INDIA VIOLATED

by

SUSHANT SAREEN

    Quite expectedly, the president and prime minister of Pakistan have condemned in the strongest words possible the most brutal, murderous, barbaric terrorist strike on high-profile targets in Mumbai. Almost on cue, the defence minister of Pakistan, Ahmed Mukhtar, has denied any Pakistani involvement in these attacks. No one ever expected anyone from Pakistan to actually admit a Pakistani involvement or link to the heinous massacre of innocent civilians. So much so that even the spokesman of the terrorist organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the prime suspect in this attack, too has had the temerity to deny any role in this attack. But this time around, it is highly unlikely that Pakistani disavowals will find any takers in India.

Unless Pakistan now backs its denials with action and cooperation on ground against organisations involved in terrorist activities in India, all bets are off as far as the peace process between the two countries is concerned. So much for the irreversibility of the peace process! Pakistan shouldn't take lightly the outrage in India over this attack which has the fingerprints of terrorist organisations based in Pakistan all over it. For the first time one is thankful that Pakistani news channels and newspapers are not widely available in India. The spin that Pakistani news anchors and columnists are trying to put on this attack – that it could be Maoists, it could be right-wing Hindu groups, it could be disgruntled Indian Muslims – would have added fuel to the fury raging in the minds of Indians.

    The nature of the attack bears remarkable resemblance to fidayeen attacks that are mounted by terrorist of the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad in Jammu and Kashmir. The level of training, the arms, ammunition and explosives, the motivational levels, the display or barbarity and remorseless massacre of innocents, the deliberate targeting of American, British, Israeli citizens, the resources and preparation that went into the attack (including perfect knowledge of the area) and most of all, military nature of strike all point towards organisations operating with relative impunity in Pakistan and enjoying very close links with the Pakistani intelligence agencies.

Despite this, if India is making a distinction between state actors and non-state actors in Pakistan, then it is a benefit of doubt (if not a fig-leaf) being given to Pakistan so that it can demonstrate its commitment to not allow its territory to be sed in any sort of terrorism against India. The decision of Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani to send the ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha to India (some reports suggest that he might accompany the Pakistani army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani) to share information and assist in investigations is an extremely important and positive step, one that will go a long way in assuaging Indian sentiments. At the same time, if this visit is used for grand-standing and winning diplomatic brownie points then it will only worsen matters.

    The Mumbai strike is nothing if it is not a micro-invasion by a highly trained commando unit. Even if this unit comprises non-state actors, the training given to them was almost certainly by military – serving or retired – personnel. These are the kind of operations that are normally launched by mercenaries against very small and vulnerable states – for example, Seychelles, Maldives, Comoro Islands – to effect a regime change in these countries. That such an operation was mounted against India's Maximum City, Mumbai, shows that it was intended to damage India economically, but even more psychologically. It was an attempt to not only injure India, but also insult it. While it is easy, even if correct, to point the finger at Pakistan, India would, at its own peril, ignore its own failings in both preventing these attacks and in having in place the systems to counter such attacks if they take place.

    The tragedy is not that such an attack has taken place. The tragedy lies in the frequency with which India is being violated by terrorists. New York, London, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Bali have all suffered devastating terrorist attacks. But the crisis management systems, security structures, legal framework that these countries put in place have to a large extent ensured that such attacks don't happen ever again. In the last couple of years India has suffered horrific terrorism ever other months, and yet rather than respond in a Churchillian manner, India's political leadership has reacted like a Church mouse.

    Indian security agencies, including the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, are under-staffed, under-equipped, under-trained. The shocking spectacle of policemen equipped with 19^th Century rifles trying to combat terrorists armed with the latest weapons tells a sorry story of India's lack of preparedness in fighting the menace of terrorism. There is probably not a single police force in India that is equipped with night-vision goggles, so important in urban warfare. Most of the flak-jackets with the police officers are so heavy that movement becomes painfully slow. Hand-guns which cannot fire more than 50 or 60 feet are normally given to officers who are supposed to fight terrorists. The training and tactics, not to mention procedures, of police forces are ancient.

    Even more scandalous is the border management of the country. India learned no lesson from the audacious arms-drop that took place in Purulia some 20 years back. Worse, the 1993 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai, for which the explosives were smuggled in by sea, did not lead to any improvement of coastal security. Not surprisingly then, the large gaps in the land and sea borders are being exploited by terrorists who are constantly looking for loop-holes in the security systems. The manner in which the terrorists involved in the Mumbai invasion sailed right up to the Gateway of India and then walked in with bags loaded with merchandise of death is shocking but hardly surprising.

    Equipment and systems are only part of the problem. More serious is the cavalier attitude and lack of seriousness with which Indian authorities and people deal with the menace of terrorism. Unless authorities develop a policy based on paranoia, the eternal vigilance that is required to pre-empt and defeat terrorists is not possible. But in a country where exemption from frisking at airports is worn as a badge of honour and equated with the dignity of institutions, there can never be an uncompromising approach to security issues.

Cynical though it may appear, the only silver lining of this latest attack is that it has hit the elite of the society, who until now were relatively insulated from terrorism. Maybe because this attack has hit so close to home, it might do some good as far as making policy, equipping the security agencies, making changes in laws to combat terrorism is concerned. But it is entirely possible that like in the past, Indian might once again forget this incident and slip back into its somnolence in taking the steps that are so desperately required to secure the life, liberty and property of its citizens from wanton acts of terrorism.

If India does not want to be described as a Banana republic or a 'failed state' then it is imperative that all necessary steps needed to defeat terrorism be taken. If another such spectacular attack takes place, it will make a complete mockery of India's claims and aspirations to be counted as an emerging economic and military power and an island of stability in a very volatile region.

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    <1230 Words>                    28^th November, 2008

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ALL SIDES PLAY BOTH SIDES IN WAR ON TERROR

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    The most remarkable aspect of the War on Terror that is purportedly being fought on both sides of the Durand line is the sheer lack of trust, not only between adversaries but also between allies. By extending drone attacks into the settled districts of NWFP, the US has yet again delivered an unambiguous message that it will not hesitate to strike unilaterally against terrorist targets inside Pakistan. More than anything else, the attack on an al Qaeda safe house in Bannu demonstrates US' lack of confidence in the ability, willingness and, most of all, commitment of Pakistani security agencies in combating the Islamists. Clearly, the US is not ready to share information with the Pakistanis and let them take the lead in anti-terror operations because they are not sure if the information will not be leaked to the intended targets, some of who – Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Mullah Nazir, Jalaluddin Haqqani, to name a few – retain close links with the Pakistani intelligence agencies.

    Even though senior US civil and military officials publicly appreciate Pakistani efforts to curb the Islamist insurgency, particularly after the military action in Bajaur and Swat, the suspicion that the Pakistanis are playing both sides outweighs the praise. There are good reasons for the doubts about Pakistan that continue to linger in minds of US officials. After all, how is it that a much-vaunted fighting force like the Pakistan army has not been able to oust the Taliban from Bajaur and Swat for over three months now despite using heavy artillery, fighter jets, helicopter gunships and tanks? It is said that the Taliban are very well dug in behind an intricate network of defensive earthworks. But if the Taliban are fighting what is by all descriptions a conventional conflict, then why has the Pakistan army deployed only around 10,000 troops in Bajaur? Why not 40,000 or even more? While the Pakistan army claims to be bleeding the Islamists, there is no independent confirmation of these claims. For all anybody knows, these claims could be mere psy-war to boost the morale of troops and at the same time damage that of the Islamists and their supporters. But psy-war can be counter-productive if there is no progress on the ground.

    This begs the question why the Pakistanis are not going whole hog against the Islamists. There are five plausible reasons for keeping the conflict lingering. The first is the India factor. In other words, the Pakistan army is using the bogey of its commitments on the eastern front to avoid moving more forcefully on the western front. And now, with US president-elect Barack Obama linking a resolution of Kashmir with the situation in Afghanistan, the India factor has acquired a new salience. Second, the Pakistanis see the continuing conflict as a cash cow. The dollars will continue to flow Pakistan's way as long as this conflict lasts. The trick is to keep it manageable so that it doesn't acquire proportions that actually threaten the Pakistani state's survival. Lending credence to this is the hubris in many top Pakistani military officials that the Taliban don't pose a significant challenge and can be bottled up as and when the decision to do so is taken. That this could be a serious miscalculation is not something that bothers the people who hold this view.

     A third reason could be that the army doesn't want to eliminate the Taliban completely because they might be needed in Kashmir and Afghanistan as and when the Americans leave, something that the Pakistanis believe will happen in not too distant a future. Perhaps this is why the use of force is at present only aimed at demonstrating to the 'irreconcilable' elements among the Taliban the massive firepower that will be brought to bear if they don't agree to function within the parameters set for them by the Army. The idea is to not allow the insurgency to capture any more territory, and at the same time not push it back completely. If in the process of a military stand-off, a substantial section of the militants can be made amenable to play the game by the army's rules, then they can be used for fighting the dirty wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

    The fourth reason could be that the Pakistan army no longer has the capacity, capability or commitment to comprehensively defeat the Taliban. The Generals probably don't want to exert beyond a point to win back the areas they have lost to the insurgents because retaining control over regained territory is an immensely difficult and expensive proposition. The force levels required to maintain supply lines and re-establish the writ of the state in this inhospitable terrain are not going to be easy to garner for the Pakistani state.

    Finally, there could be a real fear that large scale military operations may worsen situation rather than improve it. In case the militants fight the army to a stand-still or worse, defeat the army in a few engagements, it could precipitate a crisis of unmanageable proportions for the Pakistani state. The unavoidable collateral damage – civilian casualties, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people,
large scale destruction of homes and hearths – could unleash forces that could push the Pakistani state into failure. It is for this reason that the Pakistani authorities don't want to throw everything at the insurgents and want to keep open the option of a political settlement.

    In all likelihood, all these reasons are playing a role in what outsiders see as Pakistan's continuing ambivalence on the issue of fighting the Islamists. But there is another very important reason for Pakistan's double-game. The Pakistani security establishment and an influential section of the intelligentsia harbour deep suspicions, nay paranoia, of American objectives in the region. This is being reflected in the public discourse inside Pakistan that is increasingly veering around to the view that the Americans want to redraw the borders in the region and deprive Pakistan of its nuclear capability. Many Pakistanis are convinced that the US and India have deliberately diverted the Islamist insurgency into Pakistan in order to destabilize Pakistan and destroy its nuclear capability. In support of this theory, they point to the inflow of weapons and militants from Afghanistan for the insurgents and ask why the US does not destroy these supply lines. It is entirely possible that the US and perhaps even India are maintaining listening posts in Afghanistan, and might even be using smuggling networks as double agents to get information from ground zero which is then used to strike at high value targets. But to imagine that this is what is sustaining the insurgency inside Pakistan is nothing but denial at its worst.

Exploiting the growing divide between the so-called allies is the Taliban. They have very cunningly thrown the bait of a ceasefire to be followed by a dialogue towards Pakistan. The Taliban have proposed a ceasefire not because they believe in it but because it will come handy to fix both the Pakistanis and the Americans. At the same time they will use the space created by a ceasefire to rebuild and regroup their forces. While a ceasefire and negotiations will satisfy the Pakistani public's desire for a negotiated political settlement with the Islamist insurgents, it will be unacceptable for the Americans simply because even the Islamists who are in favour of negotiations with Pakistani authorities are very clear that they will continue to wage jihad against the foreign troops in Afghanistan.

The Americans will therefore mount immense political, military and economic pressure on Pakistan to prevent it from entering into any deal with the Islamists. If the Pakistanis disregard US reservations, they risk economic collapse and the prospect of military confrontation with the US. On the other hand, if the Pakistani government succumbs to US pressure it will cause public outrage, which will only increase if the US and Pakistani military operations intensify against the insurgents and the Taliban retaliate in major towns and cities across Pakistan.

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    <1340 Words>                    21^st November, 2008

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DON'T GO BALLASTIC OVER BARACK

By

SUSHANT SAREEN

    After the saturation coverage in the Subcontinent of the US presidential elections, and later the rapturous celebrations over the victory of Barack Obama, it is quite natural to be a little confused over whether the Americans were electing a President for India or for themselves. Even more infuriating was the search that TV networks and newspapers launched for a local Barack Obama. If truth be told, Obama is more an accident of history - caused by the terrible economic mess at home and a military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan that is going nowhere - rather than some Messiah, Prophet, Mahdi or Avatar, who will solve all the world's problems.

In a way, the US elections have revealed the extent to which India has become Pakistanised, at least in the widespread belief of the impact that the political change in White House will have on India's foreign policy, its economy and its politics. It is almost as though, like in Pakistan where the occupant of the Aiwan-e-Sadr survives on the sufferance of a certain address on Pennsylvania Avenue, so too in India, where the future of residents of 7 Race Course Road will increasingly be decided in the Oval Office.

To be honest, it's a little difficult not to be sceptical of the hype and hoopla surrounding the election of Barack Obama. If one swallow does not a summer make, how can the election of an African-American as the President of the US be treated as a revolution. Sure, the election of the first black man to the White House – after more than 200 years of independence and 43 presidents – is an interesting development. But to extrapolate from this and imagine that America has transcended the race barrier is like saying that because Mayawati has become chief minister of UP, caste has ceased to matter in India.

His political rhetoric certainly doesn't inspire much confidence in his ability to effectively address either the global economic crisis or the international security situation. It is one thing to sway voters suffering the effects of a terrible economic crisis and angry over the unsuccessful military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq with brave and inspiring words, and quite another delivering on these promises. At the risk of sounding cynical, jholawalas and do-gooders, whether in India or in America, have a rather poor track record in become agents of change.

Notwithstanding the expectations that people around the world have attached to his presidency, Obama is ultimately going to do what he thinks is going to serve US interests and not the interests of countries like India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq etc. If the changes he makes in US policies suit countries like India or Pakistan then it will not be because he was consciously doing them a favour but because his policies advance US interests, which happen to coincide with the interests of one or the other of the countries.

At the same time, if Obama makes a move that affects India adversely – for instance, the linkage he is drawing between Afghanistan and Kashmir – it will not be because he is targeting India deliberately but because he thinks he will be solving an American problem. It is an entirely different matter that placating the Kashmiri and Punjabi jihadis in Kashmir to counter the Pashtun Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan will ultimately be a zero-sum game and will do nothing to end the international jihadist movement of which both of the jihadis and the Taliban are an integral part.

Many people, who are suffering from irrational exuberance over Obama's victory, would have lost some of their enthusiasm if they realized that the Obama administration is likely to be far more intrusive and interfering in affairs of other countries than the Bush administration. The Democrats are notorious for political evangelism. They consider it their burden and right to spread their brand of liberal democratic gospel around the world, although these very same people were willing to not just tolerate but also do business with the Taliban – remember Robin Raphael, the South Asian pointsperson in the State Department during the Clinton administration – when they erupted on the scene in the mid-1990's.

George W. Bush, on the other hand, had followed a very hands-off approach, almost isolationist in nature, on international crises until 9/11 forced its hands and made it adopt the policy of pre-emption. Even though many people in both India and Pakistan will violently disagree, the Bush administration was good for South Asia. Its unambiguous position on terrorism and its post-9/11 policy played a big role in the roll-back of the jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan. This paved the way for the peace process between India and Pakistan, which despite all twists and turns, has resulted in improved relations between the two neighbours. At the same time, by dephenating its relations with India and Pakistan, the US was able to deal with each country on its own merits. By forcing Pakistan to become an ally in the War on Terror, the Bush administration awakened the Pakistani rulers to the horrendous domestic ramifications of the jihadist policy they were pursuing for achieving foreign policy objectives. As a result, Pakistan still has a reasonable chance to defeat the forces of radicalism that threaten the very existence of the Pakistani state.

The fear is that the Obama administration, under the influence of Clinton era officials, might change course and try to appease the so-called 'reconcilable elements' among the Islamists. This would be a big mistake because it will amount to playing into the hands of the Islamists. Such a policy change will be seen as a weakening of resolve on the part of the Americans and will betray a sense of desperation on their part to get out of Afghanistan, something that the Islamists have been banking upon ever since the Americans entered Afghanistan. Not only will this prompt Pakistan to once again start patronising the radical Islamists and use them for its own strategic objectives, it will also re-energise Islamists around the world and lead to a far more virulent form of terrorism than has been witnessed until now.

As far as India is concerned, it needs to be very wary of the next US administration. If Obama sticks to his word of cracking the whip and pressuring the Pakistani authorities, especially the military brass, to act even more forcefully against the Taliban – the 'irreconcilable' ones – there is every chance that he will balance this by trying holding out the carrot of a favorable solution Kashmir. This will confront India with a dilemma: if India accepts US intervention, then it could end up compromising, if not altogether losing, its sovereignty over Kashmir; on the other hand, if India rebuffs the US, it could sour the 'strategic partnership' with the US that many in India have so assiduously sought. The latter may not be such a bad thing because as an American diplomat once said: what is worse than being America's enemy is to be America's friend. Perhaps, the rose-tinted glasses with which India viewed the US during the Bush era, will be cracked, if not shattered, during the Obama years. If this helps India to stop depending on the crutches of superpower support, it will be a price well worth paying. But if India continues to hanker for US attention regardless of the cost this involves, then the Pakistanization of India will be complete.

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    <1240 Words>                    13^th November, 2008

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INDIA'S B.O.P DILEMMA

by

SUSHANT SAREEN

    If, as an economist, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh takes BOP to mean balance of payments, he would be right, albeit partially. Balance of Payments support is after all an important component of a "Bail Out Pakistan" plan that India needs to consider supporting, and do this not by merely voting in favour of an IMF program for Pakistan. India has long maintained that a stable, prosperous and friendly Pakistan is in its vital interest. Quite aside the fact that this policy position has been, more than anything else, only a statement of desire, if India really believes that a stable Pakistan is better than no Pakistan, or a Talibanised Pakistan, then perhaps the time has come for India to put its money – say, a billion dollars – where its mouth is.

To not put too fine a point on it, if the Pakistani economy tanks, the already precarious political and security situation in the country can easily spiral out of control, destabilising the entire region. India will therefore not be helping Pakistan because it has suddenly fallen in love with its old adversary, but because it serves India's vital strategic interests. Any assistance to Pakistan must be shorn of sentimentalism and should be based on cold-hearted diplomatic calculations of deriving the maximum bang, or if you will, benefit – economic, political, and strategic – for the buck.

As a country that aspires to join the high table of great powers, India needs to set its backyard in order. Nepal is a mess. Bangladesh is no better, exporting not only millions of economic refugees to India but also radical Islamists. Sri Lanka is wracked by civil war, the reverberations of which are being felt in New Delhi and Chennai. And then there is Pakistan, which is trouble when stable, but even bigger trouble if destabilised.

Unless India can first emerge as the paramount regional power, looked up to not in fear but awe by all its smaller neighbours, India will find itself hobbled on the world stage. In any case what's the sense in wanting to strut on the global stage when your own neighbourhood is in an utter mess and there's precious little that you can or want to do about it.

This is where a BOP plan can serve as an instrument in India's diplomatic arsenal, not just in relation to Pakistan but also for rest of the region. At a time when Pakistan has been forsaken by all its friends, India has got a tremendous opportunity to take a calculated risk and make a grand reconciliation gesture that will not only reassure Pakistanis that India does not pose a threat to Pakistan's security, but also create some breathing space for an economy that has all but collapsed. The political impact of such a gesture will be far greater than Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore to signal to Pakistanis that India does not question the existence of their state. Not only will it be a shot in the arm for the growing lobby inside Pakistan which is advocating normalisation of relations with India, it will also be a slap in the face of anti-India forces working overtime to sabotage any possibility of good relations.

There is a very good chance that Pakistan might even reject India's offer, in which case India will have gained diplomatic tremendous mileage without spending a dime. But if Pakistan accepts the offer, the potential economic benefits of a BOP plan will have a multiplier effect on India's efforts to open up trade, commerce and travel in the region and to use this as a lever for achieving diplomatic ends. A billion dollar balance of payments support to Pakistan can be used by India to pump prime the Pakistani economy by seeking repayment of this money in the form of exports to India. Alternatively, the money can be used as investment capital inside Pakistan to either purchase units being privatised or to set up green-field projects. In either case, the end result will be the demolition of artificial trade barriers and the creation of economic inter-linkages that will develop vested interests in Pakistan for normal relations with India.

Concerns in India that any financial assistance to Pakistan will be used to procure weapon systems which will ultimately be aimed at India are somewhat misplaced. While there is no fail-safe measure of ensuring that the funds are not misused, a billion dollars from India will in no way obviate Pakistan's need for an IMF program which will almost certainly come with stiff riders on reducing expenditure. And, despite Pakistan army being embroiled in combating Islamist insurgents, defence expenditure will almost certainly be affected. There is of course a real possibility that some of these cuts will be made up by military assistance from countries like the US. But this will be nowhere close to bridging the ever growing gap between the resources India devotes to defence and what Pakistan is able to muster up.

The problem in a BOP plan is therefore not so much economic or strategic; rather it is India's domestic politics that hinders such a plan, especially since general elections are just around the corner. The last thing the ruling coalition will want is to go to the hustings by giving the opposition an issue that it can use to devastating effect against the incumbent government. Adding to the government's difficulty is the economic downturn in the Indian economy. Clearly, a BOP plan is not going to win votes if the government to be seen to bail out a hostile neighbour when the same money could be used to improve the lot of people back home. There is also the problem of the fiscal profligacy of this government which has robbed it of the fiscal space that could have been used to promote diplomatic objectives.

The biggest stumbling block however is the continued violations of ceasefire in Kashmir, the involvement of the ISI in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul and the lingering suspicions of its continued patronage of terrorist groups in India has meant that there aren't too many people in the policy making establishment who are willing to think out of the box and unveil a plan to bail out Pakistan. The question is whether these actions are the result of Pakistan's inability to get over its ingrained hostility towards India, or is there something else at work?

There is a belief among some people in India that the economic meltdown coupled with the deteriorating security situation on its Western border, Pakistan is desperate for a settlement with India which will more or less be on India's terms. In support of this argument they point to the discernible change in perception of India among many Pakistanis. Perhaps it is to disabuse India of the notion that it can treat Pakistan like a pushover that a strong message is being sent from across the border. But even if this is the case, it makes it politically impossible for any Indian government to make a gesture towards Pakistan.

The dilemma and indeed difficulties in coming up with a BOP plan are obvious enough. But given India's economic strength and its soft power, it is ideally placed to try a bold initiative aimed at breaking the mould of hostility. If the initiative fails, India will still gain diplomatically. But if it works, it can bring about a paradigm change in the relations between the two countries.

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    <1250 Words>                    6^th November, 2008

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