into Pakistan as its fifth province and that they be given political and constitutional rights as citizens of Pakistan. According to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, even if their fate was tied to the resolution of the larger Kashmir issue, there was no reason why they should be denied those basic rights which the Pakistanis had already conceded to 'Azad' Kashmir'. At the same time, they opposed being linked politically and administratively to 'Azad' Kashmir since this would not only rob them of their identity, but also swamp them by the numerically larger population of 'Azad' Kashmir.

On the face of it, therefore, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-governance Ordinance 2009, is a piece of progressive legislation that has given political autonomy and self-rule to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. At least on paper the area has got the rights and paraphernalia of a province, if not the status of one – an elected Assembly headed by a chief minister with powers to legislate on some 61 subjects and also pass the budget, a public service commission, an auditor general and election commissioner for the region etc. In addition, judicial rights have also been bestowed upon the people with the formation of an appellate court. But since the devil is always in the detail, what the state of Pakistan has given from one hand, it has taken away from the other hand.

For instance, not only will there be a Governor who will be sitting on the head of the elected chief minister, there will be a non-elected Gilgit-Baltistan Council that will be headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and will hold a virtual veto over the functioning of the elected assembly, as happens in the case of 'Azad' Kashmir. As far as legislation is concerned, the now defunct Northern Areas Legislative Assembly (NALA) has no history of having legislated on any issue despite being delegated powers to legislate on around 49 subjects. Being utterly powerless, the elected members of the erstwhile NALA were only glorified show-boys. Everything was controlled by the bureaucracy, which in classic colonial style is imposed on Gilgit-Baltistan by the colonial master – Pakistan. And there is no reason to believe that things will be any different now. After all, what are the chances that the Pakistan army and bureaucracy, who continue to call the shots in 'democratic' Pakistan, will allow the newly empowered elected representatives of Gilgit-Baltistan to uninhibitedly exercise their powers?

Despite the grumblings and protests over their views not having been taken into consideration in preparing the political reforms package, both the pro-Pakistan politicians as well as the 'nationalist' parties will try and work this new system. To an extent, the sense of expectation created by the devolution of power will push forward the political process in this region. But a lot will depend upon the quantum of freedom and self-rule that Pakistan allows in this territory. If the government of Pakistan permits political expression to flower and allows the political processes to function without too much interference, this political package could go some distance is satisfying the immediate political urges of the people. However, if Pakistan violates and subverts the letter and spirit of the political reforms package, then the entire exercise of allowing self-rule in Gilgit-Baltistan could backfire badly and create even greater disillusionment, dissatisfaction and discontent than exists at present.

The success of this political stratagem will also hinge critically on how competitive politics plays itself out in the region. If the Shia-Sunni divide widens, regional and ethnic issues acquire salience, and tensions with Islamabad mount over issues like mega dams or the boundary issue, then the entire edifice could come crashing down. On the other hand, there is also a possibility that if the system works reasonably well, it could prompt demands for even greater levels of autonomy than what the Pakistanis might be willing to concede, which in turn could fuel political and social unrest in this strategically very important region.

For its part, India is caught in a double catch-22 situation on the issue of Gilgit-Baltistan. The first catch-22 is that while India claims this region to be its integral and inalienable part, India has not even raised its eye-brows over the measures that an occupying power like Pakistan is taking in the area. But merely because India is ignoring this issue is not going make it disappear. On the flip-side, by raising its voice over the issue India could draw unnecessary and unwanted international attention on the Indian state of J&K. The second catch-22 for India is that if it protests Pakistan's political package in Gilgit-Baltistan it might appear as though India wants to deprive the people of this area their basic civil and political rights; on the other hand, keeping quiet will virtually amount to a tacit acquiescence to Pakistan's back-door annexation of Gilgit-Baltistan.

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    <1250 Words>                    3^rd September, 2009

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