CHANGING HORSES WON'T HELP IN PAKISTAN

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The sudden rediscovery by the Americans and the British of the potential usefulness of Nawaz Sharif as an ally who can deliver in the War on Terror is nothing but a sign of their growing cluelessness, helplessness and desperation. Quite clearly, the Western powers are clutching at any and every thing that they think will help to extricate them from the pit that they continue to dig for themselves in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the process, they are ignoring the fact that the inimical forces at play today in the 'Af-Pak' region cannot be reined in merely by a change of face, even if that new face comes riding the wave of popularity among the people.

    Forget Nawaz Sharif, even Mullah Omar will not be much help simply because what the West is fighting is a maniacal mindset and a deep-seated radically hostile religious philosophy that transcends individuals. Instead of cosmetic and symbolic changes, what is required is a strategic overhaul that involves demonstration of unflinching commitment (no talk of withdrawal and no suing for a dialogue), application of overwhelming force (not just bombs from the air but also boots on the ground) and complete intolerance for any double-dealing (by making an example of anyone or any organisation found to be indulging in it).

No doubt, this new strategy will be more effective if it enjoys the backing of a credible, courageous, committed and clever political leader who is able to carry the people with him. But whether Nawaz Sharif is such a leader is something on which the jury will be out until the cows come home. Of course, Nawaz Sharif is very popular among a section of the Pakistani public. His right-wing, conservative politics sits well in a polity that is increasingly gravitating towards social conservatism and religious orthodoxy. As compared to a left-of-centre party like the PPP, it is easier for a right-of-centre politician like Nawaz Sharif to bring around those who are on the extreme right. Some people believe that his own Islamist leanings coupled with his links with Islamist parties like Jamaat Islami could come handy in starting a dialogue with the militant Islamist insurgents in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the same time, being a mainstream politician he understands the realities, compulsions and complexities of both domestic and international politics. As Prime Minister he adopted quite a pragmatic approach to managing the competing and often contradictory pulls and pressures of Pakistani politics, particularly on issues like relations with the US and India. The fact that he has proved that he is able to stand up to US pressure (for instance, on the issue of nuclear tests in 1998) and still maintain good relations with the Americans adds to his credibility both at home and abroad. His approach to India, especially in his second term as prime minister was a refreshing break from the past and held the promise of normalisation of relations between the two countries until it was sabotaged by the Pakistan army in Kargil. His extremely close relationship with the Saudis is yet another factor that can come in handy in manoeuvring through the minefield of Pakistani politics.

Clearly, on the face of it, Nawaz Sharif has enough going for him – much more than Asif Zardari – to be considered as the man on whom the Americans and other Western powers can hitch their wagon. But as happens so often, a closer examination of the assumptions being made about Nawaz Sharif tend to nullify many of the advantages he is considered to enjoy over his political rivals.

In a sense, the reappraisal of Nawaz Sharif today is almost similar to the way in which Benazir Bhutto was seen as the only credible political option that could add strength to the war effort then being guided by Gen. Pervez Musharraf. At that time, the Americans bought the line being sold to them by Pakistani liberals that Musharraf's political allies in PMLQ are more of a liability than an asset. The Americans were convinced that only a power sharing arrangement between a liberal and popular force like PPP and the military establishment under Musharraf could deliver the goods. Now, the opposite line is being sold, i.e. a right-wing party like PMLN is better placed than a liberal party to forge a political consensus in favour of the War on Terror inside Pakistan. Given that both PMLQ and PMLN have a common political DNA, what are the chances that PMLN will succeed where PMLQ failed? Is Nawaz Sharif alone enough to make the difference?

This question acquires a greater salience given the limited area of Nawaz Sharif's political popularity. Sharif's critics are quite correct when they refer to Nawaz Sharif's party as GT Road party. In other words, his popular appeal is limited to the Lahore-Rawalpindi belt (essentially Central and North Punjab). This area is extremely important not only electorally but also in terms of influencing events in Islamabad, as became clear during the successful movement for restoration of the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Large scale unrest in this belt is enough to pull down any government. But overwhelming support in this belt cannot be construed to constitute national consensus. Therefore even if Nawaz Sharif is brought to power, and assuming he is able to sway his supporters to back the War on Terror, his effectiveness in rest of the country – Sindh, South Punjab, Balochistan, and NWFP – is an open question. Although Nawaz Sharif does have some support in the Hazara belt of NWFP, he is a minor player in the Pashtun areas of the province and in the tribal belt, FATA, which are the real troubled areas.

There are also questions marks around Nawaz Sharif's acceptability among the top brass of the Pakistan army. Despite his pragmatism on many issues, Sharif can also be very obstinate and single-minded on issues that become his obsession. For instance, he is totally uncompromising on ending the military's influence in Pakistan's politics. Under normal circumstances, Sharif should be supported in this endeavour. But at a time when the Pakistan army is purportedly engaged in a life and death struggle for saving the country, any attempt at its political castration could easily lead to a reaction – either directly against the government or indirectly by sabotaging the government's anti-terror strategy - that could destabilise the entire system.

His influence among the Islamists should also not be overstated. Parties like Jamaat Islami are no longer in the vanguard of the militant Islamist movement but are agents, collaborators and supporters of the main players. In fact, if the Islamist political parties were to oppose the insurgents, they would become the targets of attacks. In any case, an ambivalent attitude that Nawaz Sharif is likely to adopt towards the Islamists, is not going to be very helpful in crushing the insurgency. Instead, it will add to their strength. What is needed is an unequivocal commitment against radicalism, something that Nawaz Sharif is not likely to make.

Finally there is the catch 22 situation in which Nawaz Sharif will find himself in his ties with the Americans. As soon as Nawaz Sharif is seen to be playing the American game – this being the primary reason why he will be brought to power in the first place – he will lose his credibility and much of his popularity. Given that he will be expected to broadly follow the policy that was handed down by the Americans to Musharraf and Asif Zardari, it will severely compromise his ability both to influence the Islamist insurgents and convince his own supporters to back the War on Terror.

Therefore, if at the end of the entire 'Bring Nawaz Sharif to power' exercise, the Americans will be back to square one, what sense is there in rooting for a change at the top in the political power structure of Pakistan?

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    <1315 Words>                    27^th March, 2009

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ZARDARI IS DOWN BUT STILL IN THE GAME

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    In Pakistan, the apparent resolution of any crisis is never anything more than another intermission in the unending, adrenalin-filled thriller that is that country's politics. Invariably, what follows is more high-tension, nail-biting drama, or if you will, another crisis of even greater magnitude. Therefore anyone who thinks that the last minute decision of the PPP government to restore the deposed chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, is the end of the show, has another thought coming. If anything, Pakistan should be bracing itself for a no-holds barred political power struggle, the outcome of which will decide not only the future of President Asif Zardari but also that of the only Pan-Pakistan political party, the PPP.

By eating humble pie on the issue of restoring the deposed judges, President Asif Zardari and his party's government has defused the immediate crisis that threatened to devastate Pakistan's political system. The move has, at least momentarily, disarmed the most vocal opponents of the government. With the prospect of an imminent regime change forced by a raw demonstration of peoples' power in Islamabad receding into the background, Asif Zardari has lived to fight another day, a fight that won't be long in coming. But for now, Pakistan's dangerously rickety political rollercoaster has just slowed down a little to give the riders a brief respite before they go on yet another hair-raising ride.

    There can be no two opinions that Asif Zardari's political standing has been badly damaged in this entire episode, first by his backing out from political agreements made with a lot of fan-fare before the public to restore the deposed judges, and now by his succumbing to the street pressure that was built by the opposition, the media, the lawyers and other sundry civil society activists. It will require all his considerable skills at political manipulation to rehabilitate his public image, which to start with was already tainted by a sustained, unforgiving and often unfair campaign against his personal character and his alleged proclivity to use public office to satisfy his kleptomania.

Clearly, the odds are quite heavily loaded against Asif Zardari. He now will have to contend with an enormously powerful political opponent like Nawaz Sharif who seems to have captured the pulse and imagination of the most all important Punjab province. More seriously, he might also have to fend off a potent challenge that is expected to emerge from within his own party. Rumours are rife in Pakistan that Zardari's hand-picked Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, is trying to break out his mentor's shadow and come into his own. There is talk that Gilani and the Sharif brothers are working in tandem to make Zardari's position very untenable in both the party as well as the presidency.

Helping the Sharifs' in this venture is a media that is rabidly hostile towards Zardari and his close aides. While trying to maintain a facade of objectivity, the media has very consciously rigged the public debate to create a groundswell of opinion against Zardari. Newspaper columnists and anchors of popular political talk shows (some well-known touts of the infamous Pakistani intelligence agencies and others known to be in the pay of the Sharifs') are very brazenly, and one daresay quite falsely, trying to project Yusuf Raza Gilani as a leader of unimpeachable integrity and exceptional qualities who truly deserves to be the inheritor of the political legacy of the Bhuttos.

The Sharifs' are believed to be directly and indirectly pumping air into Mr Gilani to make him rise in revolt against Zardari. By attempting to drive a wedge between the President and the Prime Minister, the Sharifs' are trying to split the PPP. If they are successful, then it is possible that the Sharifs' might prop up Yusuf Raza Gilani for some time before they eventually pull the plug on him and force a mid-term election which they then hope to sweep. In other words, Yusuf Raza Gilani is likely to remain a lame-duck regardless of whether he stick with Mr Zardari or casts his lot with the Sharifs'.

Not only Gilani but also other senior PPP members are also trying to machinate and manipulate against the leadership of Zardari. The lawyer leader Aitzaz Ahsan has used his pivotal role in the Lawyers Movement for restoration of the judiciary to assiduously build his public image as a crusading and principled politician. He has positioned himself as a credible alternative to Zardari in the event that the latter is forced to cede control of the PPP. Other lesser leaders of the party, like Raza Rabbani, Enver Baig, Safdar Abbasi and his wife, Naheed Khan, are also bristling with rage against Zardari either because they sidelined by him after Benazir's assassination, or because they were denied important offices that they thought they deserved. The knives are out for Zardari from some other quarters as well. For instance, the extended Bhutto family as well as the Sindhi nationalist groups hope to regain some political relevance by an erosion in PPP's Sindhi support base.

For the famed military-bureaucratic establishment of Pakistan, the PPP's disintegration will be the final denouement of all the political engineering and intrigues it has engaged in for nearly four decades. Chances are that if Asif Zardari is sidelined or removed from the scene, the PPP will split a dozen ways. Every two bit leader will stake a claim for the party's leadership. Most of the so-called conscientious objectors and dissidents have no political base of their own, much less the charisma or stature that can catapult them into the position of unquestioned leadership of the PPP. Given that many of these people can't even win their home seat, their political prominence is the result of their position as Benazir Bhutto's courtiers. Some of them are also darlings of the media and the chattering classes. Alas, exposure by the media alone is not enough to become a mass leader. If it was, then Imran Khan would have been the undisputed leader of Pakistan today.

And yet, all is still not lost for Asif Zardari. Despite the strong array of forced ranged against him, as a duly elected president, he still controls all the constitutional levers of power. Even if he is compelled by political circumstances to sacrifice many of his presidential powers that are incongruous in a parliamentary democracy, as long as he commands the loyalty of the party machinery and cadre, Zardari will remain a powerful political figure. Like Pervez Musharraf who drew his strength from his command of the army, the real source of Asif Zardari's political strength lies in his control of the party. This in turn depends on the basic political DNA of the PPP jiyala who places blind faith in the Bhutto family, something that Yusuf Raza Gilani and others of his ilk will never be able to mutate in their favour. At best, they can chip away at the party, but hijacking it is probably way beyond their capability.

    Of course, if the efforts to remove Asif Zardari succeed, and as a result the PPP either disintegrates or is reduced to being a spent political force, the biggest sufferer will be Pakistan's federal structure. Separatist Sindhi nationalism, effectively kept at bay by the PPP, will get re-energised, and that too at a time when the Pakistani state is fast losing control over two other provinces – NWFP and Balochistan. In the event, Pakistan's federal structure will fit the description 'Punjab-occupied Pakistan'.

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    <1250 Words>                    18^th March, 2009

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POTBOILER POLITICS

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

Like a tired Bollywood potboiler, the current political crisis in Pakistan is a replay of the hackneyed script of the 1990's, albeit with new 'treatment', lots of twists, some new faces and situations. In true Bollywood style, the script of the Pakistani political potboiler is a work in progress and keeps changing as the plot progresses – by the day and at times by the hour. Little surprise then that the drop scene has still not been written. It will depend on the twists, turns, U-turns that the main actors make, either on the own volition or on the instructions of some of the script-writers who sit in the GHQ, Rawalpindi, and the financiers who sit in Washington. A small and yet significant part of the script could also be dictated by Saudis' and other sundry creditors. But the million dollar question is how the Pakistani street receives this potboiler. Will they burn down the theatre, or have they become comfortably numb to the nonsense being peddled to them? Most important, will the script writers and financiers lose patience with the endless twists and turns in the plot and decide to shelve the whole project?

For the moment, most Pakistanis are not exactly enamoured by the plot that is playing out before them. In fact, they are worried: worried about the slippery slope on which they find their country, worried about the growing power and influence of the Islamist militias or Taliban, worried about their daily battle for food, clothing, housing, education, health, the list is endless. A small, very vocal minority – their number greatly exaggerated by a partisan media – has, nevertheless, come out on the streets, seduced by the tantalising images of a just, progressive, prosperous future that has been shown to them by plotting politicians, a megalomaniac media, and a confounded civil society. Of course, these people don't realise that while they have come out on a matter of principle, those who are leading them (one daresay, up the garden path) have latched on to the same principle for their own personal aggrandisement.

For instance, a leading light of the Lawyer's movement smells an opportunity for forcing Asif Zardari out of the picture, capturing control over the PPP by emerging as the consensus candidate, and then using this position to become either the President or Prime Minister. Then there is the current Prime Minister, who on his own is a political lightweight but has suddenly latched on to political morality as a means of shaking off the reflected glory of Asif Zardari. He too is trying to show himself as an independent minded person, a leader in his own right, who as the flag-bearer of principled politics deserves to be the leader of the PPP in the event Asif Zardari continuance becomes completely untenable. A set of disgruntled PPP leaders, some of them courtiers of Benazir Bhutto, are bristling over their being sidelined by the new leadership of the party, and are using the opportunity to settle scores with Asif Zardari.

There are of course the Sharif brothers who until their disqualification from holding elected office and the dismissal of their party's government in Punjab prevaricated over going whole hog in support of the movement for restoring the deposed chief justice. The Jamaat Islami and political non-entities like Imran Khan are in turn using Nawaz Sharif and his popular base to project themselves much beyond what their own political base will permit. But the most ridiculous aspect of the entire scene is the holier than thou attitude taken by former generals and bureaucrats. Many of these quite contemptible characters should ideally be in prison for the abuse and misuse of power when they were in office. For instance, the retired super-bureaucrat who has willingly collaborated with every military government in the past in Pakistan, and who now has the gall to come on TV and say that had he still been serving he would have refused to implement any illegal order given by the government! Or the ex-generals, who have assisted military coups in the past, and who now have the audacity to give lessons on democracy and rule of law to the people of Pakistan.

Quite in keeping with the times, the name of the game is marketing. The political actors who are able to market their story better and create a buzz and hype around themselves are likely to emerge the winner. Perception has always been important in politics. But what is happening in Pakistan today is manufacturing of perception through a blatant disinformation and misinformation media campaign. As things stand, the spin-doctors have succeeded in creating the conjecture of a full-blown crisis, which in turn has been fuelled further by the panicky, ham-handed and quite unnecessary response of the government machinery to the Long March to Islamabad. Media barons, out to prove that they have the power to make and break governments, and journalists, majority of them from a conservative, Punjabi urban lower middle-class background, with deep antipathy towards President Asif Zardari, have together declared an open season on the government. So much so that people who never had a good word to say about Benazir Bhutto during her lifetime, cannot now stop extolling her virtues, only so that they can use her name to portray her husband as a charlatan.

All this is not to deny the seriousness of the political crisis in Pakistan. Only, it has still not reached that critical stage in which only doomsday scenarios can unfold. Even at this stage – the second day of the Long March – the crisis is more manufactured than real. But with everyone wittingly and unwittingly buying into the media created conjecture, it has now taken a life of its own and is threatening to turn into a reality. As a result, a sense of unbearable pressure has been created in an already fragile political system.

Something has now got to give for this pressure to release. This in turns opens up a real possibility of some sort of deal being worked out between the main players. But chances are that any deal that is struck will only end up setting the stage for the next big showdown between the main protagonists.

The parameters of a possible deal will probably revolve around the three conditions laid down by Nawaz Sharif – reversing the disqualification order, lifting governor's rule in Punjab and restoring the deposed chief justice. Asif Zardari is reported to have agreed to the first two conditions, but is holding out on the third. Even if he was to give in on all three conditions, the devil will lie in the finalising the modalities for implementing these conditions.

The disqualification order cannot be reversed by a wave of the wand. It is possible only through either a judicial review (which Nawaz Sharif won't accept since he doesn't consider the current judiciary legitimate) or through a constitutional amendment, which requires a two thirds majority. Amending the constitution only to grant relief to the Sharif brothers will look rather strange in a political system that professes to be democratic. This means that a constitutional package will have to be agreed upon, something that will require hard-nosed political bargaining and will not happen overnight.

Lifting the governor's rule doesn't necessary mean reinstating a PML(Nawaz) government in Punjab. If the PPP and PMLQ strike a deal then they will be well within their right to form a government in Punjab. This will mean continuing hostility from Nawaz Sharif and company. On the other hand if PMLN succeeds in forming its government in Punjab, then tensions between Islamabad and Lahore will keep the political pot boiling.

Finally there is the mother of all problems – the restoration of the deposed chief justice. Asif Zardari will not be averse to conceding on this provided it is done under a constitutional package that circumscribes the powers of the Chief Justice so that he doesn't run amok and interfere in the running of the government. Left to himself, Nawaz Sharif too will be inclined to accept checks and balance on the powers of the chief justice. But he will find it difficult to sell such a package politically, more so after having gone out on a limb of the question of independence of judiciary. If however the chief justice is restored without any limits on his power, his rulings will remain controversial especially if they go against anyone who did not back his restoration. For instance, if he was to strike the controversial NRO off the statute books, who will accept that this was done on the merits of the case and not to get even with Asif Zardari!

No matter how the script pans out, it appears as though Pakistan will continue to lurch from one political crisis to another. After the February 2008 elections, the politics of consensus that Asif Zardari had initiated, was aimed precisely at avoiding the political turmoil being witnessed at present. But the manner in which political differences have been personalised by Nawaz Sharif coupled with the violation of solemn political commitments by Asif Zardari has probably created an almost unbridgeable cleavage between the two biggest political parties in Pakistan. Even if they now manage to paper over their differences for the time being, their mutual distrust and suspicion will ensure that such an arrangement will not last very long. The biggest beneficiary of this will be the army and by extension the Islamists who will use this to show the perfidy of mainstream politicians and present themselves as the only viable and workable political alternative in Pakistan.

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    <1600 Words>                    14^th March, 2009

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BODYLINE SERIES, PAKISTANI STYLE

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Long before 26/11, the Indian High Commission in Islamabad had advised the government of India to not allow the Indian cricket team to tour Pakistan. The advisory had pointed to the clear and present security threats that the Indian team would face during its Pakistan tour. Had 26/11 not happened, the advisory would in all likelihood have fallen on deaf ears in South Block and instead of the Sri Lankans, Team India would have been the target of the terrorists. Fortunately for the Indian cricketers, the post-Mumbai carnage politics, and not security considerations, ensured the cancellation of the Indian tour of Pakistan. In the case of the Lankans too security took a back seat to politics. The decision by the Lankans to play a series in Pakistan was partly taken to show solidarity with a country that not only never refused a cricket tour even during the worst days of the civil war in Sri Lanka, and partly to reciprocate the military assistance and supplies that Pakistan has been giving the Island nation.

    There is little doubt that what happened in Lahore on 3/3 could have easily happened anywhere else. Terrorists always look for high profile targets to make a statement. It is immaterial whether the target is a place of worship (Temple of Tooth in Kandy), a school (Beslan), hotels (Mumbai and Islamabad), or a sports event (Munich Olympics). What is more, terrorism is a global problem and Pakistan alone is not suffering from this scourge. There is no way of ruling out the possibility of radicalised British youth of Pakistani origin targeting an Indian team in England, an al Qaeda cell mounting an operation in Australia or in Dubai, the LTTE attacking a cricket stadium in Sri Lanka, an Islamic terror group like Harkatul Jihad Islami (HUJI) creating an incident in Bangladesh or a separatist terror group like ULFA disrupting a cricket match in India.

The issue therefore is not so much that such a heinous act happened in Pakistan. The problem really is the nature of terrorism inside Pakistan where no one is quite sure as to who the terrorists are, who is directing and supporting them and what they might or might not target. For instance, until the 3/3 attack it was assumed that cricket was above terrorism. But now there is no sanctity attached to anything anymore and everything and anything is fair game for the terrorists in Pakistan.

What makes Pakistan particularly dangerous and problematic is that the tentacles of the myriad terrorist groups extend into every nook and corner of the country including civil society (there are al Qaeda supporters running human rights organisations), the security services, the political establishment, the civil services, the traders, academia, and media. In a country where terrorism has long been used as an instrument of both foreign policy and domestic politics, by state agencies, and by non-state actors who sometimes work in conjunction with the state and at other times in pursuit of their own agendas, no one can be sure who is a terrorist and who is not, who is a militant and who is a moderate.

Is it any surprise then that the driver of the bus carrying the Sri Lankan cricketers was a supporter of a party like Jamaat Islami whose cadres have been closely associated with the al Qaeda? What is more, the driver's own brother was a terrorist who was killed in a counter terror operation in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Perhaps the Pakistani authorities vetted the bus driver's background. Only they would have not found anything really strange in this man's profile simply because it is now impossible to find anyone in Pakistan who is not linked one way or another with a terrorist outfit. For instance, almost all the members of the Pakistan cricket team are born-again Muslims and members of the Tablighi Jamaat, an organisation famous for having many militants among its adherents. The former Pakistan cricket captain Imran Khan is a great supporter of the Taliban and has very gleefully welcomed the imposition of an obscurantist form of Shariah in the troubled Swat valley. Another former cricketer, Javed Miandad, has no compunctions in flaunting his friendship with one of the most dangerous international terrorists, Dawood Ibrahim.

The head of the Pakistan's premier intelligence agency ISI, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha considers terrorists like Baitullah Mehsud and Mullah Fazlullah to be patriotic Pakistanis. Members of parliament and of government openly associate, aid and assist terror organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaishe Muhammad and Harkatul Mujahedin. Jihadi journalists pervade media organisations and openly spread hatred in newspapers and on TV. Innumerable police and military personnel have been found to be members of terrorist organisations and some of them have even participated in jihadi adventures in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The tragedy of Pakistan is that despite the reality of terrorism staring them in the face, and in spite of knowing that the fount of terror lies within and not without Pakistan, the Pakistanis are in denial. They refuse to admit that the root of their problems lies in a fascistic interpretation of Islam which makes it impossible for them to coexist in peace with anyone who does not conform to their worldview. Not surprisingly, after every spectacular and savage act of terror the Pakistanis construct elaborate conspiracy theories to implicate their usual suspects - Americans, Indians, Jews. At times, when the usual suspects cannot be blamed, the finger is pointed at the government of the day or the infamous intelligence agencies.

This time is no different and right from the time the first bullets were fired at the Lankan cricketers, the media and analysts blamed the Indian intelligence agency RAW. But there are two problems with this theory. First, the RAW unfortunately doesn't have lethal capability on display in Lahore, because if it did then Pakistan's biggest export to India – terrorism – would have ceased long back. Second, it is illogical to blame India for 3/3 on the grounds that there was a remarkable similarity between the Mumbai outrage and the Lahore attack. Since it is a proven fact that Mumbai was the handiwork of LeT, unless the LeT has now started working for RAW, or it has started a training course for RAW operatives, one has to take leave of ones senses in pointing fingers at India.

Of course if the finger pointing is done on the basis of motives then there are both state and non-state actors within Pakistan on whom motives can be imputed for carrying out 3/3. It could have been the handiwork of the Pakistan Army and ISI to destabilise the elected government. Perhaps the elected government orchestrated the attack to divert attention from the political mess in Punjab and the Lawyers' Long March in a few days. It could have been the al Qaeda or the Taliban who wanted to destabilise the Pakistani state and expose its alarming vulnerability. Or it could have been the jihadi militias like LeT, who wanted to send a signal of their capability of striking at will and use it to make the government back off from prosecuting its leaders for the Mumbai terror attacks.

Regardless of who was behind the attack, the result is that Pakistan has effectively become a no-go area for rest of the world. The conjecture that Pakistan is heading for failure has been firmly established by this incident and now everyone is waiting for the conjecture to become reality.

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    <1250 Words>                    6^th March, 2009

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