INSIDE POK : KASHMIR THAT IS NEITHER AZAD NOR KASHMIR

Crossing from Pakistan into what is euphemistically called “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” is almost an anti-climax. It is almost like crossing from one district to another. If this appears to be a statement on the extent to which “Azad” Kashmir has been integrated into Pakistan, then it is a trifle misleading. While there is little doubt that the geographical and political border between Pakistan and PoK is seamless and the presence of Pakistan in PoK, both literal and metaphorical, is overwhelming, “Azad” Kashmir is still not Pakistan. At least not as far as a people of “Azad” Kashmir are concerned. Most people we met in PoK exerted to emphasize their separate identity from Pakistan. In a sense this was a mirror image of what an Indian would experience in the Kashmir valley where he would be asked if he was from India! This was the first great revelation during a tour of PoK as part of a delegation of Indian journalists who visited the occupied territory under the aegis of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA).

The tour of PoK was instructive in more ways than one. It shattered many of the myths that we harbored about the people, attitudes and politics of what is cartographically still a part of India. The most striking thing in AJK was that despite the people defining their identity as Kashmiris. And this, in spite of the fact, that they have little if anything in common with the Kashmiri Kashmiris. None of the criteria that are normally used for defining an identity is common between Kashmir (and here one is talking of only the Valley) and “Azad” Kashmir. Hardly anyone in AJK speaks Kashmiri, they don’t wear the same clothes and they don’t eat the same food. In fact, the every region of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir – Ladakh, Jammu, Kashmir Valley, “Azad” Kashmir and Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan) – has a culture that is very different from the other regions. Surprisingly, unlike in India where no self-respecting Jammuwallah will ever call himself a Kashmiri and a Kashmiri will never accept a Jammuwallah as a Kashmiri, in PoK everybody insists on calling himself a Kashmiri and distinguishing themselves from Pakistan, its government and its policies.

The current thaw between India and Pakistan is also reflected in the way people interacted with the Indian journalists. There was hardly any show of hostility – except perhaps for the poisonous Emir of Jamaat Islami who defended the massacre of women and children in the cause of Jihad and the obnoxious and pompous “president” of the “Azad” Kashmir, Sardar Anwar Khan, who insists on continuously calling himself the only Sadr-e-Riyasat, as though he has doubts about his position. Most people we met were more interested in the softening of the LoC so that the traditional routes of trade could be opened up and divided families could meet. The demand for a plebiscite was always hovering in the background but it was expressed more as a pro forma demand and a debating point rather than a passionate article of faith. Whether this was done not to offend their Indian guests or whether it indicated a shift away from the traditional political stand is an open question. But it appeared as though a sense of realism was creeping in and mindsets were changing in AJK and the people were reconciled to the fact that there are going to be no quick fix solutions to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. In the interregnum people wanted to get on with their lives and wanted free movement of people, politicians and goods across the line of control.

This was a sentiment that was reflected in the meeting with Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who is perhaps still the tallest political figure in AJK and whose political instincts are legendary. He was quite clear that it is pointless searching for permanent solutions to the issue of Kashmir. He believes that what is required is that both sides take a series of interim steps which provide relief to the people and make the situation more amenable to a solution. Other political leaders were not as candid as Sardar Qayyum, but even they appeared amenable to a peaceful and negotiated settlement.

In a series of interactions with political leaders, representatives of civil society and ordinary people, we would inevitably be asked by our hosts in a rather self-righteous tone whether we are now satisfied that there are no terrorist training camps in AJK. But this self-righteousness would get punctured quite fast when our hosts were asked if the camps were located on main highways! Nevertheless, there appears to be an effort to wind down the terror camps in the Pakistan occupied territory. Journalists accompanying us informed us that right from the Kohala bridge that marks the border of Pakistan and AJK up to Muzaffarabad the entire stretch of road was full of posters, wall chalking and banners advertising Jihad and exhorting people to join one or the other jihadi organization. But now there was nothing all along the road. This was probably one sign that the infrastructure of jihad is being winded down, not entirely but substantially.

Another abiding theme was of alleged human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. Everywhere the Indian journalists were confronted with this one issue. But a few counter questions would bring the inquisition to an end. One of the most interesting incidents took place when this writer was confronted over a lunch by the cadre of the JKLF in Muzaffarabad with the human rights violations by Indian security forces. Present among the young cadre was Zahoor Butt, the youngest and sole surviving brother of one of the icons of Kashmiri nationalism, Maqbool Butt. My answer to these people was in the form of four questions, each of which I made Zahoor Butt answer: One, before the start of insurgency how many troops were present in Kashmir? Answer: Very few; Two, How many cases of human rights violations by security forces were there before violence erupted in the state? Answer: practically none; Three, How would Pakistan have reacted had a similar insurgency broken out in PoK? Answer: Worse than India; Four, Would a man like Syed Ali Gilani be able to survive in Pakistan if he took the position that he currently take against India? Answer: He would be long dead.

The other question that was perpetually put was as to why India did not adhere to the UN resolutions. On this again, one had to make the questioners undergo a reality check. Such was a level of indoctrination and indeed ignorance borne out of a one-sided debate within Pakistan and PoK that it came as a shock to our interlocutors when they were told that it was not India but Pakistan that did not adhere to the UN resolutions. Clearly, most people in AJK had probably never bothered to read the UN resolutions. They would simply parrot ‘plebiscite’ without knowing that there were obligations on Pakistan's part which preceded a plebiscite, obligations that were never met.

Apart from HR violations and UN resolutions, there appears to be a political consensus within AJK against America. The level of anti-Americanism witnessed in AJK probably surpasses that one witnesses in Pakistan. In meeting after meeting it was tried to impress upon us how important it is to keep the US out of the region. There is deep suspicion of US objectives in the region and interestingly the people of AJK seemed to be more keen on an understanding with India to keep the US out rather than involve the US and get their aspirations fulfilled. In fact many in AJK would use Pakistan’s relations with the US to taunt the Pakistanis that unlike them the Kashmiris were not beholden to the Americans and were still ‘independent’. This seemed to be yet another manifestation of the sense of separateness that the people of AJK feel from Pakistan. In a sense this could also be seen as an expression of Kashmiri nationalism in AJK, which we in India had probably never imagined existed.

The fact that these expressions of nationalism were emanating from people who were very closely linked to Pakistan (they were either working in or for a Pakistani organization or were settled in Pakistan) is quite significant. But even otherwise, there is a very vocal lobby that demands independence from both India and Pakistan. Everywhere we went in AJK – Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Chakhoti – there was no dearth of political activists who spoke of “Pakistani occupation of Kashmir”. At the forefront of the demand for complete independence are organizations like JKLF, All Parties National Alliance (APNA) which is an umbrella organization of nationalists in both AJK and Northern Areas, the leftist students organization National Students Federation (NSF) and a smattering of other smaller groups. Every where we went, we would be approached by small groups of nationalists who would inform us of the oppressive control exercised in AJK by the Pakistani security agencies. They would tell us that what they want is to see the back of both India and Pakistan. They however appeared resigned to the fact that neither India nor Pakistan would ever let go of them. In fact, they would appear depressed when asked if by demanding that both India and Pakistan quit Kashmir they were not tempting fate by giving both countries a common cause to get together and crush the Kashmiri aspiration!

When confronted with the overwhelming odds of India and Pakistan versus the Kashmiris, the nationalist element (and even the pro-Pakistan moderate element) would try and explore if there were any models from other parts of the world that could be applied in Kashmir. They would bandy about models like Andorra, Trieste, Northern Ireland etc. But here again one couldn’t help feel sorry for the people who felt that their nationalist aspirations could be solved by one of these models. This they understood when they were asked if they knew how old the Andorra problem or the Northern Ireland problem was. When they were told that it has taken over a thousand years for finding a solution to Andorra and close to 500 years for a solution to Northern Ireland, the coin suddenly dropped and they realized that the solution to Kashmir might not be forthcoming in their life time and could take perhaps a 100 or 200 years. They seemed to appreciate that the trick for them was to keep their aspiration alive until such time in the future when they can realize it. And in the meantime, they should try and get the best deal possible from both India and Pakistan.

It must however be said that despite their intense passion for their cause, it is not clear how much public support these groups enjoy. The impression we got was that these nationalist groups are quite well organized and have a degree of support but are probably still in a minority. The majority opinion still favors some sort of accession to Pakistan. Nevertheless the dissenting voices are far more vocal and open than they have ever been in the past. This is what we were told by Pakistani journalists accompanying us.

Surprisingly for the Indians, the nationalists were more disparaging of the political set-up in AJK than in Jammu and Kashmir and would express a sneaking admiration for the power enjoyed by the elected legislature in Jammu and Kashmir as compared to state of affairs in AJK where even the “prime minister” had to seek permission from the chief secretary before embarking on a tour or sanctioning an expenditure. But at the local level the administration is AJK is very responsive and approachable for the common man than is the case in J&K. The civil service is recruited locally and mans all lower and middle level positions. It is only at the senior most level – chief secretary, home secretary and IG police – that Pakistani officers are appointed. We saw none of the bandobast normally associated with district administration in India. We were informed that even the most ordinary citizen can simply walk into the office of the Deputy Commissioner or Superintendent of Police and get his work done. Ministers and legislators are also very accessible. As for services, the roads and civic infrastructure is reasonably good and we were told that power cuts are practically non-existent. The territory however suffers from the fact that there is little or no industry and very few sources of revenue for the government, which depends on Islamabad for its funds. Even within “Azad” Kashmir, there is a big difference between Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. The Mangla dam in Mirpur led to an exodus of Mirpuris to UK and their remittances have transformed the face of the place. On the other hand, notwithstanding its status as capital of “Azad” Kashmir, Muzaffarabad remains a bit of a mofussil town.

The presence of the Pakistani security agencies is overwhelming in “Azad” Kashmir. In the hotel in which the Indian journalists were staying there were probably more security personnel (mostly in plain clothes) than people. A close watch was kept on every journalist as well as on people who came to meet them. That despite such oppressive presence of security personnel there were people who were coming to meet the Indians was in itself a sign of the changing times. Some of the people we met told us that they would have to now spend hours explaining to the intelligence agencies what they spoke to us about and probably have to contend with surveillance for a few weeks.

Probably the most closely watched people in “Azad” Kashmir are the Kashmiris who went across the LoC to get training and return to fight the Indian state. Many of these people are completely disillusioned and long to return home. Except those who have adjusted themselves in the pro-Pakistan jihadi groups, and are therefore enjoying the patronage of the Pakistani state, most of the other “freedom fighters” are out on a limb, barely managing to survive. The treatment meted out to them by the Pakistani agencies is not only humiliating but also repressive. Many of these Kashmiris told us that they never realized that Pakistan will never allow them their ‘Azadi’, and that if Azadi is not possible then they are better living in India than in Pakistan. But the doors for their return are closed. They wan to return to their normal lives but fear that they will be picked up by Indian security agencies and harassed. If they can be assured their dignity, most of them would return by the first available bus.

The disillusionment with Pakistan is not limited to only the Kashmiris who crossed the LoC or the nationalist element in “Azad” Kashmir. It was a surprise to hear some fairly senior officials in the district administration and police service also criticize Pakistan's oppressive control on “Azad” Kashmir. Probably the most interesting experience I had was when we visited the “Azad” Kashmir university. There I happened to get into a conversation with a few students and a couple of civil servants. I asked them that they keep paying lip service to Kashmiriyat and keep parroting that the Kashmiri pandits need to return to their homes, but on the walls of the AKU there were posters in which even a man like Jinnah was painted out as a jihadi! Among other jihadis were people like Iqbal, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and other luminaries of the freedom movement. I asked how any non-Muslim can ever be convinced of their intentions if the mouth jihadi slogans. The answer I got was quite surprising. I was told that these kind of propaganda posters were not the work of the Kashmiris but of Pakistanis. They said the Kashmiris have no use for these things and if they were allowed to exercise power they would tear up most of these posters. Listening to the civil servants and students one got the feeling that the Kashmiris of “Azad” Kashmir are bristling under the oppressive control of Pakistan but feel helpless in doing anything about it.

Even the politicians in “Azad” Kashmir are not exactly enamored of the status of their territory. In private, a number of politicians would express their helplessness in the face of diktats from Pakistan. In public however they would all faithfully parrot the official line. But while most people would try and convince us of their secular credentials, the communalization of Kashmir is a given reality. Ask a few searching questions and this reality manifests itself. One instance is of a office bearer of the Mirpur press club who initially made a speech in whch he professed his love for his Kashmiri pandit brethren. But once an open interaction started he couldn’t help reveal that when it came to politics he would rather disenfranchise the KP’s because of their preference for India than allow them their right of choice. He was of the opinion that since the Hindus and Sikhs favored India, they should not be allowed any say in the future of Kashmir. Many other people, including politicians and civil society representatives, would eventually come out of the closet and say that Jihad was an article of faith and they couldn’t denounce it. One Kashmiri leader from the Valley, Tarimi, first took pains to disabuse us of the fact that the “freedom struggle” in the Valley was a communal movement. But after a few minutes, he started raving and ranting about the perfidy of the KPs and said that they defamed the “freedom struggle” and went on to say that even before the “freedom struggle” started the KPs used to paint the Muslims in black. So much for secular Kashmiriyat!

From whatever little we saw in “Azad” Kashmir, it was clear that there is no one monolithic opinion in the territory. While there was always some dissent about the status of the territory, it appears that the voices of dissent are gaining in strength. Pakistan will probably need to reinvent its role in the territory if it wants to avoid a situation of the sorts that confronts India in Jammu and Kashmir today. There are some signs of Pakistan reversing the destructive policies of proxy war that it has followed in last two decades, and which are now threatening the stability of the Pakistani state itself. While the measures to de-weaponize and dismantle the infrastructure of jihad need to be further strengthened, Pakistan also needs to take some very important political steps in the area if it wants to avoid discontent in the region from bubbling over.

Written on 18th April, 2005

INSIDE PoK : The Gilgit Grumble

“We have nothing in common with Pakistan, neither identity nor culture, nor for that matter do we have any constitutional link with Pakistan. We are under occupation…the oppressive and repressive regime of the army and the agencies have reduced us to being slaves…we have the support of the masses, but they are afraid to support us openly because even if we hold a demonstration cases of sedition and treason are slapped on us…what we want is our right to self-determination”. These are the words of Nawaz Khan Naji, the charismatic leader of the Balawaristan National Front. The BNF represents the nationalists from the Gilgit-Baltistan region (better known as Northern Areas) and is spearheading the demand for an end to Pakistan’s control over the region. The meeting with the BNF and other nationalist elements from both parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (“Azad” Kashmir and Northern Areas), took place first in Muzaffarabad and later in Gilgit.

More than “Azad” Kashmir, the sense of alienation, deprivation and marginalization is very strong in the Northern Areas, where issues of economic deprivation and denial of political freedoms have coupled with sectarian tensions to create an explosive mix. And articulating the grievances of the people in a very logical and coherent manner are people like Nawaz Naji.

The BNF doesn’t consider Gilgit-Baltistan as part of Kashmir. They lay claim to the entire swathe of land from Ladakh to Chitral as a separate region – Balawaristan – which has nothing in common with rest of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. Naji is, however, pragmatic enough to realize that unless they place their demands within the context of the larger Kashmir issue, their voice will get stifled. This, Naji said, is the only way that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan can bring their case on to the world stage and get recognized as a party to dispute. He considers the Balour people as the fourth party to the dispute – the other three being India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris.

But Naji is very clear that as and when the demand for the “right to self determination” is granted to the people of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan cannot be clubbed with rest of the state. The reason for this is simple and lies in the demographic character of the state. Naji said that there are only 2 million people (the official figure is 1 million) in Gilgit-Baltistan, compared to 5 million in Kashmir and some 4 million in Jammu region. He said that it would be gross injustice if the future of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan is to be decided by the overwhelming numbers of Jammu and Kashmir regions. This is the reason why Naji welcomed General Musharraf’s proposal to identify seven regions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and treat them all separately. This was perhaps the first time that the Northern Areas were included by Pakistan as part of the Kashmir dispute.

While Naji has no love lost for Pakistan, he accepts that Pakistan's position on the Kashmir dispute suits the people of Gilgit-Baltistan more than the Indian position. He said the Indian position talks of a united Kashmir in which the smaller nationalities and communities tend to lose out. On the other hand, Musharraf’s latest proposal takes into account the demands of the smaller communities.

Unlike most other people in PoK who are in denial over the communal underpinnings of the Kashmir issue, Naji openly accepts that Muslim majoritarianism is the guiding force behind the Kashmir dispute. He believes that the partition of India was the result of communalization and doesn’t mince his words in saying that when countries come into existence on the basis of a sectarian/communal ideology, this pernicious ideology then gets state sanction and pervades the psyche of the people. Despite opposition to Pakistan, Naji is under no illusion that if the choice before the people of Gilgit-Baltistan is limited to choosing between India and Pakistan, then geography and religion will ensure that the people choose Pakistan. However, if there is an option of independence, then an overwhelming majority will opt for that.

Naji is convinced that there is no shortage of secular and nationalist forces in Kashmir, but these forces are suppressed through fear, harassment and terror by the radical elements that operate under the patronage of the state. He said that while Indians talk of communalism only in terms of Hindu-Muslim differences, in Gilgit-Baltistan the issue was of sectarian – i.e. Shia-Sunni – tensions. He claimed that as a proportion probably the same number of people have dies in sectarian clashes in the Northern Areas as have dies in the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. He is convinced that without international intervention these forces will never be reined in.

In no area under Pakistan's control is the Shia-Sunni divide as deep as it is in the Northern Areas. Everything in the Northern Areas is seen in terms of the sectarian divide. According to the local Balawaristan National Front leadership, the Pakistani agencies use sectarianism as a tool in its policy of divide-and-rule. They claim that the situation is so delicate in the region that even a small spark can set off a communal conflagration. The BNF leadership is convinced that the virus of sectarianism has affected the entire body politic and will take a long time before the region regains a semblance of sectarian harmony.

Mirza Nadir Hassan, a member of the Gilgit-Baltistan Thinkers Forum, believes that Pakistan has deliberately deprived Gilgit-Baltistan the right to self-rule because it fears a Shia state might come into existence. He alleged that the entire top civil and political administration in Gilgit-Baltistan was in the hands of the Sunnis and the government of Pakistan had brought in the Frontier Corp (overwhelmingly Sunni in composition) to ostensibly maintain law and order, but in reality to keep a check on the Shias. So virulent is Hassan’s opposition to Sunni domination that he even called the current Chief Executive of the Northern Areas (the minister for Kashmir affairs sitting in Islamabad) Faisal Saleh Hayat a “so-called Shia”. He complained that the class composition of the Northern Light Infantry had been changed after the Kargil war. The local component in NLI was reduced to only 45% and 90% of NLI units have been shifted down-country so that non-locals could be recruited in this regiment. As a former army officer, he appealed to the Indian government to put pressure on the Pakistan government to accept the bodies of NLI soldiers who died during the Kargil conflict. He even alleged that while bodies of Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers were accepted by Pakistan, it refused to accept the bodies of the NLI soldiers.

The sectarian divide aside, the real problem in the Northern Areas appears to be the denial of all civil and political rights. As a member of the BNF put it, if the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have no right to vote in the Pakistani parliament, then how can the Pakistani laws apply in the region? How can any Pakistani law be imposed in the Northern Areas if the territory is not covered by the Pakistani constitution. In other words, the denial of the right to vote and right to self rule lies at the heart of the political sense of deprivation that pervades the region. Dr G. Abbas, Convenor Gilgit-Baltistan Thinkers Forum points to the double talk that the Pakistani establishment indulges in when the demand for self-rule if put forward. He says that on one hand Pakistan argues that there is no dispute over the future status of the Northern Areas, while on the other hand when self-rule is demanded, Pakistan says it is not possible as the area is part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.

According to Dr Abbas although “Azad” Kashmir is under Pakistan's occupation, that territory at least has an elected prime minister and legislature. He wonders why a similar right has been denied to the people of Northern Areas. He derided the so-called Northern Areas legislative council and said it has no real powers to pass any legislation. In the last five years the NALC has not been able to pass a single piece of legislation. He alleged that elections in Northern Areas are completely rigged and only the favorites of Pakistan are allowed to win in the polls. He expressed the fear that these ‘lackeys’ of Pakistan will in future be used to decide the genuine representatives of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Compounding the problem created by denial of political rights is the lack of sensitivity of the Pakistani state towards the identity, culture and aspirations of the local population. Being a sparsely populated area, the people are very particular about maintaining the demographic character of the region. This was ensured to an extent by the state subject rules that did not allow anyone from outside the Jammu and Kashmir state to settle in the state. Over the years, however, while the state subject rules have survived in “Azad” Kashmir, in the Northern Areas they have been violated and outsiders (mostly Sunni Pashtuns) have been settled in the area, changing the demographic character of large parts of the region.

Dr Abbas articulates this grievance and says that the Pakistani establishment has tried to erase the identity of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan over the last 50 years by calling the region ‘Northern Areas’. He alleges that the culture of the region was sought to be changed by settling Pashtuns in Gilgit. He gives the example of the historical market in Gilgit that was demolished and a new market built in which over 90% of the shops were allotted to ‘outsiders’. He lamented that all heads of departments are non-locals who in turn dole out favors to their friends and relatives as far as the lucrative China trade is concerned. He points to the development statistics – over 60% of people living below poverty line, literacy level among the lowest in Pakistan, no major infrastructure except the Karakorum highway – and accuses Pakistan of deliberately keeping the region backward.

The demand for greater political rights so that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan can govern themselves and maintain their culture and identity, has now reached a point where it has transformed into a demand for an independent state. That this has happened in a region whose people took pride in the fact that they were the first in the state of Jammu and Kashmir to rise in rebellion against the Dogra rule and declare accession to Pakistan, speaks volumes for the Pakistani establishment’s efforts at national integration.

While both mainstream and nationalist political parties in Northern Areas have gathered together under the umbrella of Gilgit-Baltistan National Alliance to press for their demand for getting a political status similar to “Azad” Kashmir, the demand for an independent state is being articulated by the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), which represents nationalist parties from both parts of PoK and includes the BNF and Karakorum National Movement from the Northern Areas. According to the APNA Secretary General, Arif Shahid, for over fifty years the Pakistani state obstructed contacts between the people of Northern Areas and “Azad” Kashmir. The APNA is now trying to coordinate the activities of all the nationalist groups in PoK with the objective of evolving a consensus about the future political set-up in the region. The APNA is demanding the right to self-determination from both India and Pakistan. At the very minimum the APNA wants all restrictions of trade, travel, political contacts between the two parts of PoK and between PoK and Jammu and Kashmir to be lifted.

In recent years the nationalists have gained a lot of support for their cause in the Northern Areas. In the markets of Gilgit, the BNF and other nationalists appear to enjoy overwhelming support of the locals. Many of the journalists we spoke to would in private tell us that the nationalists are gaining ground and an ever increasing number of people are attracted to their cause. But the situation has still not reached a point of no return.

According to Eiman Shah, vice chairman of the Gilgit Zila Council, the atrocities by the Pakistani agencies and corruption of the bureaucracy has shifted support in favor of the nationalists. He said the sheer ineffectiveness of the NALC – it has no real legislative powers and cannot even pass a resolution without the concurrence of the bureaucracy, the Deputy Chief Executive (who is supposed to be the effective head of the NALC) has to seek an appointment to meet the Home Secretary and Chief Secretary and gets his instructions from the local ISI chief, the entire upper bureaucracy (from Assistant Commissioner upwards) is from ‘down country’ – has only contributed to the growing popularity of the nationalists. However, Eiman Shah is convinced that a solution to the problem lies in finding the middle ground between being part of Pakistan and becoming independent. He believes neither of the two extremes is possible.

There is no doubt that the pro-independence movement is gaining in strength in the Northern Areas. It is also clear that the nationalists are well organised and quite committed to their cause. But their support at the mass level is still unclear. The nationalists claim that the climate of fear that hangs over the Northern Areas prevents people from openly supporting the pro-independence movement. But if Pakistan was to take some steps that satisfy the political aspirations of the people, chances are that the pro-independence movement could lose a lot of steam.

Even otherwise, the nationalists suffer some very basic problems. Most of the leadership is based not in the Northern Areas but in Rawalpindi, right under the nose of the Pakistani military establishment. Already serious attempts are being made to break the fledgling alliance of the nationalists, APNA. According to Sardar Ishtiaq Hussain Khan, Secretary Information (APNA), many senior leaders have been bought over by either blandishment or blackmail. He said the close surveillance by the Pakistani agencies on those seeking independence and the plethora of cases (including sedition and treason) imposed on pro-independence activists has not allowed the demand for independence become a mass movement.

Sardar Ishtiaq’s remarks do raise suspicions even about organisations like APNA. For instance, the JKLF (Yasin Malik) faction is a member of APNA, even though Yasin Malik is known to be a known agent of the Pakistani intelligence agencies. On the other hand, the JKLF (Amanullah Khan) faction is not a member of APNA on the ostensible grounds that Amanullah Khan does the bidding of the Pakistani establishment. And this despite the fact that if there is one person who has suffered at the hands of the Pakistani establishment in terms of resources and patronage it is Amanullah Khan.

While the oppressive and intrusive role of the Pakistani state is a major constraint, the nationalists also suffer from a certain lack of clarity on what they want and how to get it. Apart from Naji, most other leaders we met were confused about how they could achieve their objective. For instance, Mirza Nadir Hasan believes that any solution to the Kashmir issue is not possible without the involvement of at least a score of countries – all the neighboring countries (including the central Asian states), all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Iran as a representative of the Shias, Saudi Arabia as a Sunni state, the OIC as a representative of the Muslims, Nepal as a Hindu state and Japan to represent the Buddhists! Arif Shahid of APNA is realistic enough to understand that the demands of the nationalists are not going to be conceded in a hurry. But he believes that the way the situation is evolving, nearly 70% of their demands will be met. But ask him what he means by 70%, and there is no answer. Similarly, others talk of a United States of Kashmir, with three entities – Kashmir, Jammu and Gilgit-Baltistan. But how this fits into the aspiration for complete independence and freedom from the majoritarianism of the Kashmiris is not clear. The left leaning National Students Federation still sticks to the old imperialist conspiracy theory, and yet wants international intervention. Finally, there is confusion over what sort of struggle needs to be waged to get the Pakistani state to concede their demands.

Be that as it may, there is trouble brewing for Pakistan in the Northern Areas, where the apathy of the Pakistani state is fuelling the sentiment in favor of independence. Much of this trouble can be sorted out if the government of Pakistan was to actually follow the policy of ‘enlightened moderation’ and along with this respect the rights of ethnic minorities living under Pakistani rule. Moreover, a more liberal political set-up with elected and empowered legislatures will go a long way in addressing the political grievances of the people. But time is running short. Unless Pakistan moves fast to address the issues being raised by the nationalists, there is every chance of alienation with Pakistan growing to the point of no return in the Northern Areas.

Written on 15th March 2005

DON’T GIVE UP ON MUSHARRAF, JUST YET

Reports of terrorists training camps in Pakistan being reopened, rising cases of infiltration from across the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir and the fact that so far no concrete action has been taken to uproot the jihadi infrastructure, have once again raised doubts about General Pervez Musharraf’s commitment to the peace process with India. But despite all the negative developments in recent weeks, Musharraf remains the one man on whom the future of Pakistan and indeed the peace process between India and Pakistan depends critically. One is aware that many people will roll their eyeballs in utter frustration at this proposition, because this is exactly what has been said about every individual who has ever ruled Pakistan. There are however very valid reasons for cutting some slack for Musharraf, but without compromising either India’s vital national and security interests or lowering the pressure on the General to delivering on his agenda of ‘enlightened moderation’.

Howsoever imperfectly, Musharraf is trying to reverse everything that Gen. Ziaul Haque did to Pakistan in the name of Islam. Musharraf’s public pronouncements against the fundamentalist and radical groups are quite revolutionary, at least in the Pakistani context. No one else in Pakistan has tried to take on the radical Islam, even if this is only verbally, the way Musharraf has. He has spoken in favor of reform of madrasas, blasted the closed mindset and petty thinking of the Maulvis and openly called upon the people to defeat the Islamists in elections, favored celebrating traditional festivals like Basant, reformed the political system by introducing joint electorates for religious minorities and reserving seats for women, and tried to introduce reform in the school curriculum and give it a more secular look. His general liberal approach has allowed the Pakistani society to breathe much easier and more freely than it has done in the last 25 years. Most of all he has tried to get off the Kashmir hobby-horse of the Pakistani military and religious establishment.

In Musharraf’s case, his evolution from a time he was an unabashed jihadi general, to a time when he thought he could run with the Jihadi hare and hunt with the American hound, to now when he is emerging as an outspoken critic of Islamic radicalism and a man ‘with a new heart’ on India, has been quite remarkable. It can however be argued, and quite correctly, that despite his efforts to put Pakistan on a moderate path, nothing has really changed – the madrasas keep spouting poison, the state schools curriculum has not changed in any significant manner, the minorities continue to be third-class citizens, the Islamists continue to do their own thing without much let or hindrance from the state. And yet, the fact remains that Musharraf has gone much further than all the so-called liberal and moderate political forces in trying to put Pakistan along a moderate path.

Musharraf’s critics continue place a great deal of faith in democracy to pull Pakistan out of the rut of radicalism. But the ground reality in Pakistan militates against such misplaced faith in the so-called liberal and moderate political forces. When, if ever, have these political forces ever spoken out as openly as Musharraf has done against Islamic fundamentalism? If anything, they have been duplicitous on the issue of both radical Islam and peace with India and have always hidden behind the coat-tails of the army to hide their duplicity.

Many will argue that the overwhelming and overbearing influence of the army in Pakistan's politics never allowed civilian politicians to really speak up against the fundamentalists. And since now the army itself has, at least ostensibly, undergone a paradigm shift on the issue of radical Islam and even India, the civilian politicians will be able to come into their own. But the corollary to this logic is that the civilians still follow the lead of the army. And if this is the case then why not deal with the army itself. What is more, many Pakistani analysts have commented that a civilian politician would have resisted international pressure to change course much more than Musharraf has done. If indeed this is the case, then it makes more sense to have someone like Musharraf at the helm rather than a politician who would try to hedge his bets and not go the whole distance in eradicating radical Islam.

Of course, Musharraf’s task of ridding Pakistan of Zia’s poisonous legacy is not easy. The virus of radicalism has spread too far into Pakistan's body politic. As things stand, Musharraf is today deeply unpopular in Pakistan not only because of the paradigm shift he is trying to bring about in the country but also because of his close relationship with the US and his peace overtures to India. While his ever growing unpopularity is a statement on how difficult his task is in reforming Pakistan, it also is an indication of how limited his space for maneuver is.

Musharraf’s problems are compounded by the fact that he has not been able to effectively sell his agenda for either political reform or the peace process. While the political opposition will not lose any chance to pull him down by accusing him of a sell-out, even the commitment of his own camp followers is suspect. His political partners – the ruling PML – are conservative with leanings towards fundamentalists and even as Musharraf raves and rants against radical Islamists, his own ministers, like Ejazul Haq (son of Ziaul Haque) pay eulogies to suicide bombers and express the desire to follow their path. He is unable to rope in parties with liberal pretensions like the PPP because of political compulsions. His core constituency – the army – too is not very comfortable with the direction and pace he is setting, especially since there is very little on offer as far as the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir is concerned. Another major problem Musharraf suffers from is that like any military officer he believes that once he has issued orders they are deemed to have been implemented. But this is hardly the case, with the bureaucracy and intelligence agencies playing their own games, especially when it comes to cracking down on the jihadi groups which they have nurtured for so long. This factor, coupled with exigencies of politics, that has often forced him to backtrack on some steps he has announced with great fanfare, has dented his credibility.

The big question therefore is: can Musharraf deliver? As things stand, Musharraf is fast running out of both time and options. His efforts to politically and socially isolate the jihadis have not worked. Nor have attempts to tighten the leash on the Islamists by banning radical groups, withdrawing open state patronage to them, closing down their fund collection machinery, and asking jihadis to furnish certificates of good behavior. Since the Islamists are simply not going to fade away from the scene, the only real option left is to eliminate them and their poisonous ideology by carrying out a Stalinist purge against them. But this will have massive political and social repercussions and could well ‘capsize the boat of the Pakistani state’.


The critical question before India and the West is how they can push Musharraf to do what is required to close down the Jihad factory in Pakistan. At the same time, they will have to devise measures that make Musharraf’s task easier, but without compromising either their commitment against Islamic terrorism or their own vital national and security interests. If India and the West give up on Musharraf now and don’t help him pull Pakistan out of the spiral of Islamic radicalism in which the country is caught, there is a real danger of losing an excellent opportunity to bring back from the brink ‘the most dangerous country in the world’.

Written on 3rd August, 2005

Are Muslims in Denial?

MOST of the reactions from across the Islamic world to the London bombings have been remarkably similar. While condemning the bombing, almost everyone has pointed out to the “root causes” that have spawned Islamic terrorism. These “root causes” range from alienation and lack of assimilation in Western societies to “Islamic rage” at the perceived “injustices” being perpetrated on hapless Muslims around the world (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Palestine - the list is endless) and from the political expression of anger against illegitimate dictators and monarchs who are ruling over Muslim countries with the support of the West, to the abysmal social and economic conditions in the Islamic world.

But the implicit justification offered by the so-called moderate Muslims to acts of terrorism by pointing out at the “root causes” begs the question: does the “root cause” lie in social, political and economic conditions in Muslim societies or do they lie in the religion itself? Do the root causes lie in “grievances” or do they lie in the way Islam is perceived, taught and imbibed by its followers?

To say that “no religion teaches hatred” is utter nonsense. The fact of the matter is ALL religions teach hatred (anyone who disagrees needs to read “Religion in Politics” by Arun Shourie). They also teach love and compassion and tolerance. What matters is the ruling paradigm of any religion at any point of time, and this depends on what the followers of a religion make of their faith. Until the separation of the Church from the State, Christianity was hardly a religion of peace - remember the inquisitions and the desire to “harvest the souls of heathens and pagans” by whatever means necessary. However, today, Christians, if not their Church and priests, are far more tolerant of other religions and cultures.

Hinduism too has its share of institutionalised hatred. It is hardly important whether the obnoxious caste system has religious sanction or not. What is important is that many practising Hindus still discriminate against the so-called lower castes. But caste discrimination, while it still exists, is no longer the ruling paradigm of Hindu religion. Whether this is the result of a political churning taking place in the country or the result of “enlightenment” is hardly an issue.

In the case of Islam, there is enough religious sanction available to justify terrorism. In Pakistan, for example, terrorism is an essential part of military strategy and derives inspiration from the Quran. In his book, “Quranic concept of War”, Brig S.K. Malik writes, “Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is an end in itself”, and finds justification for this in the Quranic verse Anfal (Sura 12) which reads as “Remember, the Lord inspired the angels (with the message), “I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will instil terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers”. Thus, for every Quranic verse that preaches love, brotherhood and equality of man, there is another verse that preaches the opposite.

Therefore, to say that “suicide bombing” is an un-Islamic act is simply a matter of how someone interprets and understands the religion. Those who tie bombs around their bodies and blow themselves up actually believe that they are waging war in Allah’s name. Those who blew up the Bamiyan Buddhas also thought they were doing God’s work. The problem in Islam today is that the ruling paradigm is increasingly gravitating towards violence and intolerance. The moderate and enlightened voices are getting snuffed out by their failure to take an unambiguous stand against terrorism. Every time they mention “root causes” in the same breath as they condemn an act of terrorism they effectively end up providing a tacit justification for terrorism.

What is more, this state of denial prevents a deeper soul-searching within the community on the direction the religion is taking and prevents any course correction. An example of this is the position Pakistani leaders take on the issue of jihad, which they consider (probably for political reasons) to be obligatory in their religion. Of course, for political and diplomatic reasons again, they will put a spin on what constitutes jihad. But the signals this sends out are, to say the least ambiguous.

Even the so-called “root causes” need a closer examination. There is a lot of anger in the Islamic world over the civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pakistani Press and TV channels like Al-Jazeera have been in the vanguard of using these casualties to implicitly justify terrorist acts in Iraq and Afghanistan and indeed in the rest of the world. But there is a great difference between the “collateral damage” in Iraq and Afghanistan and terrorist attacks on civilian targets. The American or British troops have never deliberately aimed at the civilians and, in fact, the entire US hi-tech military capability is designed to limit civilian casualties to the minimum. On the other hand, the terrorist who targeted the Twin Towers in New York, or the trains in Madrid or the Tube in London, were deliberately targeting civilians and non-combatants.

Another very important point that is often missed in any discussion on Iraq or Afghanistan is: Who has caused maximum civilian casualties? The fact of the matter is that most of the civilian casualties in Iraq, Afghanistan or even Kashmir have been caused by the “holy warriors” or jihadis. In Kashmir, for example, even though most of the civilian casualties have been caused by the terrorists, this fact is often glossed over by the Pakistani propaganda machine because it is so inconvenient.

Such is the state of denial in Pakistan over the barbarism of its proxies in Kashmir that even the most blatant acts of terror are explained away by blaming them on “Indian agents”. This tendency of not accepting the blame for what their co-religionists and compatriots do was again on display when the Pakistani ambassador to the UN, Mr Munir Akram, called Britain “a breeding ground for terrorists too…(it) has its own radical preachers and now home-grown suicide bombers” and glossed over the role his own country played in turning these people into human bombs. But this state of denial is not only limited to the Pakistanis. It also extends to their proxies in Kashmir, like the APHC, the JKLF and others. Why else would they deny the religious cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley and in turn blame it on the then Governor, Mr Jagmohan. In fact, by cleansing the valley of the Pandits, the separatists proved that their movement was not one of national liberation but inspired by a nationalism based on religion.

The bottom line is that today the Muslims are working themselves into a victimisation psychosis and driving the world towards a “clash of civilisations”. In this the responsibility lies with Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan which have propagated and promoted radical Islam for achieving political and diplomatic objectives. Instead of cosmetic measures like crackdowns on radical groups every time there is an international incident, what is required is the rooting out of the entire infrastructure that has given rise to radical Islam.

It is also the responsibility of ordinary Muslims to snatch their faith from the “thekedars” of Islam, who are pushing them towards radicalism, and base their faith on the more benign rather than aggressive and regressive aspects of their religion. Finally, it is critical that no justification is provided to terrorism by talking of “root causes”. The war against Islamic terrorism has to be really fought within Islamic societies if a “clash of civilisations” is to be avoided.

Published in The Tribune 5th August, 2005