SQUEEZING INDIA TO CREATE SPACE FOR PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Isn't it strange that despite Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani asserting that the Pakistan army has adequate force levels to fight the Taliban and that there is no need to withdraw troops from the Indian border for this purpose, the American think-tanks and policy-makers are suggesting to India that it should redeploy its troops along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and also the international border to allow Pakistan to move its troops from the eastern border to the western border? Even more ridiculous is the linkage that the US is drawing between a solution to the Kashmir issue (which by definition will work only if it is to Pakistan's complete satisfaction) and Pakistan army's capacity to successfully fight against the al Qaeda/Taliban led Islamist insurgency inside Pakistan.

Clearly, either the Americans are over-blowing the insurgency inside Pakistan, or else the Pakistanis are under-estimating the scale of the problem. If it is the former, then expecting political and military concessions from India for Pakistan flies in the face of logic. But if it is the latter, then surely before India can do anything to save Pakistan, it is Pakistan that must save itself by acting resolutely and unflinchingly to dismantle the Jihadist infrastructure and ending the distinction that it makes between good jihadists (those like the Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaatud Dawa or Hizbul Mujahedin who operate under the command and control of the Pakistan army and spread terror in India) and bad jihadists (those who seek to fight the Pakistani state). If anything, the resistance that the Pakistan army claims to be facing from the Taliban should by now have convinced it of the power that the Islamists wield and the inroads they have made. What is more, it should have also disabused the Pakistan army of its hubris that since it can eliminate the Taliban with a snap of its finger or a crack of the whip it can continue using the Taliban for attainment of strategic objectives.

    Interestingly, while on the one hand the Pakistan army is cocksure about tackling the Taliban threat without having to scale down its troops positioned against India, on the other hand it is trying to exploit US concerns about Pakistan troop levels being insufficient by impressing upon the Americans that they need to play a more active and interventionist role in resolving the disputes between India and Pakistan. Only this, the Pakistanis say somewhat disingenuously, will allow them to focus all their energies on combating the Islamists. On their part, the Americans are not averse to playing such a role, more so since it fits in well with their quest for seeking a regional solution for solving the Af-Pak problem.

But given India's strong resistance to being directly included in the Af-Pak equation, the Americans are probably trying to rope in India through the back-door. This they are doing by using the specious logic that India in its own long-term interest needs to create the space that will make it possible for Pakistan to slay the demons of fanaticism that threaten not only Pakistan but the entire region. And to create this space India must pull back troops from the border, re-start the stalled dialogue process with Pakistan and not do anything that disturbs the strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

While it is true that it is in India's interest to see the end of the Taliban, India cannot afford to ignore the hostility and the ever present threat of adventurism by the Pakistan army. Pakistan today confronts what is arguably its worst crisis since it came into existence. And yet, the Pakistan army continues to remain obsessed and fixated on the imagined threat from India. What then are the chances of any improvement in Indo-Pak relations if and when normalcy returns to Pakistan? This question acquires even greater importance when one takes into account the propaganda campaign launched by the Pakistani state against the Taliban.

Instead of admitting that the Taliban insurgency is a blowback of the disastrous policy of using Jihadists as instruments of state policy, the basic thrust of propaganda campaign is that the Islamists are being funded and directed by the Indians and the Israelis. Without a shred of evidence to back their poisonous verbiage, ministers, officials (serving and retired), clerics, journalists, politicians are all busy constructing conspiracy theories implicating India for the acts of people like Mullah Fazlullah, Baitullah Mehsud and other such Islamist luminaries. Quite aside the fact that the Pakistanis have conveniently forgotten that just a few months back the current ISI chief called these same people 'patriotic Pakistanis', the demonization of India and the hatred for India that is being spawned through this campaign will ensure that the animosity between the two South Asian neighbours will never end. What is more, this sort of propaganda only adds to India's apprehensions that Pakistan might redouble its efforts to export jihadist terror to India not only to keep India unsettled but also to settle scores for the imagined Indian hand in the Islamist insurgency in Pakistan.

Under these circumstances, India quite simply cannot be expected to lower its guard against Pakistan, especially since much of the terrorism that India has faced has emanated from the supposedly modern and moderate Pakistan and not from a Talibanised Pakistan. As things stand, there are a lot of doubts and questions being raised in India over Pakistan army's motives, its seriousness and indeed its tactics and strategy in fighting the Islamists. Is the military operation in Swat-Dir-Buner merely an effort to be seen to be acting resolutely against the Taliban and thereby pre-empt the threat of a unilateral strike by the Americans in this region? Is it only an operation designed to convince the Americans that the Pakistanis are actually earning the dollars that the Americans are handing out to them and to keep the dollars flowing? Has the operation been undertaken because the Taliban have crossed the red line set by the army, which is now bludgeoning the Taliban only to make them amenable to once again operate only as strategic assets of the army? Or is it the case that the Pakistan army has finally realised its Jihadist folly and decided to eliminate once and for all the threat that Islamic extremism poses to the Pakistani state?

If it is any of the first three cases, it would be completely untenable and rather senseless for anyone to ask India to create any political or military space for Pakistan because it means that whatever is happening in the Malakand division is a carefully calculated, choreographed and calibrated action. Of course, the scale of the refugee crisis that this operation has created – nearly 2.5 million internally displaced people –is perhaps an unintended consequence, but one that in a rather cynical way demonstrates the costs of defying the Pakistan army.

Only in the case that the Pakistani establishment is committed to completely root out the jihadist infrastructure and put Pakistan on a liberal and progressive path will it make any sense for India to try and take measures that assist Pakistan in this effort. But even in this case there is a caveat: if at the end of this war, India is saddled with the sort of Pakistan that it has faced for six decades – outwardly liberal and moderate but at the same time virulently anti-India – the very purpose of helping Pakistan out of its existential crises would be defeated.

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    <1248 Words>                    29^th May, 2009

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LANKAN LESSONS FOR SOUTH ASIA

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    After 25 long years of brutal fighting, major military setbacks, torturous negotiations, ceasefire deals that gave the impression of surrenders, all sorts of domestic and international pressures, resource constraints that prevented acquisition of essential military equipment, an anaemic economic performance (in large part because of the war), Sri Lanka has finally crushed the Tamil insurgency led by the LTTE. The final victory of the Sri Lankan army over its deadly adversary is the result of a combination of factors – a political leadership committed to pulling out all stops to win the war, an inspiring military leadership that forged a largely ceremonial army into a fine fighting force, and some deft diplomacy (especially with India), which in turn was helped in no small measure by the enormous blunders made by the LTTE. In this, the Lankan experience holds important lessons for other countries in South Asia that confront challenges that are in one way or another not very different from what the Sri Lankans have overcome.

    Among the most important factor that enabled the Lankans to defeat the LTTE was that there was absolutely no confusion about the enemy. Unlike in Pakistan, where the Pakistan army is unable to decide whether they want to exterminate the Islamist insurgents or merely want to bludgeon them to a point where they once again become amenable to working as strategic assets of the Pakistani state, the Sri Lankans had no such confusion about the LTTE. Only once did the Lankans try to use the LTTE for a strategic purpose. This was when President Premadasa joined hands with the LTTE to force out the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF). But very soon the Lankans learned to their cost – the assassination of Premadasa – that double-games invariably backfire.

After that one mistake, the Lankans very sensibly avoided cutting their own nose to spite India, something that the Pakistanis seem incapable of doing. Had Sri Lanka been Pakistan, the Lankans would have probably tried to deflect the unrest among the Lankan Tamils by starting a separatist movement inside the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. That in the process their own country would have got severely destabilised is hardly something that they would have even paused for a moment to consider. But Lankans being Lankans, they very wisely came to the conclusion that toxic matter – Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka and radical Islamism in Pakistan – can never become a strategic asset.

The Lankans understood very early on that they could neither fight on two fronts (against both India and LTTE) nor was there anything to be gained by entering into a hostile relationship with India. Unlike Pakistan, the Lankans never felt the need to define their identity as 'not India', or to assert their independence and sovereignty by being seen to be standing up to India. In a sense, Sri Lanka is a unique case in South Asia, being the only country that has learnt to live comfortably with the huge power differential that exists between it and India. The Lankans know that India is in many ways irreplaceable. After all, if there is a shortage of onions it makes sense to import them from Kerala rather than Brazil. If there is a shortage of medicine or someone needs medical treatment, it makes sense to go to Chennai rather than Beijing. The Indian tourist and businessman is valued more in Colombo than any other country of South Asia.

This is not to say that Sri Lanka has not tried to balance the influence of India by developing relations with countries like China, USA or even Pakistan. But even while forging ties with these countries, the Lankans have either taken India into confidence, or else given India the first right of refusal (for instance on the Trincomalee oil tanks, or the leasing out of the radio frequency to the Americans, or in the latest case of procuring weapons from China and Pakistan). There have of course also been times when the Lankans have indulged in patently imprudent acts like giving Pakistan logistic support during the build up to the 1971 war to counter India's stoppage of over-flight rights to Pakistan. But once again the Lankans learned from their mistakes and rectified them.

While Tamil separatism was an outcome of the chauvinistic and extremely discriminatory 'Sinhala only' policy, the Lankans understood that India had and continues to have a legitimate interest in an amicable settlement of the Tamil question in the Island nation. Rather than rejecting outright or reacting strongly to any Indian intervention on the ethnic issue, the Lankans kept a dialogue open with India at all times. Despite the dubious role played by India in the initial years of the Tamil separatist movement, the Sri Lankans never burned their bridges with India. This is something that helped the Lankans immensely after the LTTE became a four-letter word for India, first by fighting the IPKF and then by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi.

On its part, the LTTE made two very big miscalculations: one, losing the support of India; and two, going for broke in its quest for Eelam and sabotaging the peace process which was initiated by the Ranil Wickremasinghe government that offered a de facto Eelam. Like so many other South Asian militant and separatist groups – the Taliban, the Kashmiri separatists, the Naxalities – the LTTE too never could understand that there was a time for war and a time for a negotiated settlement, especially if such a settlement is offering very favourable terms.

For the Lankans, the break between India and LTTE came as a Godsend and tilted the balance against the LTTE. Unlike other South Asian countries, the Lankans realized that good relations with India were extremely important for their territorial integrity and unity. Even if India did not give any monetary or material support to Sri Lanka, it was enough for the Lankans that India did nothing to add to their difficulties. Imagine the Pakistanis or the Bangladeshis or even the Nepalis adopting a similar attitude vis-a-vis India. This is so even if it involves an issue on which India's interests are in conjunction with those of these countries. For instance, India is as worried as many Pakistanis claim to be over the prospect of the spread of talibanisation in Pakistan. And yet, rather than use this to forge a common front with India against the Taliban threat, the Pakistanis are more interested in accusing India of supporting and sponsoring the Pakistani Taliban and trying to leverage their war against the Taliban for a solution to the Kashmir issue on their terms!

While there is a lot that other South Asian countries can learn from the Lankans in how to fight a war and conduct diplomacy, it remains to be seen whether Sri Lanka can now also teach them how to bring peace and reconciliation. Having won the war, President Mahinda Rajapakse has earned enough political capital to push through constitutional measures that will address Tamil aspirations without necessarily leading to a backlash from the Sinhala community. If he can indeed pull this off, he will go down in history as a statesman. If he fails he will have squandered all the gains that Sri Lanka made by vanquishing an implacable foe like the LTTE.

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    <1215 Words>                    21^st May, 2009

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ANOTHER 26/11?

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    For any Indian citizen, the possibility of another Mumbai-type terror attack taking place sometime in the future is just too real to ignore. This is so for two reasons: one, the kind of robust security architecture and systems that is needed to prevent such an attack is still not in place and are not likely to be there in the foreseeable future; two, and more importantly, not only does the source of such attacks – terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba – continue to operate with relative impunity inside Pakistan, but there has also been no change in the demonic mindset that planned, perpetrated and then provided protection to those responsible for executing such attacks. This is why when a highly regarded American expert warned of a serious risk of a repeat of the 26/11 type of an attack, it only reaffirmed the sense of foreboding that exists in the minds of many Indians.

Bruce Riedel, who chaired the task force for reviewing US war effort in Afghanistan that formulated the Af-Pak strategy, is not concerned so much about the possibility of another 26/11; he is more bothered about the impact that such an attack will have on the US military operations in Afghanistan which are increasingly getting tied up with the now-on, now-off sort of military operations being undertaken by the Pakistan army against the Taliban inside Pakistani territory. The Americans are of the view that Pakistan needs to redeploy the bulk of its army against the Islamist insurgents who now control vast swathes of Pakistani territory. This is possible only if Pakistan army gets over its fixation with India and focuses on the threat that the jihadist militias pose to the existence of the Pakistani state.

But Riedel fears that if the terrorists were to launch another spectacular attack on India, it could "would ratchet up tensions and make the Pakistani army even more determined to keep 80 percent of its manpower focused on India rather than on the threat posed by the internal jihadist problem". While Riedel acknowledges that the 'jihadist Frankenstein monster' was a creation of the Pakistan army, he says that now "the 'Frankenstein' (monster creates) the conditions for the [Pakistan] army to be focused on India." This is so partly because, as Riedel says, India's tolerance for terror attacks emanating from Pakistan is running dangerously low, and the next attack could see the dam of India's restraint burst. According to Riedel "They [jihadists] want the situation constantly boiling on the India-Pakistan front that diverts the Pakistani army away from them, providing them (Islamic militants) the conditions that allow for them to grow and fester in Pakistan".

There is really very little to disagree with in Riedel's prescient analysis of how the situation might develop in the event of another 26/11 type of attack. But where he goes wrong majorly is when he implicitly assumes that the Mumbai type attacks were the handiwork of jihadist terror groups that were operating without the knowledge or support of the state of Pakistan or any of its agencies. He also presumes that in order to relieve the pressure being put by the Pakistan army on them, the al Qaeda/Taliban will carry out a repeat of Mumbai.

There is by now ample evidence to prove that the 26/11 attacks were the handiwork of the LeT, which is a terror organisation that is very closely aligned with the Pakistani security services, especially the ISI. The LeT is perhaps the most 'obedient' and 'loyal' of all jihadist groups and has long served, and continues to serve, as the sword-arm of the ISI for conducting 'dirty operations' in India. Over the years the LeT has managed to develop an extensive network inside India and has brain-washed some Indian Muslim youth to carry out terror attacks outside Jammu and Kashmir. It is also true that the LeT has developed linkages with the al Qaeda and is part of an international jihadist movement. But it is doubtful if these links over-ride the LeT's role as an auxiliary unit of the ISI.

Notwithstanding the LeT's linkages with the al Qaeda and all its assets and network in India, it could not have carried out an operation like the Mumbai attacks without some sort of official patronage by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. It is one thing to smuggle in a couple of terrorists who carry out a low-level, low impact terror strike; but it is quite another thing to launch a micro-invasion by sending in multiple teams to carry out coordinated terror strikes in India's commercial capital. This is not possible without a level of planning and professional training that can only a state agency can give. Regardless of whether this support was the result of a breakdown of the command and control system of the ISI and the Pakistan army, or it came as part of an officially sanctioned operation, the fact remains that at least some elements of the Pakistani state structure were behind the wanton massacre of civilians in Mumbai.

This is a factor that acquires even greater salience when fears are expressed of another Mumbai-type assault on India. In all likelihood, if there is a repeat of 26/11, it will not be the handiwork of Taliban/al Qaeda, but that of the jihadist extensions of the Pakistan army. Of course, the al Qaeda/Taliban will be the biggest beneficiaries of such an attack. But they have neither the sort of network nor the wherewithal that will enable them to mount a Mumbai style terror attack in India. The only way these outfits can carry out such an operation is either with the direct assistance of elements inside the Pakistani security services or else with the support of jihadist groups operating as adjuncts of the Pakistani state.

The question is what will the Pakistani security services gain from undertaking a very dangerous operation that could either lead to war with India or, at the very least, create tensions on the border that will severely hamper the operations against the Taliban. There are four or five reasons that could explain such an adventure: one, damage India by making it appear to be an unsafe destination for trade, tourism, sporting events and what have you; two, using the resulting tensions between India and Pakistan to force the international community to get involved in seeking a solution to the Kashmir issue; three, a terror strike in India could be a diversionary tactic to shift global attention from Pakistan's western border to its eastern borders, thereby giving Pakistan wriggle room to either end or scale down military operations in the Western sector; four, to use tensions with India to unite an increasingly divided nation against an enemy on whom everyone agrees; and finally, to demonstrate the impotence of the Indian state in preventing such incidents, and it's inability to retaliate forcefully against such provocations.

The Americans know that the only way they can ensure that the Pakistan army stays focussed against the Islamist insurgents is by preventing any flare-up on the Indo-Pak border. This is going to be possible only when the Pakistan army if made to dismantle the entire infrastructure of jihadi terror that it seeks to use against India. No doubt, this will be a Herculean task. But it is also unavoidable if the US wants to win the War on Terror. Otherwise, it is only a matter of time before another jihadist misadventure is launched against India. Only, next time India might hit back where it hurts, thereby unravelling the entire US game-plan in the Af-Pak region.

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    <1260 Words>                    14^th May, 2009

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PAKISTAN'S FIXATION, INDIA'S DILEMMA

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Imagine a situation in India where a largely indigenous group (the Naxalities come to mind) started to pose a clear and present danger to the Indian state by occupying vast and ever increasing swathes of territory and advance to within 100 Km of New Delhi. Such a development would certainly set alarm bells ringing both within India and without. If at this stage, Indian authorities were told or advised to concentrate all their attention and resources on the internal threat to its existence and pull out the bulk of its troops deployed on the Western border with Pakistan, how many people in New Delhi would accept, much less act, on such an advice? The answer: hardly anyone. Why then is anyone surprised if, despite being faced with precisely such a situation, there are not many people in the Pakistani security establishment who are willing to listen to the Americans that the threat to Pakistan's existence is not from India but from the Taliban?

For any Pakistani who has the image of India and the Hindu as the eternal enemy engraved on his mind, and his soul, it was always going to be very difficult to suddenly stop seeing India as the greatest threat to Pakistan's existence. Things become even more difficult for him when he is asked to replace India with a fellow Pakistani, who is not only a Muslim but has also for long been a strategic asset (jihadist cannon-fodder is a more accurate description) against the eternal enemy India. While even the most purblind would readily agree that India would be more than happy to see, even assist, Pakistan take on its jihadist strategic assets that have now turned toxic, try telling this to the Pakistanis, who have convinced themselves that India will never let go of any opportunity to add to Pakistan's difficulties. A strategic mindset made indurate by the maxim "my enemy's enemy is my friend" has ensured that the Pakistanis, even in their wildest imagination, cannot ever conceive of a time when they could actually share a common enemy with India.

Part of the reason why Pakistan is unable to get over its India fixation is psychological, and no amount of logic, rationality or common sense can cure such a national psychosis and that too overnight. All this is not to deny that there are many irritants and unresolved issues that bedevil the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan and in turn colour their perceptions about each other. But there is a critical difference in the idiom that each country uses to define its problems with the other. For Pakistan, its manufactured Islamic identity has made it see its problems with India as a continuum of a millennium old civilizational conflict. On the other hand, pluralistic and secular India sees Pakistan not as a civilizational adversary but as an inveterate and instinctively hostile neighbour with which it would ideally like normal relations but not at the cost of its unity and integrity.

The conflict over Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan is really a manifestation of this fundamental problem between them. And this is also the reason why even if Kashmir is resolved, the adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan will not end. If anything, wresting Kashmir from India is seen by Pakistani strategists as the starting point of the unravelling of India. While Pakistanis never tire of saying that India has never reconciled to the creation of Pakistan, the reality is that it is in fact Pakistan that has not reconciled to India's existence and has used any and every ploy to try and damage, and if possible, destroy India. And increasingly it appears as though Pakistan has reached a point where nothing short of India agreeing to undo itself will make it feel secure.

Perhaps this is why even though Pakistan is facing a life and death struggle on its Western front, it continues to ratchet up tensions with India by once again pushing in terrorists in large numbers into Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India. One reason for this is that Pakistan believes that if it has to pull out troops from its eastern border to fight the Taliban, it must keep India unsettled by sponsoring insurgencies that keep the Indian troops occupied internally. Another reason is that Pakistan can use the threat from India to make the international community intervene on its behalf and to its advantage on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's fear and apprehension of India indulging in adventurism or mischief have forced it to take military and diplomatic counter measures to prevent being caught in a nutcracker situation. Ironically, these measures are what could force India to rethink, re-examine and revisit its long stated policy that a stable, friendly, prosperous Pakistan is in India's national interest.

Unremitting hostility from Pakistan now confronts India with a dilemma: will India be better off by resurrecting or rescuing an adversary or will it serve India's national interest better if India slays the adversary when it is down on its knees. In other words, should India help Pakistan get out of the grave of Islamic fanaticism that it had actually dug for India; or should India let Pakistan be buried in this grave or at the very least ensure that Pakistan remains embroiled for a long time in combating internal crises that pose a mortal danger to its existence.

The former option would make little, if any, sense if Pakistan, after clambering out of this grave, tries to push India into it. This is something that cannot be ruled out until and unless the Pakistani state's basic DNA mutates into something more tolerant, liberal, and secular than what it has been so far. As things stand, there doesn't appear much chance of this happening especially since the Pakistani establishment and intelligentsia is trying to get public opinion to back the war against the Taliban on the grounds that these barbarians are working on India, Israel and America's agenda to sully the image of Islam and damage Pakistan. After such propaganda, to expect that Indo-Pak relations will normalise if and when Pakistan defeats the Islamists, will be nothing short of a delusion.

The second option – letting Pakistan be buried – has its attractions, not the least of which is the prospect of India no longer will have to contend with a virulently hostile neighbour whose only purpose is to confront India. But this option also has serious ramifications for India's security because India doesn't know what will replace Pakistan. Nor is there any surety that India will be able to insulate itself from the fallout of an extremely destabilised neighbourhood.

In a sense, the 'Prithviraj Chauhan syndrome' has once again come back to haunt India. If, instead of being magnanimous in victory and allowing his adversary to return to Afghanistan merely on the promise that he will never again attack Hindustan, the King of Delhi had executed Muhammad Ghori after having defeated him, perhaps the history of the subcontinent would have been different. Ghori made full use of the second chance he got and mobilised another army to attack Delhi. This time he won and he made sure he didn't make the same mistake as Chauhan. He blinded the King of Delhi, put him in shackles and transported him to Afghanistan. Is there a lesson in this story for India's policy towards Pakistan, or will India repeat the folly of Shimla agreement?

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    <1250 Words>                    8^th May, 2009

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PAKISTAN'S UNCERTAIN, UNCLEAR, UNCONVINCING AND UNREAL WAR

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

The panic buttons pressed by the international community on the relentless advance of the Taliban has finally shaken the Pakistani authorities out of their somnolence. Reports that the US was considering unilateral action against the Taliban bases in places like Dir, Swat and other troubled districts of the Malakand division of NWFP probably added to the urgency of the situation and forced the Pakistan government to at least take some sort of counter measures against the Islamist militia.

The launching of a military operation to clear the Dir and Buner districts of the Taliban is, therefore, clearly an attempt to not only reassure the world that the Pakistani state faces no mortal threat from the Taliban, but also restore the plummeting confidence of the people of Pakistan in the capacity, intention and will of the Pakistan army to take on and defeat the Taliban. Brave statements from the president, prime minister and also the army chief promising to not allow any parallel government to emerge inside Pakistan, and to protect the life and liberty of the citizens, have helped somewhat to stem the tide of despondency sweeping through the country.

Unfortunately, words alone don't win wars. More importantly, if there is no action backing the words, then after a while, no matter how inspiring the words, there will be no takers for them. And until now at least, all that has been on display is tons of verbiage expressing resolve against the scourge of the Taliban, accompanied by half-baked, half-hearted military and political steps to stop the march of the Taliban inside Pakistan. Not surprisingly, the Taliban have gone from strength to strength while the Pakistani state has seen its authority and credibility being whittled down in equal measure.

Even in the case of the latest operation in Dir and Buner, it is still not quite clear what exactly it aims to achieve. Is this operation the start of the long and bloody war that Pakistan will have to fight against its home-grown Islamist militias? Or, is the entire operation is only a move to dispel fears that the Taliban were on the doorstep of Islamabad and could soon be in a position to commandeer Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? If it is the former, then the cautious welcome accorded to the operation within Pakistan and without is in order. But if it is the latter, then this operation will almost certainly be yet another half-measure that will end up strengthening the Taliban and destroying whatever little confidence there remains in the ability of the state to defeat this more serious challenge to its existence?

The media hype surrounding the operation suggests the start of fight to the finish against the Taliban. However, senior members of the provincial government insist that it is only a 'limited operation' aimed at not allowing the Taliban to spread out of Swat to adjoining districts from where they can pose a threat to the Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. If indeed this is the case then this operation is quite useless. One doesn't need to study rocket science to understand the trajectory of the Taliban phenomenon or movement or even ideology. To put it quite simply: the Taliban cannot be contained to one or two areas; they have to be eliminated because it is the nature of this beast to expand the area under its control.

Scepticism over Operation Black Lightening is even otherwise quite natural. After all, there have been plenty of such operations carried out in the past in other parts of the troubled Pashtun belt. All these other operations – in South and North Waziristan, Bajaur, Swat, Khyber agency – either failed or ended in a stalemate after which the Pakistan army would withdraw and cede effective control of the area to the Taliban. There is nothing to suggest that the current operation will produce a different result.

It would be tempting to buy the line being sold by the Pakistan army spokesman that the operation is a resounding success. But when have military spokesmen anywhere in the world ever conceded that an operation has failed or is likely to fail. In the past too, Pakistan army's spin machine would reel out casualty figures of the Taliban running into hundreds. But not once has anyone seen any evidence corroborating the assertions made by the army. If anything, people from the areas in which the military was carrying out its operations would say that most of the casualties were that of civilians and that the Taliban ranks were hardly affected by the military strikes.

It won't be entirely wrong to say that the ham-handed and unprofessional manner in which the Pakistan army has conducted its operations against the Islamists is a cure worse than the disease. Instead of infusing confidence in the people to stay and resist the Islamists, the Pakistan army has created hundreds of thousands of refugees by clearing up entire areas of civilian population and then blasting it out of existence. This has created a huge reservoir of resentment among the displaced people against the Pakistani state. Their misery is compounded by the failure of the state to provide them even with half-decent temporary shelters. The human tragedy and misery that an army operation inflicts on ordinary people naturally leads to an outrage and weakens the resolve of both the people and the politicians to fight the war to its logical conclusion. Very soon there is a clamour to stop the military offensive, something that the army is only too happy to do. The end result: another victory for the Taliban.

More than the refugee problem, the inability of the Pakistani security forces to provide protection and security to people who stand by it is the biggest failure of the Pakistani state. The abandonment of pro-government civilians and vigilantes by the army and paramilitary forces has created a sense of betrayal among the people and added to the strength of the Taliban by snuffing out all resistance to them. Many people say that if the army is going to quit after a while and allow the Taliban to re-enter their areas then it is better not to stand up against them in the first place. It is in any case pointless to first establish area dominance only to move out later and let the insurgents move in.

Clearly, there are lot of problems in the military tactics being adopted against the Islamists. One indication of this comes from the Pakistan army's spokesman who seems to believe that the force differential between the Taliban and the Pakistan army is enough to ensure the defeat of the Taliban. No doubt the Pakistan army has hundreds of aircraft and artillery pieces, thousands of tanks, nearly a million well-trained men in arms. But these are weapons that are used in a conventional conflict not in a sub-conventional conflict like an insurgency. Fighter jets, heavy artillery, helicopter gunships, tanks, APCs, are quite useless in a war against a highly mobile enemy armed with only AK47s, RPGs, light mortars, LMGs and IEDs.

Not only weapons, even the tactics for tackling insurgency are totally different from those used in a conventional war. Insurgencies have to be fought by placing boots on the ground for long lengths of time during which the soldiers have to first clear the area and then hold it and not clear it and then vacate it. The troops also have to carry out mopping up operations by chasing the insurgents and putting them out of business. It is all very well for Pakistan to have a million man army, but what is its use if it is deployed in an area where there is no conflict or if a sizeable number of these men empathise with the enemy within and are reluctant to fight it on the specious logic of the insurgents being their 'own people'.

Perhaps the Pakistan army needs to consult their counterparts in India on how to handle insurgencies. Not only has the Indian army never used fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery and helicopter gunships against insurgents in Kashmir, it has also developed effective counter tactics against terrorists who were trained by the Pakistan army before being sent into Kashmir.

Be that as it may, there is very little reason to believe that the latest military offensive against the Taliban in Dir and Buner will add up to anything at all in the larger war that confronts Pakistan against Islamist insurgents. Without a reorientation of the Pakistan army's strategic outlook and a reworking of its military tactics, the war against the Taliban will never be won. And if Pakistan continues with being uncertain, unclear, unconvincing and unreal in its war against the Islamist insurgency, it won't be long before the Pakistani state is overwhelmed by the Taliban.

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    <1470 Words>                    1^st May, 2009

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